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The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1937-1938 Term*
It is intended in this survey to examine the work of the highest appellate court of Louisiana during the last judicial yearfrom October 1937 to August 1938.1 This will be done by furnishing statistical studies of the judicial business handled, together
with a panoramic topical consideration of the more important developments in the jurisprudence during the period considered.
In this manner, attention will be focused upon general trends in
the progress of the law as evidenced in the decided cases, emphasis will be laid upon matters of importance and some discussion will be given to a variety of subjects of interest.
I.

STATISTICAL SURVEY

The various tables prepared in the statistical survey reveal a
number of interesting facts. During its 1937-1938 term, the Supreme Court disposed of 268 cases in written opinions. 2 The corresponding figures for each of the four preceding terms were: in
1933-34, 371 (an average of 53 cases per judge); in 1934-35, 341
(average of 48 cases per judge); in 1935-36, 268 (38 cases per
judge); and in 1936-37, 252 (36 cases per judge). The fact that
the number of cases disposed of annually has remained substantially the same in the past three terms after an abrupt drop from
48 to 38 cases per judge between the 1934-35 and 1935-36 terms, is
largely reflected in and explained by the number of cases filed in
the Supreme Court during each of the years mentioned above. In
* This symposium has been contributed by the members of the faculty
of Louisiana State University Law School as follows: Statistical SurveyPaul M. Hebert and Carlos E. Lazarus; Procedure, Security Contracts, Prescription, Insurance-Henry G. McMahon; Family Law, Successions, Mineral
Rights-Harriet S. Daggett; Conventional Obligations-J. Denson Smith;
Sale, Lease, Partnership, Banking and Negotiable Instruments-Paul M.
Hebert; Torts and Workmen's Compensation, Public Law-Thomas A. Cowan;
Criminal Law and Procedure-Jerome Hall; Bankruptcy-Ira S. Flory; Corporations-Dale E. Bennett.
1. This Rzvizw will make a similar survey each year, and a survey of the
work of the Louisiana Legislature will be made after each legislative session.
Cf. Hebert and Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1938 (1938) 1 LOUISIANA
LAW REvIEw 80.

2. This tabulation includes all cases for the 1937-38 term officially reported
in Volumes -188, 189, and 190 of the Louisiana Reports.
[314]
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1933-34 the total number of cases docketed in the Supreme Court,
including applications for writs, was 538; in 1934-35, 525; in 193536, 493; in 1936-37, 494.3
These figures indicate that the Supreme Court, at the present
time, is keeping abreast of its judicial business in that it disposes
annually of a number of cases practically equivalent to the number of new matters docketed in the Court. Thus Table I shows
that, with a total of 478 cases (including 213 writ applications)
filed during the 1937-38 term, 459 cases (including 191 writ applications) were actually disposed of. This was an average of 65.6
matters per member of the Court.
During 1937-38, a total of 163 applications for rehearings were
considered. Yet, despite the fact that rehearings were granted in
only 13 instances (7.9%), a substantial portion of the Court's time
must be devoted to their consideration (see Table VII).4
In view of the Supreme Court's heavy burden of reviewing
both the law and the facts in all civil cases 5 and the additional
constitutional mandate requiring at least two justices to read
each record,( the disposition of such a large number of matters at
each term is noteworthy-particularly so since the Court does not
employ the memorandum opinion found so useful in other juris7
dictions.
3. The figures covering the number of cases filed in the Supreme Court
are those furnished from the Office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana. The cooperation received from the Clerk and his assistants is
here gratefully acknowledged.
4. In a few other jurisdictions congested dockets have been partially attributed to increase in the number of applications for rehearing. For discussion of this problem see Cook, The Rehearing Evil (1928) 14 Iowa L. Bull. 36.
The large number of applications for rehearings does not present as serious a
problem in Louisiana as it does in some other states because there is no oral
argument on the application. Art. 913, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
5. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
6. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 6.
7. For example, in Wisconsin, a Rule of Court provides: "In cases where
the order or judgment is affirmed, opinions will not hereafter be written unless the questions involved be deemed by this court of such special importance
or difficulty as to demand treatment in an opinion.. ." The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin in 1934-35 disposed of 85 cases amounting to 23.1% of the cases before it in memorandum opinion. The Work of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
for the August 1934, and January 1935, Terms (1935) 11 Wis. L. Rev. 5, 6, 8-9.
The use of the memorandum opinion might easily be resorted to in Louisiana
as a means of lightening the burden imposed on our appellate courts. But
cf. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 1: " . . . The judges of all courts shall
refer to the law and adduce the reasons on which every definitive judgment is
founded." However, this latter provision should prove no obstacle to the
adoption of the memorandum opinion in Louisiana in the light of (1) the accepted practice of using abbreviated opinions in cases closely connected with
others decided with written opinions; and (2) the practice of not assigning
detailed reasons when writs are denied, despite the provisions of La. Const. of
1921, Art. VII, § 2.
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Of a total of 209 cases appealed from the District Courts
throughout the State, 67% of the judgments were affirmed, 20%
were reversed and 13% were modified or otherwise disposed of
(see Table II). In 34 cases considering decisions of the Courts of
Appeal on writs of review, only 26.5% were affirmed, 58.8% were
reversed and 14.7% were modified or otherwise disposed of (see
Tables II and III).
The classifications in Table IV are arbitrarily chosen for the
purpose of topical analysis since many of the cases obviously involve more than one legal point. The tabulation is, therefore, based
upon the main subject matter to which the decisions relate. It is
especially significant that 18.7% of the cases deal with Criminal
Law and Procedure. The next largest groups include: Procedure
and Practice-12.7%; Divorce-6.4%; Succession matters-6.4%;
Torts and Workmen's Compensation-6.4%; Mineral Rights6.0%; Taxation-5.2%; Insurance-3.4%.
The bulk of the litigation reaching the Supreme Court is on
appeal from the District Courts, such appeals accounting for 78%
of the reported cases while only 12.7% were on writs of review to
the Courts of Appeal (see Table V). The geographical analysis
of appeals from the District Courts reveals that the parish of Orleans gave rise to 21.3% of the cases so appealed, the parish of
Caddo provided 13.1%, East Baton Rouge parish sent 6%, and the
other parishes supplied the remaining 59.6% (see Table VI).

TABLE I
VOLUME OF JUDICIAL BUSINESS
Cases disposed of with written opinions ..................................
Applications for writs considered ........................................
Applications for rehearings disposed of ..................................
Cases docketed during 1937-38 term (excluding writ applications) ........
Applications for writs filed during 1937-38 term ..........................
Total matters docketed during 1937-38 term ..............................
Total cases handled by the Court (excluding rehearing applications) ....
Grand total of matters handled (including rehearing applications) ......

268
191
163
265
213
478
459
622
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TABLE II
DISPOSITION OF LITIGATION
On
Certi-

orari

On

On

Appeal

On

Appeal

or
Review

Supervisory

Certificate

from
District
Courts

from
City
Courts

Appellate
Courts

to
District
Courts

Courts
of
Appeal

On

Affirmed ...............
Amended and affirmed.
Reversed and rendered.
Affirmed In part and
reversed in part ......
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded ...........
Reversed and remanded
Remanded on motion...
Reversed and judgment
of lower court reinstated ...............
Motion to dismiss appeals granted ........
Motion to dismiss appeals refused ........
Motion to dismiss writs
of certiorari or review granted ..........
Motion for re-entry of
judgment granted ......
Transferred to Court of
Appeals for lack of
jurisdiction ..........
Writs made peremptory
Writs made peremptory
in part, recalled in
part .................
Writs recalled ...........
Certified questions
answered ..............
Petitions dismissed ......
TOTALS ............

140
11
29

2

from

Writs

9
2
9

from

..
..

On

Original
Jurisdiction

TOTAL

151
13
38

..
..

2
1

1
13
1

8

..

o

3.
7.

o1

1
2.

..

209

2

34

..

11

..

1
7

19

1

..

11

2

o.

2

2
2

1
2

1
268

..
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TABLE III
DISPOSITION OF CASES REVIEWED ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
FROM COURTS OF APPEAL

Affirmed .............................
Amended and affirmed ................
Reversed and rendered ..............
Reversed in part and affirmed in part
Affirmed in part, reversed in part
and remanded ...................
Reversed and remanded ...............
Court of appeal reversed and lower
court judgment reinstated ......
Writs dismissed .......................
TOTALS ............................

Parish
of
Orleans
4
2

First
Circuit
3
1
1

1

....

Second
Circuit
2
1
6

1
1
2

1
3

3
..

8
1

15

34

..
"1
2
9

3
1
10

TOTAL
9
2
9

TABLE IV
TOPICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS
Attorneys ...........................................................
Banking and Negotiable Instruments ......................................
Bankruptcy ..............................................................
Carriers ..................................................................
Constitutional Law .......................................................
Conventional Obligations .................................................
Corporations .............................................................
C ourts ....................................................................
Criminal Law and Procedure ............................................
D ivorce .................................................................
Expropriation ............................................................
Father and Child .........................................................
H usband and W ife .......................................................
Insane Persons ...........................................................
Insurance ................................................................
L abor Law ...............................................................
L ease ....................................................................
M ineral R ights ...........................................................
M inors and Tutorship ....................................................
M ortgages ................................................................
Partnership ..............................................................
P ledge ...................................................................
Practice and Procedure ..................................................
P rescription ..............................................................
Receivers and Receivership Procedure .................................
Sale ......................................................................
Schools and School Districts .............................................
Statutes .................................................................
Successions ..............................................................
Suretyship ................................................................
T axation .................................................................
Torts and Workmen's Compensation ......................................
Trade Marks and Trade Names ...........................................
Telegraphs and Telephones ..............................................

2
5
2
5
9
9
4
8
50
17
1
1
2
1
10
1
2
16
2
5
1
2
34
9
3
9
2
4
17
2
14
17
1
1
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TABLE V
JURISDICTIONAL ORIGIN OF CASES
Appeals from District Courts ............................................
Appeals from City Courts ................................................
On Writs of Review from Courts of Appeal ..............................
Questions certified by Courts of Appeal ...............................
On Supervisory Writs to District Courts ................................
Petitions and Motions in Supreme Court ................................
TO TAL

.............................................................

209
2
34
2
19
2
268

TABLE VI
GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF APPEALS FROM DISTRICT COURTS
No. of

Parish

Cases

Arcadia ........................
Ascension ......................
Beauregard .....................
Bienville ........................
Bossier .........................
Caddo ..........................
Calcasieu .......................
Claiborne .......................
Concordia ......................
DeSoto .........................
East Baton Rouge ..............
Evangeline .....................
Franklin ........................
Grant ..........................
Iberia ..........................
Jackson ........................
Jefferson .......................
Jefferson Davis ................
Lafourche ......................
LaSalle ..........
..............
Lincoln ........................
Livingston ......................
M adison ........................
Morehouse ......................

5
1
2
2
2
35
4
3
2
3
16
1
1
1
1
1
6
2
2
2
3
2
1
3

Parish

No. of
Cases

Natchitoches ...................
2
Ouachita .......................
8
Orleans Criminal ...............
5
Orleans Civil ...................
52
Pointe Coupee ..................
1
Rapides ........................
8
Red River ......................
1
Sabine ..........................
2
St. Bernard ....................
2
St. H elena ......................
1
St. John the Baptist ...........
1
St. Landry ..................... 1
St. M artin ......................
1
St. M ary ........................
2
St. Tammany ...................
1
Tangipahoa ....................
7
Terrebonne .....................
3
Union ..........................
2
Washington ....................
2
W ebster ........................
4
W est Carroll ...................
1
Winn ...........................
1
TOTAL ......................

209
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TABLE VII
DISPOSITION OF APPLICATIONS FOR WRITS AND REHEARINGS
Number
163
191

Applications for Rehearings ..................
Applications for Writs ........................
TOTALS .................................

Granted Refused
13
150
40
151

354

53

301

TABLE VIII
DISSENTS*
Concurrence
in written
With
Opinion

Without
Opinion

dissenting
opinion

10

11
2

1

"1
1
2
1

....

O'Niell, C. J ......................
Fournet, J ........................
Higgins, J ........................
Land, J..........................
Odom, J .........................
Ponder, J ......................
Rogers, J ........................

14

1
..

2

TOTAL

22
2
1
1
17
1
2

TOTALS ....................
15
29
2
46
* In cases wherein rehearings have been granted, the dissents here tabulated are those from the opinion on rehearing. Dissents from the original
opinions therein have not been included, since in such cases the final opinion
of the court is that rendered on the rehearing. Total number of cases in
which dissents were expressed-33.

II.PROCEDURE
For the past decade the decisions of the Supreme Court have,
on the whole, evidenced a marked trend towards a liberality of
procedure. With but one possible exception, it will be seen that all
of the cases involving adjective law decided during the past term
show that the momentum of this movement has not diminished.
While the majority of these decisions required little more than the
application of rudimentary principles, at least two cases were of
landmark importance.
COURTS. In O'Brien v. Delta Air Corporation,' it was again
held that a court having territorial jurisdiction over the place
where a contract of carriage was breached had jurisdiction ratione
personae to try an action in damages therefor.
Three cases involved the exercise of the authority of Louisi1. 188 La. 911, 178 So. 489 (1938).
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ana courts to restrain the prosecution, by Louisiana citizens, of
transitory causes of action in the courts of other states. In two
of these cases, 2 the court restrained a Louisiana citizen from suing other Louisiana citizens or corporations in the courts of Mississippi, where the purpose of such suits was to take advantage of
the materially different substantive law of the latter state. In the
third case," however, the court refused to enjoin the prosecution
of an action instituted by a Louisiana citizen in the Mississippi
courts-the accident having occurred in the latter state, and the
action being brought against a Louisiana corporation and its agent,
who was a resident of Mississippi. All of the plaintiff's witnesses
were citizens of Mississippi. The mere inconvenience to which
the defendant Louisiana corporation was subject was held insufficient, in the face of the above facts, to justify any restraining of
the Mississippi litigation.
EXCEPTIONS.

The trite principle that the well pleaded allega-

tions of the petition must be deemed admitted for the purposes of
the trial of an exception of no cause of action was affirmed by two
cases.4 The similarly well settled rule that a vague petition is not
ordinarily subject to the exception of no cause of action was also
affirmed.5
Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Jones6 involved exceptions which were more interesting than meritbrious. When the
record in a former suit on the same subject matter disappeared
from the files of the court, plaintiff instituted a new suit, and in
the second petition recited that he took a nonsuit in the former
action. All costs of the first suit were paid to defendant. The defendant's exception of lis pendens was properly held by the court
to be frivolous. Defendant also moved unsuccessfully to recuse
the judge-ad-hoc, alleging inter alia that since his appointment
plaintiff's representatives and counsel had visited his office several times. Defendant also excepted to plaintiff's corporate capacity on the ground that, since there was no allegation of the payment of its corporation franchise tax, it lacked capacity to bring
the suit. Since no statute prohibits a Louisiana corporation from
using the courts unless it first pays its franchise tax, this excep2. Natalbany Lumber Co. v. McGraw, 188 La. 863, 178 So. 377 (1938); Daniels v. McGraw, 188 La. 874, 178 So. 380 (1938).
3. New Orleans Brewing Co. v. CahalU, 188 La. 749, 178 So. 339 (1937).
4. Ward v. Leche, 189 La. 113, 179 So. 52 (1938); Dusenbury v. Board of
Com'rs, etc., 190 La. 694, 182 So. 719 (1938).
5. Brunson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 189 La. 743, 180 So. 506
(1938).
6. 188 La. 519, 177 So. 593 (1937).
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tion was overruled. The nonpayment of this tax was held to be
a matter personal to the state.
Two cases involved the nonjoinder of parties. In one,7 the
court held that in an action to enjoin a school board from executing a contract alleged to have been let illegally, the person to
whom the contract was awarded was a necessary party defendant.
The other, Pierce v. Robertson,' again applied the rule that all
beneficiaries under Article 2315 of the Civil Code must join in any
action to recover damages for wrongful death. In the event that
a beneficiary would not join as co-plaintiff, the court held that he
must be made a defendant and ordered to assert his rights as a
plaintiff therein, or be precluded thereafter from asserting them.
One of the most important cases on cumulation of actions
handed down in recent years was Keel v. Rodessa Oil & Land
CoY There, the plaintiff sought to recover an undivided one-third
interest in immovable property. A petitory action against a defendant in possession was cumulated with an action to establish
title brought against another defendant out of possession. Exceptions to the petition on the grounds that it had "improperly [cumulated] distinct causes of action and [had] improperly joined
the parties defendant" were maintained by the trial court. Finding a community of jural interest between the two actions, the
Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed from, overruled
the exceptions and remanded the case for trial. The decision is
thoroughly harmonious with the trend of liberality of practice
which our courts have been following during the past decade. It
is unfortunate that the opinion perpetuated the myth that our
procedure looks to the common law for rules relating to joinder. °
EXECUTORY PROCESS. The most important question presented
in Coreil v. Vidrine" was whether appeal or injunction was the
proper procedure to point out the lack of authentic evidence to
support an order of foreclosure under executory process. The
court, following a number of prior cases, 12 held that appeal was
the proper remedy; and refused to consider the question when it
was presented under a rule nisi for injunctive relief. Contrary
7. State ex rel. James H. Aitken & Sons v. Orleans Parish School Board,
190 La. 193, 182 So. 324 (1938).
8. 190 La. 377, 182 So. 544 (1938).
9. 189 La. 732, 180 So. 502 (1938).
10. On this point, see Flory and McMahon, The New Federal Rules and
Louisiana Practice (1938) 1 LouIsIANA LAW REVIEW 45, 61 n. 120.
11. 188 La. 343, 177 So. 233 (1937).
12. Of the seventeen cases cited by the court (188 La. at 349-350, 177 So.
at 235) in support of its position, the following are not in point: Wood &
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rules have been announced by our Supreme Court on this subject
at various times. Curiously enough, in the only case in which the
conflicting authorities seemed to have been called to the attention of the court,18 it held that injunction was the proper remedy
in such cases. Three cogent reasons seem to require this rule.1
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court has again breathed life
into the contrary view. In Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. Lacoste, 5 the court again held that a proceeding via ordinaria to
enforce a mortgage, prosecuted against a curator ad hoc appointed
to represent the nonresident mortgagor, was a proceeding in rem.
When the plaintiff, which had proceeded to enforce the mortgage
and obtain a personal judgment against the mortgagor, discovered that the latter was a nonresident, it was allowed to convert
the proceeding into one purely in rem to enforce the mortgage,
upon having an attorney at law appointed to represent the absent
defendant.
REAL ACTIONS.

A number of cases on this subject involve

merely the application of rudimentary principles of civil law to
Roane v. Wood, 32 La. Ann. 801 (1880); Miller, Lyon & Co. v. Cappel, 36 La.
Ann. 264 (1884); Van Raalte v. Congregation of the Mission, 39 La. Ann. 617,
2 So. 190 (1887); Buck v. Massie, 109 La. 776, 33 So. 767 (1901); State ex rel.
Pelletier v. Sommerville, Judge, 112 La. 1091, 36 So. 864 (1904). The following
cases cover the point only by way of dictum: Durac v. Ferrari, 25 La. Ann.
80, 81 (1873); Montejo v. Gordy, 33 La. Ann. 1113, 1115 (1881). In addition to
the pertinent cases cited by the court, Bank of Coushatta v. Burch, 177 La.
465, 148 So. 680 (1933) supports its position.
13. Jones v. Bouanchaud, 158 La. 27, 103 So. 393 (1925). Accord: Chambliss
v. Atchison, 2 La. Ann. 488 (1847); Hackemuller v. Figueroa, 125 La. 307, 51 So.
207 (1910). See also, Calhoun v. Mechanics' & Traders' Bank, 30 La. Ann. 772,
780 (1878). Cf. Ricks v. Bernstein, 19 La. Ann. 141 (1867).
14. First--"a party desiring to bring before [a] court the question of the
sufficiency of the evidence on which the order issued, and other questions
besides, would be obliged to resort to an appeal for the one and an injunction
for the other, thus involving that multiplicity which the law abhors." Calhoun v. Mechanics' & Traders' Bank, 30 La. Ann. 772, 780 (1878). Secondto require the defendant in executory process to post the necessary suspensive
appeal bond would, in the vast majority of cases, result in the deprivation of
the only remedy which a contrary view would permit. Third-the defendant
in executory process should not only be permitted, but should be required, to
seek the necessary relief from the trial court which committed the error before invoking the aid of the appellate courts. Cf. Ascension Red Cypress Co.
v. New River Drainage District, 169 La. 606, 125 So. 730 (1930).
It is folly, in this day of busy judges, to ask, with Wyly, J.: "Why should
the same judge who decided the evidence sufficient, and issued the flat, grant
an Injunction and restrain it on the ground that the evidence he had just
pronounced sufficient, Is insufficient?" Naughton v. Dinkgrave, 25 La. Ann.
538, 539 (1873). Such an argument ignores the unfortunate actualities. The
point is that trial judges seldom, If ever, examine minutely the evidence annexed to a petition for executory process to determine whether it is sufficient
or authentic, unless some question thereof is raised by the defendant. In the
very great majority of cases, the trial judge is not only willing, but anxious,
to correct any error of oversight.
15. 190 La. 162, 182 So. 314 (1938).
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the court's findings on issues of fact.18 Rudd v. Land Co.17 escapes this classification only because of one point decided. Plaintiff brought a jactitory action 8 and, in order to make specific allegations of the slanderous acts, incorporated an alleged tax sale
to defendant and an alleged act of sale thereunder into his petition by reference. The answer denied the slander, alleged the
validity of the acts and prayed for the rejection of plaintiff's demand. The court held that no question of title was presented
under the issues framed by the pleadings. Since the plaintiff had
proven possession of the property, defendant was ordered to institute a petitory action within 60 days.
Judge Westerfield is reputed once to have said, when considering an obviously inflated claim for damages, that the injunction "Ask and ye shall receive" had no application to such
worldly affairs as lawsuits. Cook v. Martin 9 would lead one to
suspect that it is applicable to litigation, but often with a result
opposite to that intended by the person invoking it. Plaintiffs instituted a petitory action to be decreed owners of property once
held by the community existing between their paternal grandparents. What purported to be an act of sale executed by the
grandmother, after the death of her husband, was attacked as a
forgery. In the alternative, plaintiffs demanded that (if the instrument attacked be held genuine) they be decreed the owners
of their grandfather's half of the property. The court found the
evidence insufficient to prove the act a forgery.20 Further, it held
that, by instituting the suit, plaintiffs had accepted their grandmother's succession unconditionally, and had thereby assumed
her obligation of warranty of the whole title. Consequently, plaintiffs were held estopped from attacking the sale even to the extent of claiming the half which their grandfather had owned.
The opinion induces one to believe that if plaintiffs had claimed
only a half-interest in the property they might have recovered.
16. Duffourc v. Constantin (Jambon v. Same, Pitre v. Same), 189 La. 826,
181 So. 183 (1938); Foscue v. Mitchell, 190 La. 758, 182 So. 740 (1938).
17. 188 La. 490, 177 So. 583 (1937), reversing Rudd v. Land Co., 172 So.
804 (La. App. 1937).
18. For a discussion of the action of Jactitation, see Comment (1938) 12
Tulane L. Rev. 254.
19. 188 La. 1063, 178 So. 881 (1938).
20. Some loose language in the opinion might lead the reader to believe
that the court resolved this question against plaintiffs also because of the estoppel. Obviously, if the act of sale were spurious, the alleged vendor would
not have warranted title to the property, and plaintiffs could never have assumed this obligation by accepting her succession. It was necessary for the
court to decide the question of forgery only on the factual issue presented.
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Certainly, they would have escaped the estoppel which the court
21
maintained.
SUCCESSION PROCEDURE. The loose manner in which many of
the "accounts" filed in succession proceedings are drafted2 2 was
again productive of litigation. In Succession of D'Hebecourt,28 it
was held that an annual account which listed assets considerably
less in amount than that shown on the inventory, which did not
list certain assets shown thereon, and which failed to explain
certain of the liabilities listed, did not comply with Article 1674
of the Civil Code. A judgment vacating a provisional homol24
ogation of such account was affirmed. Succession of Prima
found no authority in the courts to compel an heir to advance his
proportion of the succession debts under penalty of having only
his interest in the succession property sold. In Succession of Giordano,25 the court again applied the rule that the maxim "le mort
saisit le vif" had no application to irregular heirs, and that the
latter may be sent into possession of the succession only after a
contradictory proceeding against the presumptive heirs. A petition for possession brought by a natural child, which showed the
existence of legitimate children of the deceased who were not
made parties to the proceeding, was held subject to an exception
of nonjoinder of parties defendant. Succession of Strange21 presented a contest between two creditors of the deceased to be appointed administrator of his succession. Pointing out that the
courts had no discretion in the matter, and that the creditor first
applying for the administration (unless otherwise disqualified)
had a prior right thereto, the trial judge was directed to make
the appointment accordingly. No facts sufficient to disqualify the
first applicant were found in his nonresidence in the parish in
which the succession was opened, and in his being administrator
of the succession of the wife of the deceased even though there
might be some conflict of interest between the two successions.
RECEIVERSHIP PROCEDURE. In Sklar Oil Corporation v. Stan21. By suing to recover only the grandfather's interest In the property,
plaintiffs could not have been held to have accepted their grandmother's succession thereby.
22. The "account" filed in the majority of succession proceedings today
confuses the respective functions of the tableau of distribution and the account, properly speaking. On this subject, see Succession of Bofenschen, 29
La. Ann. 711, 712-713 (1877).
23. 189 La. 319, 179 So. 440 (1938).
24. 188 La. 319, 177 So. 62 (1937).

25. 188 La. 1057, 178 So. 627 (1938).
26. 188 La. 478, 177 So. 579 (1937).
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dard Oil Co. of Louisiana,27 the receiver had secured an order of
court, after notice to all interested parties, to sell certain property belonging to the receivership free and clear of all liens and
encumbrances. The sale made pursuant to this order was duly
approved and confirmed by a judgment of court. The latter was
held to be res judicata of all actions brought by the creditors to
enforce their claims against the property sold, after the lapse of
one year from the date thereof. The sale of the property, however, was held subject to the claims for royalty, which were not
mentioned in the order authorizing the sale. Receivership of
Manteris No. 1 Well28 applied the established rule that claims
for materials furnished and services rendered to the receivership
prime the claims of creditors of the partnership incurred prior to
the receivership. Certain creditors also contended that their
claims for the reimbursement of funds alleged to belong to them
which had come into the hands of the receiver were privileged.
Since these creditors had acquiesced in a court order turning such
funds over to the receiver, and since these funds had become mingled with other moneys belonging to the receivership, the claims
were held not privileged.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE. A statutory provision2 forbids the dismissal of appeals prosecuted to an appellate
court which has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
cause. Such appeals must be transferred to the proper tribunals.
Four instances presented the question of whether the cases should
be so transferred. In H. A. Bauman, Inc. v. Tilly, 0 the court again
applied the rule that the amount in controversy at the time of
the submission of the case to the trial court determined the appellate court to which a suit for a moneyed judgment would go on
appeal. Since the primary demand for a large amount had been
abandoned prior to submission to the trial court, and the only contest concerned an alternative demand for $1,500, the cause was
transferred to the proper Court of Appeal. The question of whether a claim for penalties sanctioned by statute would be included
in determining the amount in controversy was presented for the
first time in Madison v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America.31 The
court's affirmative answer to this question-on rehearing-ap27. 189 La. 1049, 181 So. 487 (1938).
28. 188 La. 893, 178 So. 386 (1938).
29. La. Act 56 of 1904, § 1, as amended by La. Act 19 of 1912, § 1 [Dart's
Stats. (1932) § 1427].
80. 188 La. 531, 177 So. 657 (1937), reversing H. A. Bauman, Inc. v. Tilly,
175 So. 489 (La. App. 1937).
31. 190 La. 103, 181 So. 871 (1938).
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pears to be correct.3 2 The Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction because the penalties must be included in determining the
amount in dispute. In A. M. Edwards Co. v. Hano,83 the court
again had occasion to point out that the homestead exemption is
lost irrevocably if it is not claimed prior to a judicial sale of the
property under seizure. Consequently, when no such claim was
urged in the trial court and the property had been sold, the Supreme Court did not have appellate jurisdiction over the cause on
the theory that a homestead exemption was at issue. The case
was transferred to the proper court of appeal.
In several cases motions by the appellee to dismiss the appeal
were disposed of through the application of elementary principles. D'Angelo v. Nicolosi 4 applied the rule that a motion to
dismiss the appeal relating only to the regularity of bringing the
appeal to the appellate court, and not to appellant's right to appeal, comes too late if filed more than three days after the expiration of the period allowed for filing the transcript. Appellee
moved to dismiss on the ground that the transcript was not lodged
in the appellate court within the original period allowed by the
order of appeal, and that an extension of time therefor had issued
improvidently. Since the motion was filed later than the third
day after the expiration of the extended period for filing the
record, it was held to come too late. Dent v. Dent8" was disposed of
through the application of the rule that days of grace are allowed
only for the original period granted to file the transcript, and not
for any extended period. In Harding v. Hackney86 the order of
appeal was signed by the trial judge in chambers; since no citation of appeal was prayed for or served on the appellee, under the
pertinent code provision" the appeal was dismissed. In Mason v.
Red River Lumber Co.,8 8 the appellee sought to dismiss the appeal
on the ground that the appellant had acquiesced in the judgment
(dismissing his petition because it disclosed no cause of action)
32. The subject Is discussed more fully, and the same conclusion reached,
in Foundation Finance Co. v. Robbins, 144 So. 293 (La. App. 1932). Both of
these decisions are in accord with the legislative interpretation. It was
thought necessary to adopt a constitutional amendment to permit the City
Courts of New Orleans to entertain jurisdiction of money demands not in
excess of $300, "exclusive of penalties." Cf. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 91,
prior to and after amendment pursuant to La. Act 197 of 1928.
33. 188 La. 632, 177 So. 691 (1937).
34. 188 La. 326, 177 So. 64 (1937).
35. 189 La. 888, 181 So. 435 (1938).
36. 189 La. 132, 179 So. 58 (1938).
37. Art. 573, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 49 of
1871.
38. 188 La. 686, 177 So. 801 (1937).
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by thereafter filing an identical suit in the federal court. The court
held that there was no acquiescence thereby in the judgment appealed from. However, it was held that the institution of the
second action was an abandonment of any right of appeal in the
first. In Frost Lumber Industries v. Bryant, 9 judgment was rendered against the defendants as prayed for, and only one appealed. The appellant and the plaintiff-appellee both moved to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was abandoned. These
motions were granted even though the nonappealing defendants
had not consented thereto, the court holding that the latter were
not concerned with the abandonment of the appeal. Succession
0 recognized the
of Jones"
right of a litigant, suing in forma pauperis, to a suspensive appeal without bond when the dispute was
over a fund in the custody of the court. Consequently, the unwarranted act of the trial judge in requiring the appellant to furnish
bond in order to suspend the execution of the judgment appealed
from was held not to render the appeal a devolutive one. And an
administrator who distributed the succession assets in the face
of such appeal was condemned individually and officially to
pay the claim of the appellant which the Supreme Court recognized. Brock v. Stassi 1 applied the commonplace rule that when
the order of appeal was executed more than ten days after the
signing of the judgment, any appeal taken thereby was purely a
devolutive one. Appellant's prior application for supervisory
writs was held not to toll the running of the ten days allowed for
suing out a suspensive appeal. State ex rel. Knighton v. Derryberry42 held that an order vacating the judicial sequestration of
the proceeds of oil extracted from the lands in controversy was
an interlocutory order which might cause irreparable injury, and
hence could be appealed from suspensively. But an order vacating a previous one requiring the defendants to account was held
to be an interlocutory judgment from which no suspensive appeal
could be taken because it could not cause irreparable injury.
Two cases were remanded for new trials because there were
no stenographic notes of the evidence. In Dreher v. Guaranty
Bond & Finance Co., 8 the court stenographer who had reported
the trial had left the state without transcribing his notes. Williamson v. Enterprise Brick Co.4" held that it was the duty of the
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

189 La. 227, 179 So. 297 (1938).
189 La. 693, 180 So. 489 (1938).
189 La. 88, 179 So. 44 (1938).
188 La. 412, 177 So. 256 (1937).
188 La. 421, 177 So. 259 (1937).
190 La. 415, 182 So. 556 (1938).

1939].

WORK OF LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

329

clerk to take down the testimony in writing, or to have this done
by a deputy or stenographer. The mere fact that plaintiff was
suing in forma pauperis and could not pay the charges therefor
was held to be no excuse for the nonperformance of this duty.
5
Gautreaux v. Harang"
settled one question which has long
been mooted by attorneys of the state. The court held that while
it could grant an extension of time for filing a brief in support
of an application for rehearing, it had no power to enlarge the
time allowed for filing the application itself. Any "supplemental
application" for rehearing, or any points urged in a brief, filed
after the delay for applying for rehearing had expired, could not
be noticed by the court. Zylks v. Kaempfer 6 filled another gap
in our law of appellate procedure. The appellee died before the
rendition of a judgment in her favor by the Supreme Court. Since
this judgment was obviously invalid, her executors made themselves parties to the appeal and petitioned the court to render a
judgment in their favor nunc pro tunc, otherwise identical with
the original decree. Since no opposition thereto was filed by the
appellant,47 judgment was rendered accordingly.
In Succession of Robinson,48 the court refused to dismiss the
appeal because of a late payment of the Supreme Court filing fee,
when the latter had been paid prior to argument. In Gumbel v.
New Orleans Terminal Co.,' 9 the court properly held that its decrees could not be annulled when final, on the ground that errors
of law had been committed.
The Injunction Statute" prohibits the granting of a suspensive appeal from a judgment refusing an injunction. In Knott v.
Himel,51 this act was held to prevent a trial judge from issuing
an injunctive order ex proprio motu and without bond, after sustaining an exception to the plaintiff's petition and rejecting his
demands. The effect was held to be the same as if the judge a quo
had granted a suspensive appeal.
SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE. A

constitutional

45. 190 La. 1060, 183 So. 349 (1938). This case is discussed further herein,
infra, pp. 344 and 354.

46. 190 La. 839, 183 So. 174 (1938).
47. Even if the appellant had opposed the petition, the same result should
have obtained. There is no necessity

for a busy appellate court to try a

case anew simply because of the death of a party, unless new issues are presented thereby.
48. 188 La. 742, 178 So. 337 (1938).
49. 190 La. 904, 183 So. 212 (1938).
50. La. Act 29 of 1924 [Dart's Stats. (1932) §§ 2078-20831.
51. 189 La. 323, 179 So. 441 (1938).
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provision5 2 requires the issuance of the writ of review as a matter
of right whenever a decision rendered by one Court of Appeal
conflicts with the jurisprudence of another or with that of the
Supreme Court. This provision was invoked but once during the
1937-1938 term. 53 In Rembert v. Fenner & Beane," the court held
that when the intermediate appellate court had remanded a case
for further trial on one particular point, the latter was not before the Supreme Court under a writ of review, since the matter
had not yet been determined finally by the intermediate appellate court. Laurent v. Unity Industrial Life Ins. Co. 55 pointed out
that the rule of court requiring an applicant for a writ of review
to annex to his application certified copies of the opinion of the
Court of Appeal and other portions of the record was adopted
purely for the convenience of the Supreme Court. Noncompliance
therewith by the applicant would not result in the recall of the
writ after its issuance.
In Cardino v. Scroggins," the defendant's prior application
for supervisory writs had been denied on the ground that he had
an adequate remedy by appeal. Thereafter the plaintiff sought to
prevent the exercise of this remedy by reducing his claim below
an appealable amount. The expedient proved unsuccessful because the Supreme Court granted defendant relief under a writ of
certiorari issued to the trial court.
MISCELLANEOUS.

Several cases involved procedural points

which either cannot be classified conveniently, or constitute the
sole decision on the subject. Strange v. Albrecht 7 held that it
was not necessary, on the confirmation of a default, to prove the
genuineness of the payee's blank endorsement of the instrument
sued on. Pointing out that early cases to the contrary had been
overruled by the Negotiable Instruments Law,5 8 the court held
the plaintiff to be a prima facie holder in due course, with the
right to sue thereon in his own name.
Bogalusa Ice Co. v. Moffett"9 held inter alia that a judicial se52. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 11.
53. Geddes & Moss U. & E. Co. v. First National Life Ins. Co., 189 La. 891,

181 So. 436 (1938), aff'g 177 So. 818 (La. App. 1938). This case is discussed further herein, infra, p. 411.
54. 188 La. 385, 177 So. 247 (1937), aff'g Rembert v. Fenner & Beane, 175
So. 116 (La. App. 1937).

This case is discussed further herein, infra, p. 351.

55. 189 La. 426, 179 So. 586 (1938). This case is discussed further herein,
infra, p. 410.

56.
57.
58.
59.

190 La.
190 La.
La. Act
188 La.

53, 181 So. 810 (1938).
897, 183 So. 209 (1938).
64 of 1904, §§ 24, 51, 59 [Dart's Stats. (1932) §§ 813, 840, 848].
598, 177 So. 679 (1937).
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questration may be issued without bond, and that movable as well
as immovable property might be sequestered when necessary.
The rule that a temporary restraining order will not issue without bond except in those cases where the law requires no security
was again applied.
In Liquidation of Canal Bank & Trust Co.,60 the plaintiff of
an action pending in a federal district court brought an ancillary
proceeding in the state court to compel the state bank examiner
to permit an examination of the books of a defunct bank. Since
the federal court had jurisdiction over the bank examiner, and
could compel discovery by him, the plaintiff was denied the relief
prayed for.
In 1933 the Supreme Court had held that, although the
formalities and requisites of law had been complied with, an attempted partition was invalid unless such an intention was disclosed by an express use of the term "partition."61 The successful
plaintiffs in this case were among the party defendants in Rauschkolb v. Di Matteo62 and they reconvened, praying that the mortgage be decreed invalid insofar as their interest in the property
was concerned. They asserted that since the mortgagor had no
title to the interest which they claimed, such interest was not
subject to the mortgage. On the question of their ownership of
the property these defendants pleaded as res judicata the decree of the Supreme Court in the first case, which defense the
trial court had maintained. In reversing this judgment, the Supreme Court held that the mortgagee, not having been a party to
the first suit, was not bound by any judgment rendered therein.
But for the fact that it overruled its prior decision, the court's
language in differentiating stare decisis and res judicata might
have indicated an acceptance of the common law judicial technique. Finding its former decision entirely too technical, the
court held that the proceeding in question was a valid partition
even though it was not labeled as such.
III.

CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS

A. FAMILY LAW
Separation from Bed and Board, and Divorce
(a) Jurisdiction. Three cases appear in which the plea to
the jurisdiction must have been urged as a matter of last resort,
60. 188 La. 1069, 178 So. 883 (1938).
61. Fradella v. Pumilia, 177 La. 47, 147 So. 496 (1933).
62. 190 La. 7, 181 So. 555 (1938).
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since the issues were plain and well settled. In Gennusa v. Gennusa'
the wife sued in Orleans parish for divorce under Act 31 of 1932,2
the four-year act. The husband pleaded res adjudicata and divorce in his favor in St. Bernard parish. The wife answered that
she and the husband were both residents of Orleans parish when
the judgment was rendered but she did not bear the burden of
proving that the district court of St. Bernard was without jurisdiction to render the judgment. The records of the husband's
judgment did not show the court to have been without jurisdiction, and the petition showed a notation of service accepted and
signed by the wife. The wife alleged that her signature was not
a waiver to submit her person to the jurisdiction; but the court
held otherwise. In Parsley v. Parsley8 the husband submitted to
the jurisdiction of a Texas court by appearing, filing answer, and
defending a suit brought by his wife. The Texas divorce and order for the custody of the child was held to be entitled to full
faith and credit in Louisiana under the doctrine of Haddock v.
Haddock.4 In Plitt v. Plitt' there was issued against the district
judge of East Baton Rouge parish a writ of prohibition to proceed
further in a suit for separation from bed and board on the ground
that the court was without jurisdiction, either ratione personae or
materiae, the last matrimonial domicile having been Atlanta
(Georgia).
(b) Cause. Four cases were presented which should be a
proper warning to erring wives. The decisions are sound and offer
little of unusual interest but for two points, one of evidence and
one of procedure. In the case of Adranga v. Tardo, the wife sued
for separation from bed and board on the grounds of public defamation and cruelty. The husband reconvened alleging the same
things plus abandonment. The husband proved to the court that
the wife and her relatives "abused, cursed and nagged him ' 7 from
the time of the marriage until four months later when she left,
taking all of the furniture, leaving his clothes on the floor and
locking the house! The judgment was for the husband. The trial
judge said that the wife was "very pugnacious and bellicose"!'
In Henderson v. Henderson"the wife sued for separation from bed
1.
2.
8.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

189 La. 137, 179 So. 60 (1938).
Dart's Stats. (1932) § 2202.
189 La. 584, 180 So. 417 (1938).
201 U.S. 562, 26 S.Ct. 525, 50 L.Ed. 867 (1906).
190 La. 59, 181 So. 857 (1938).
189 La. 678, 180 So. 484 (1938).
189 La. at 680, 180 So. at 485.
Ibid.
190 La. 836, 183 So. 173 (1938).
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and board, alleging cruel treatment. The spouses had three girls,
aged 11, 14 and 16 years. The wife gave no notice of her decision,
moved the furniture and the car to another house, filed suit
against the husband and let him come home unprepared to an
empty house. The wife could not prove her allegations. The husband provided well according to-his means, was quiet and agreeable. The wife was said to be of a nervous and excitable temperament and of a jealous disposition. No separation was granted. In
Mouille v. Schutten'0 the wife sued for separation from bed and
board on the ground of cruelty, asked for custody of the minor
daughter, alimony and attorney's fees. There was a great deal of
conflicting testimony. The husband proved, however, that the
wife went out with men friends against his expressed wishes.
This conduct was the real cause of the failure of the marriage.
Separation was granted to the husband, giving him permanent
custody of the child. The decision seemed wise and just. However, the admission of the 'testimony of one witness, while not
relied upon, is subject to criticism as indicated in the dissenting
opinion. A voluntary witness was allowed to testify to improper
relations between himself and the wife. The dissenting justice
said that "Such testimony is, in its very nature, and from the
source from which it comes, utterly unworthy of belief .... A
woman is defenseless against such testimony .... If such a wit-

ness does not refuse to divulge his secret, the judge ought to forbid him to divulge it. And the reason for that is that the testimony would be utterly worthless as evidence."' 1 In Landry v. Regira'2 the wife sued for separation on the ground of cruel treatment, asked for custody of the children, alimony pendente lite,
judicial sequestration of community property, and attorney's fees.
The husband made a reconventional demand for absolute divorce
on the grounds of adultery, which was proven. The husband was
granted the divorce and given the custody of the children. The
court said that the reconventional demand was connected with
and incidental to the main demand. The abandonment cases were
distinguished. No alimony was granted to the wife except pendente lite and a sum of the community property given her by the
husband on parting was held enough to cover that. The major importance of this case lies in the procedural point involved which
is discussed under the appropriate heading.13
10. 190 La. 841, 183 So. 191 (1938).
1l. 190 La. at 869-870, 183 So. at 200.
12. 18,La. 950, 178 So. 502 (1938).
13. Supra p. 320.
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(c) Alimony. These cases are of more than usual importance
as several of them raise issues of peculiar social interest. Gantz v.
Wagner " presented the case of an absolute divorce granted the
wife in 1932. Subsequently, she obtained a rule against the husband directing him to show cause why she should not have alimony, and the rule was made absolute fixing alimony at $40.00
per month. The present proceeding was on a rule to show cause
why the husband should not be adjudged in contempt for failure
to pay certain installments and further, to increase the alimony
to $60.00 per month. It was alleged that the wife and 14-year old
daughter were in necessitous circumstances and that $40.00 per
month was not enough. The husband was a city fireman, making
$136.00 per month, and had to pay $10.00 per month from his salary to the Firemen's Retirement Fund. He had remarried and his
second wife was a maid at the Charity Hospital earning $30.00
per month, the same amount that she had received before her
marriage. The court stated that under Article 160 of the Civil
Code the maximum of $42.00 per month should be allowed for the
divorced wife. The child was entitled to an extra sum, so $50.00
was awarded in toto. The court arrived at this sum by adding the
husband's earnings of $125.00 a month to the second wife's earnings of $30.00 per month, equaling $155.00. They concluded that
$105.00 was enough to support the husband and his second wife.
The economic and social aspects of a situation wherein the earnings of a second wife are included in order to compute the alimony award for a divorced wife are worthy of very serious consideration. In Hulett v. Gilbert 5 an award of $75.00 per month to
a wife was held fair, when the husband's salary was $300.00 per
month. The court stated that when a trial judge acts fairly and
without abuse, his judgment for alimony is not ordinarily interfered with on appeal. In Pitre v. Burlett 6 suit for divorce was
brought by the husband under the four-year act,'I the parties
having lived separate and apart for over 20 years. The wife left
the domicile because of alleged unfaithfulness of the husband.
The latter was not proved to the court's satisfaction though there
was much testimony on the subject because of the claim for alimony by the wife under Act 27 of 1934 (2 E.S.),18 permitting the
granting of alimony in such a case when "the wife has not been
14. 188 La. 833, 178 So. 367 (1938).
15. 189 La. 877, 181 So. 431 (1938).
16. 190 La. 127, 182 So. 123 (1938).
17. La. Act 31 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 2202].
18. Art. 160, La. Civil Code of 1870, as last amended by La. Act 26 of 1934
(2 E.S.).
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at fault." The court held that the wife was "not without fault"
and hence awarded no alimony. Undoubtedly the statute permitting alimony in these cases serves a useful and just purpose, but it
is most unfortunate that under the interpretation of the word
"fault" it becomes necessary to wash all of the dirty domestic
linen, a process otherwise obviated by the 7-year, 4-year, and 2year acts. 19 Since these acts apparently contemplate what in reality might be a separation by mutual consent, to demonstrate actual fault or absence of fault on the part of the wife may be most
difficult as well as sociably undesirable. Another case interpreting
the same clause is now before the Supreme Court and it is hoped
that the judicial art will mold a more favorable social process
out of this well-intended act. In Cotton v. Wright20 the wife procured a judgment for separation from bed and board for cruelty
and excesses admitted by the husband. There was a reconciliation, another suit, and prayer for $200.00 per month alimony. From
a judgment for separation and alimony of $19.85, the husband
took a suspensive appeal. It was held that the husband had to pay
alimony pendente lite whatever the merits of the case, as a husband has to support his wife as long as the marriage lasts. In
Wright v. Wright21 it was held that the prescription of ten years
under Article 3547 of the Civil Code does not apply to an alimony
judgment in favor of minor children against the father. It was
very properly stated that not a debt, but a duty, exists in this
situation and, hence, the judgment was not founded on debt, but
22
was to enforce a "continuing legal duty." In Glaser v. Doescher
the wife obtained a separation from bed and board on January
16, 1933, with a $45.00 per month alimony award. The sum was
reduced to $40.00 on May 2, 1934. Final divorce and $40.00 a month
alimony were granted on February 26, 1937. On March 2, 1937 a
rule to reduce the alimony to $20.00 per month was upheld by the
Supreme Court. The child had come of age but was giving the
wife no support and she had no property or income. The husband's income was hard to determine, but apparently more than
$30.00 per month. He operated a little grocery store, employed
help, and ran a small truck in connection with his business. In
Reichert v. Lloveras23 the wife brought suit for separation from
bed and board for causes arising subsequent to a reconciliation
19.
years),
20.
21.
22.
23.

La. Acts 269 of 1916 (7 years), 31 of 1932 (4 years), 430 of 1938 (2
[Dart's Stats. (1932) § 2202).
189 La. 686, 180 So. 487 (1938).
189 La. 539, 179 So. 866 (1938).
189 La. 518, 179 So. 840 (1938).
188 La. 447, 177 So. 569 (1937).
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after a judgment for separation from bed and board nearly ten
years before. The wife also prayed for alimony pendente lite.
The court held that the wife had a right to this type of alimony
award. As an incident to the controversy, the court had occasion
to mention that a property settlement from the original judgment
for separation from bed and board stands as the sole remainder
of that judgment under Louisiana jurisprudence. This principle
seems incongruous, illogical and unfair, both as a legal principle
and as a social doctrine in the best interests of the family.2" In
the case of Snow v. Snow 25 the court refused to modify a judg-

ment for past due alimony because, under Article 548 of the Code
of Practice, it becomes the property of the one in whose favor it
has been granted. An interesting question is suggested by the
discussion in regard to the personal nature of an alimony judgment and its validity under the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution, when substituted service has been
used in the divorce proceedings.
2
(d) Property Settlement after Divorce. In Rhodes v. Rhodes
a wife obtained a judgment of divorce against her husband, decreeing a dissolution of the community and a partition of property. The judgment did not fix the manner in which the partition
should be made. The present suit was filed by the wife with a
view to partitioning the community by licitation and receiving an
accounting from the husband. One of the contentions of the defendant was that the property could not be partitioned because of
a mortgage. The court ruled that this defense was entirely without merit because of the specific provision of Article 1338 of the
Civil Code. The husband further contended that because of the
insolvency of the community, there could be no partition until a
liquidation of the debts had been effected. This contention was
also held to be invalid under the settled jurisprudence. Finally,
the husband contended that since the wife accepted the community with benefit of inventory, she renounced the debts and, hence,
had no interest or right to a partition by licitation. The court very
properly stated that on the contrary, under Act 4 of 1882,27 she
does not repudiate the debts, but simply limits them to her onehalf of the community property, thus relieving her from any personal liability beyond her community interest. The husband and
wife became co-owners of the community property by virtue of
24. For a full discussion, see Comment, infra p. 422.

25. 188 La. 660, 177 So. 793 (1937).
26. 190 La. 370, 182 So. 541 (1938).
27. Dart's Stats. (1932) § 2213.
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the dissolution of the marriage by divorce and either had a perfect right to a partition.
Annulment of Marriage
In Rhodes v. Miller2 s the husband secured a judgment by default for annulment of his second marriage. The second wife herein appealed devolutively, the delay for suspensive appeal having
lapsed. The husband alleged that he married his second wife after
she had been named as corespondent in his first wife's successful
divorce suit for cause of adultery. The husband and his second
wife were married in Chicago in order to avoid the effect of Article 161 of the Civil Code. 29 The second wife alleged that the husband could not plead his own turpitude; that he had not come
into court with "clean hands"; that causes for annulment are specific and exclusive in Articles 110-118, and that this is not one of
them, citing Ryals v. Ryals, 0 where annulment was refused when
insanity was pleaded. The court stated that the decision on insanity was correct but that Article 161 does give a right to annul
when coupled with Articles 93 and 113.1 While the husband's
hands were not clean, an estoppel could not be invoked to impair
the force and effect of a prohibitory law. The marriage was annulled. The court stated that it was "not acting for the sake of
the party, but for the public good.

' 82

There were apparently no

children. Article 161 was taken from an article of the French
28. 189 La. 288, 179 So. 430 (1938).
29. Art. 161, La. Civil Code of 1870: "In case of divorce, on account of
adultery, the guilty party can never contract matrimony with his or her accomplice in adultery, under the penalty of being considered and prosecuted as
guilty of the crime of bigamy, and under the penalty of nullity of the new
marriage."
30. 130 La. 244, 57 So. 904 (1912).
31. Art. 93, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Persons legally married are, until a
dissolution of marriage, incapable of contracting another, under the penalties
established by the laws of this State."
Art. 113, La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended by La. Act. 426 of 1938: "Every marriage contracted under the other incapacities or nullities enumerated
in the second chapter of this title may be impeached either by the married
persons themselves, or by the person interested, or by the Attorney-General;
however, marriages heretofore contracted between persons related within
the prohibited degrees, either or both of whom were then or afterwards domiciled in this State, and were prohibited from Intermarrying here, shall nevertheless be deemed valid In this State, where such marriages were celebrated
in other States or countries under the laws of which they were not prohibited; but marriages hereafter contracted between persons, either or both of
whom were domiciled in this State and are forbidden to intermarry shall not
be deemed valid in this State, because contracted in another State or country
where such marriages are not prohibited, if the parties after such marriage
return to reside permanently in this State."
32. 189 La. at 300, 179 So. at 433 (1938).
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Civil Code which was repealed in 1904.33 The associated rule
refusing to permit legitimation by marriage of adulterous illegitimate children has also been dropped in France.34 It seems unfortunate and socially unprogressive to enforce the letter of Article
161, especially in favor of an admittedly guilty plaintiff, unless
there was no method of circumventing the statute. It would have
been simple enough in this situation to have refused annulment
just as the earlier decisions softened the harsh letter of the law
by insisting (although not specified in the article) that the corespondent must be named in the divorce proceeding, thus effecting a wiser and more progressive social policy. The present court
could have followed suit in further emasculating an outworn
statute. In the same year, 1938, the court in Succession of Elmer,85
upheld but for the l6gitime, a testamentary gift by a husband to
his second wife of the whole of his estate despite the plea of his
children that the donee had lived in open concubinage with their
father prior to his first wife's (their mother's) death, citing the
exception of Article 1481 in favor of those who afterwards marry. 8 These children would doubtless not be impressed with the
high moral tone of the reasoning upon which the nullity of the
marriage in the instant case was placed. The distrust of the law
by the laity is easily understood when the confusion and contradiction of social policy evidenced are noted.
Husband and Wife
In D. H. Holmes Co., Ltd. v. Morris and his wife, 87 suit was
brought on open account for purchases made by the wife in her
own name without her husband's knowledge, and while she was
living separate and apart from him. She bought a wrist watch for
$150.00, a watch band for $100.00, five items of clothing totaling
$22.09 and two lunches totaling $1.15. Judgment in solido was
asked for against the husband and wife. There was no appeal
from the judgment of the lower court for the clothing and lunches.
33. Art. 298, French Civil Code, repealed by Law of Dec. 15th, 1904.
34. Art. 331, French Civil Code, as amended by Laws of Nov. 7th, 1907,
Dec. 30th, 1915, and April 25th, 1924, "make(s) proviaion for the legitimation
of adulterine children on the marriage of their parents if they have been
acknowledged by the parents before, or at the time of such marriage." Renton, The Retouchement of the Code Civil (1933) 20 Va. L. Rev. 188, 189.
35. 189 La. 1016, 181 So. 477 (1938).
36. Art. 1481, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Those who have lived together in
open concubinage are respectively incapable of making to each other, whether
inter vivos or mortis causa, any donation of immovables; and if they make a
donation of movables, it can not exceed one-tenth part of the whole value of
their estate.
"Those who afterwards marry are excepted from this rule."
37. 188 La. 431, 177 So. 417 (1937).
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The Supreme Court gave judgment against the wife for the watch
and band. The parties were living separate and apart by common
consent and the husband was furnishing the wife with $25.00 per
month. On the facts, the decision seemed fair, so far as property
law is concerned, and definitely in line with the statutes making
a distinction between the phrases "when living apart" 8 and "living separate and apart . . . by reason of fault." 9 Since the wife's
earnings in a separate occupation would in this situation be her
separate property according to the distinction made in Houghton
J 0
v. Hall
and Byrd v. Babin,1 certainly the community should not
be bound by debts contracted by her. It is doubtful if the husband, under this set of facts, should have been held for the clothing and lunches though that was a matter of his individual liability to support the wife during the existence of the marriage. The
latter question was not before the Supreme Court. In Shannon v.
Shannon4 2 the wife tried to upset a contract with the husband
made when the spouses were contemplating judicial separation.
She pointed out that she only got one-half of the community
rightfully hers, and received nothing for her alimony rights, and
hence that the contract was without consideration. There was no
charge of fraud or error. The decision was on contract law and
pleadings and stated that she could not change the instrument
by her own proof without an allegation of fraud or error. The
contract between the husband and wife was admitted with no
reference to the Acts of 1926 or 1928. 41 The analysis on contract
statutes made no reference to the particular laws of husband and
wife. The soundness of the decision is questionable even on pure
contract grounds, as the jurisprudence admits proof of lack of
consideration. The Chief Justice dissented, stating that it was
not necessary to plead the prohibitory law under Act 34 of 1902"
providing that the husband must support the wife. The fact that
this was his responsibility was a matter of public policy. In the
Chief Justice's opinion the contract was null on its face.
38. Art. 2334 (par. 3), La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended by La. Act 170
of 1912.
39. Art. 2334 (par. 4), La. Civil of Code of 1870, as amended by La. Act.
186 of 1920.
40. 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933).
41. 181 La. 466, 159 So. 718 (1935).
42. 188 La. 588, 177 So. 676 (1937).
43. La. Acts 132 of 1926 and 283 of 1928 [Dart's Stats. (1932) §§ 2169-21731.
These are the two latest so-called married women's emancipatory acts.
44. Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) Art. 927.
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Tutorship and Emancipation
In Caskey v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.4 5 the
bondsman of a natural tutor, father of minors, was held for the
unpaid price of property adjudicated to the father. The theory of
the decision was that a failure to record an adjudication which
would have operated as a legal mortgage was an act of maladministration. In Webster's Tutorship4" the mother was made natural tutrix of a minor child. She later asked to be relieved of her
duties and at her request, a bank was made tutor of the finances
of the minor and the mother given the custody of the person. Subsequent to these appointments, the mother consented to the
minor's emancipation, and the court emancipated him. The bank
refused to turn over his property to him, contending that it had
not been properly discharged. The court so held. It was stated
that the bank was in reality the tutor under Act 45 of 1902. 47 The
mother simply had care of the person of the minor and was not
even a co-tutor, so the bank was not discharged by the emancipation proceedings (to which it had not consented) and consequently did not have to turn over the estate of $11,000 or more to
the minor.
Interdiction
The Interdictionof Scurto" again instances the wisdom of the
court in refusing to affirm a judgment of interdiction. A father
and two brothers were attempting to secure the interdiction of a
young woman, and the interdiction was granted apparently because she refused to answer questions on trial. The girl trusted
only her sister, who was not a party to any of the proceedings.
Two medical experts appointed by the court found the young
woman sane and able to care for her person and property.
Duty of Support
The case of Steib v. Owens" presents an action by an aged
mother to recover alimony from her three sons. Two of the defendants rightly excepted to the jurisdiction of the court ratione
personae. The third son averred that he had offered his mother
$7.00 per month, or a living with him, which she refused because
of the smallness of the sum and incompatibility with her son's
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

190 La. 997, 183 So.
188 La. 623, 177 So.
La. Act 45 of 1902,
188 La. 459, 177 So.
190 La. 517, 182 So.

242 (1938).
688 (1937).
§ 1(6) [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 582(6)].
573 (1937).
660 (1938).
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wife. The lower court awarded $5.00 per month. The Supreme
Court raised the sum to $10.00 per month and stated that the son
could not compel the mother to reside with him and his wife
against her wishes. The two sons, without the jurisdiction, were
sending the mother $10.00 a month each.

B.

CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS

Although no cases of any great moment dealing with the general law of contract were presented to the Supreme Court during
the sessions being considered, not without importance was the
case of Baucum & Kimball v. Garrett Mercantile Co.50 There a
seller of cotton defended an action for the recovery of a portion
of the purchase price on the ground that the transaction was a
wager. Several sales "on call" were made, the seller delivering
the cotton to the buyer and the buyer advancing to the seller the
future price listed for a future month agreed upon, less an agreed
number of points off such price and a fixed additional amount
per bale. Under the contract the seller could then "call" the price
at any time prior to the agreed date. If the price of cotton had increased at the time the price was called, the seller profited by the
difference, and if it had declined, the difference between the
amount received and the then market price was to be repaid to
the buyer. If the transaction had not been closed out in this
fashion before the agreed date it could then be closed by the
buyer with the necessary adjustment in price being made. However, if the future price for the month agreed upon increased before the agreed date the buyer would be obliged to pay to the
seller an additional amount to cover the increase, and if, in the
meantime, it declined the seller would be obliged to make a refund to the buyer to protect his margin. Finally, the seller might
prevent the buyer's closing out the contract at the agreed date by
paying the buyer an additional commission for transferring the
contracts to a future date then to be agreed upon. The facts disclosed that seven transactions of this nature had occurred between the parties beginning in the year 1931 and that in each case
the contracts had been transferred to May, 1935. In March, 1935,
the price of cotton having declined severely, the buyer called on
the seller for additional margin. The seller failed to respond and
the buyer exercised the privilege of calling the price, thereby
closing out the contract. The buyer then sued to recover the dif50. 188 La. 728, 178 So. 256 (1938).
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ference due him. The court found none of the elements of a bet
or wager but that the contract involved merely a present sale and
delivery of cotton with the price ultimately to be paid to depend
upon the market quotations on the agreed future date. It did not
mention two contrary Texas cases which had been relied upon by
the Court of Appeals, and felt that actual delivery of the cotton
prevented the transaction from constituting merely a gamble on
the future price of cotton. In view of the seller's ability to transfer the contracts at the expiration of the time originally agreed
upon to a future date by paying an additional commission, the
transactions in question seem to have gone beyond the simple
sales at a price to be determined in the future which the Texas
courts found invalid. Taken alone this portion of the transaction
seems to constitute a mere wager. Legal support for it must
therefore be found in the original "delivery." The result of the
case seems to be that a single delivery could serve as a basis for
future indefinite speculation based on the periodical payment of
a "commission" to the buyer. Since "delivery" is treated as significant because it is considered as indicating that the parties are
not merely gambling on the rise or fall of prices, the instant case
seems to stretch its legal effect to the breaking point. 1 That the
court did not consider this aspect of the case is to be regretted.
In Crowell and Spencer Lumber Co. v. Hawkins,52 an action
to recover for a deficiency in acreage, the court properly rejected
a defense grounded on the theory that there was mutual error
concerning the extent of the subject matter of the contract and
that it should be reformed to express the true intent of the parties.
Only the testimony of the vendor was offered to sustain the defense and this evidence was found insufficient to establish mutual
error. Since the land was not of uniform value the court determined the amount to be recovered by accepting expert testimony
concerning the value of the acreage in question at the time of the
sale.
Bauman v. Michel3 permitted a buyer to recover a ten per
cent deposit from a real estate agent when the owner was unable
51. See Conner & Hare v. Robertson, 37 La. Ann. 814 (1885); Standard
Milling Co. v. Flower, 46 La. Ann. 315, 15 So. 16 (1894); Stewart Bros. v.
Beeson, 177 La. 543, 148 So. 703 (1933), cited by the court. Cf. Burney v.
Blanks, 136 S.W. 806 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), and Wolfe v. Andrews, 192 S.W.
266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917), both of which were relied on by the Circuit Court
in pronouncing the contract illegal, and H. Seay & Co. v. Moore, 261 S.W. 1013
(Tex. Comm. App. 1924).
52. 189 La. 18, 179 So. 21 (1938).
53. 190 La. 1, 181 So. 549 (1938).

1939]

WORK OF LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

343

to make title to the property as a consequence of his wife's declaration of a family home in keeping with Act 35 of 1921 (E.S.).54
Although specific performance was prayed for in the alternative
this was impossible by virtue of the wife's action. The buyer's attempt to show a solidary obligation between owner and agent for
the return of the deposit failed under the provision of the agreement making the broker a depositary and in the absence of any
provision imposing a solidary duty. Here the court relied on Article 2093 of the Civil Code which provides that an obligation in
solido is never presumed.
The court concluded in Williams v. De Soto Bank & Trust
Co. 55 that a reservation of right contained in a release given to
one solidary judgment debtor upon a settlement of the claim
against him, pending appeal from the decision of the lower court
sustaining the exceptions of other defendant debtors, was sufficient to prevent a release of the other debtors in solido, notwithstanding that the creditor did not reserve its rights against the
latter in the motion to dismiss the suit against the first debtor,
after the previously mentioned compromise. In reaching this conclusion the court followed a rule now well settled by the cases
that form is not sacramental in making such a reservation.
The principle that one cannot accept the benefit of a contract
and then set up its unenforceability on the ground that it should
have been in writing was applied in Burk v. Livingston Parish
School Board,- where the plaintiff was seeking to recover for
services as an architect rendered the Board. Earlier Louisiana
cases were cited along with Articles 1816, 1965, and 2272 of the
Civil Code.
An attempt by a subsequent creditor to have a sale from a
father to his daughter declared a simulation failed in Eureka
Homestead Society v. Baccich 7 on the defendant's showing an actual consideration for the transfer. The court declared that where
a real consideration is shown its inadequacy is not open to question, but this expression perhaps does not mean that if the consideration given is not "serious" the transaction may not be attacked as a simulation.
In Primus v. Feaze5 8 the plaintiffs sought to recover damages or the rental value of certain oil lands on the theory that
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Dart's Stats. (1932)
189 La. 246, 179 So.
190 La. 504, 182 So.
190 La. 494, 182 So.
189 La. 932, 181 So.

§ 3806.
303 (1938).
656 (1938).
653 (1938).
449 (1938).
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there had been a wrongful recordation of an oil and gas lease
which was being held in escrow pending examination and approval of title. The court found that no damage had been sustained by the plaintiffs as a consequence of the recordation and
that plaintiffs were not justified in attempting to ratify so as to
recover the stipulated rental inasmuch as they had previously
filed a repudiation of the lease.
Andrus v. Eunice Band Mill Co.,59 a suit to recover a balance
claimed on a timber contract, was decided against the plaintiff
for lack of proof that any amount was owing.
An effort by a lessor to secure specific performance of an oil
and gas lease and at the same time to have the court declare the
lease forfeited, on the ground that defendant had failed to make
a payment which fell due while the case was in litigation, failed
6 0
in Slaughter v. Watson.
The court felt that the lessor's attempt
to have the lease forfeited was inconsistent with his allegation
that he was ready, able, and willing to deliver the lease.
C.

PARTICULAR CONTRACTS

Sales
The extensive oil development throughout Louisiana continues to increase the normal volume of litigation involving the
validity of land titles. The result has been that a variety of problems calling into application principles of the law of sales were
presented to the Supreme Court for consideration during last
term. Gautreaux v. Harang1 has caused widespread comment
and attention. A notarial act in the usual form of a cash sale but
containing the additional declaration that "this sale is made to
secure a debt on said described property and that no Revenue
Stamps are to be attached hereto," was construed to be a pledge
of immovable property or the contract of antichresis. 62 In answer
to defendant's contention that the transaction was intended to be
a cash sale and not antichresis, the court held that because the
instrument showed patently on its face that it was "to secure a
debt on said described property" a contract of pledge resulted.
Parol evidence was, therefore, not admissible to show a contrary
intention. Article 3179 of the Civil Code provides:
"The creditor does not become owner of the pledged im59. 190 La. 141, 182 So. 127 (1938).
60. 190 La. 331, 182 So. 529 (1938).

61. 190 La. 1060, 183 So. 349 (1938). See Comment (1938) 13 Tulane L. Rev.
131.

62. Arts. 3133-3135, 3152, 3176-3181, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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movable by failure of payment at the stated time; any clause to
the contrary is null, and in this case it is only lawful for him to
sue his debtor before the court in order to obtain sentence
against him, and to cause the objects which have been put in
his hands in pledge to be seized and sold."
Since defendant had not complied with this provision plaintiff's
unencumbered ownership of the property was recognized by the
court. The criticism that the Harang case has evoked does not
appear justified in the light of the authorities relied on by the
court.63 It would seem that the important consideration here involved was not what the parties intended but-What did they
actually do? Under the parol evidence rule the unambiguous
clause in the act justified the result reached but it is unfortunate
that the instant decision will call into question the validity of
numerous titles in which similar clauses have been inserted.
Conklin v. Caffall6 involved a distinction between an option to
purchase and a contract of antichresis. The owners of a piece of
property entered into an agreement with a second party whereby
the former promised to transfer title if they were reimbursed the
amount of certain existing indebtedness against the property
within a period of three years. This was held to create an option
to purchase within three years within the meaning of Article 2462
of the Civil Code. This could not be the contract of antichresis,
the court held, because no relation of debtor and creditor existed
between the parties to the agreement. It is essential to antichresis
that the pledgor be debtor of the pledgee.6 5 It was further decided
that an extension of the three year option period could not be
proved by parol evidence. 6
In Arkansas Improvement Co. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.,",
the question raised was whether a certain act of sale amounted to
a conveyance of title in full ownership or whether it purported
merely to create a right of passage or servitude. The act (in the
form of a common law deed with typical common law terminology) recited that the land had been "Remised, Released, and
Quitclaimed" to the defendant Railway Company "for additional
63. Cf. Calderwood v. Calderwood, 23 La. Ann. 658 (1871). A problem analogous to the Harang case is to be found in the decisions construing a vente
d rdmdrd to be a mortgage or pignorative contract: Latiolais v. Breaux, 154
La. 1006, 98 So. 620 (1924) and see particularly, Provosty, J., dissenting in
Marbury v. Colbert, 105 La. 467, 29 So. 871 (1901).
64. 189 La. 301, 179 So. 434 (1938).
65. Arts. 3176-3179, 3181, La. Civil Code of 1870.
66. Arts. 2275, 2276, 2462, La. Civil Code of 1870.
67. 189 La. 921, 181 So. 445 (1938).

[Vol. I

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

right of way" and "for railroad purposes, forever." Such language
was held not to limit the conveyance to a mere servitude. Since
the intention of the parties did not clearly appear from the
language of the instrument as a whole, the court resorted to extrinsic evidence showing that the vendors had abandoned the
property and had failed to exercise rights of ownership for more
than thirty years. While the expression "right of way" may be
either a title in fee simple or a servitude (right of passage), the
factors here present (for example, failure to pay taxes since the
sale) indicated very strongly that the vendor "intended the grant
to be one in fee and not merely one of servitude."68 It should be
noted that the question of adequacy of consideration raised in
plaintiff's amended petition was not before the court for decision.69
One of the recent cases involving title to a portion of the
Rodessa oil field was Jackson v. Spearman7 0 which presented for
construction a notarial deed. The deed recited the appearance of
"Hannah Jackson, wife of Thomas Jackson" as vendor, and also
contained the following statement:
"I authorize my wife to sign the above. Thos.

his

x

Jackson."

mark

Through clerical error, the notary in taking the vendor's signature by mark, inserted
her

"Hanah

x

Johnson" instead of "Hannah Jackson." It was held

mark

that this error, patent on the face of the act of sale, was not such
a "defect of form" as would make the instrument a "private writing" instead of an authentic act. 71 Consequently, as an authentic
act the instrument was full proof of the agreement it evidenced.7 2
The fact that two reputable witnesses had signed the notarial sale
sufficed to make it an authentic act and additional names affixed
as witnesses were properly disregarded as surplusage.
Under the articles of the Civil Code, sales and contracts relating to immovable property do not affect third persons unless
recorded in the manner provided by law.78 From these provisions
68. Cf. Noel Estate, Inc. v. Kansas City Southern & Gulf Ry. Co., 187 La.
717, 175 So. 468 (1937); Bond v. T.&P. Ry. Co., 181 La. 763, 160 So. 406 (1935).
69. See Noel Estate, Inc. v. K.C.S.&G. Ry. Co., 187 La. 717, 175 So. 468
(1937) (recital of $1.00 consideration held inconsistent with an intention to
convey full ownership of tract of land).
70. 188 La 535, 177 So. 658 (1937).
71. See Art. 2235, La. Civil Code of 1870.
72. Arts. 2234, 2236, La. Civil Code of 1870.
78. Arts. 2246, 2264, 2266 and 2442, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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it follows that one who purchases in reliance on the public records
isprotected.7 4 Jefferson v. Childers75 was decided in accordance
with the above principles and the lessee of an oil and gas lease,
obtained by a duly recorded cash deed from the record owner appearing to have a good title, was protected against a vendor who
asserted the right to impeach the prior sale for fraud and nonpayment of the recited cash consideration.7 6 In Porterfield v.
Parker7 7 immovable property belonging to the community between plaintiffs' mother and stepfather was sold by the latter as
head and master of the community. The act of sale was not recorded until after the death of plaintiffs' mother. It was held that
such failure to record did not entitle the plaintiffs as heirs of their
mother to recover an interest in the property since they were not
"third parties" within the meaning of the codal article requiring
recordation,"8 and the sale by their stepfather during the community operated to divest their mother's interest in the property.79 Consequently there was nothing to pass to the plaintiffs as
heirs.
The validity of a building restriction contained in an act of
sale forbidding the use of the real property for commercial purposes and placing a minimum value upon residential construction
was sustained in Ouachita Home Site & Realty Co. v. Collie.,' The
defendant in injunction proceedings, charged with violation of
the restrictions, contended that the covenant would serve "to take
property out of commerce perpetually, and to create a tenure of
property unknown to our law." Relying upon the two leading
Louisiana cases upholding similar restrictions8' the court drew a
distinction between the attempt perpetually to restrain the alienability of property82 and "contracts for the use or nonuse of real
74. McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1910) (actual knowledge
not equivalent to registry).
75. 189 La. 46, 179 So. 30 (1938).
76. The instant principle must not be confused with the right of an unpaid vendor to resolve a credit sale, appearing on the public records to be
such, for non-payment of the purchase price. Art. 2561, La. Civil Code of 1870.
Cf. Johnson v. Bloodworth, 12 La. Ann. 699 (1857); Templeman v. Pegues, 24
La. Ann. 537 (1872); Stevenson v. Brown, 32 La. Ann. 461 (1880); Ragsdale v.
Ragsdale, 105 La. 405, 29 So. 906 (1911); and Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co.
v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 166 La. 201, 116 So. 851 (1928).
77. 189 La. 720, 180 So. 498 (1938).
78. Art. 2442, La. Civil Code of 1870.
79. Art. 2404, La. Civil Code of 1870.
80. 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841 (1938).
81. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915);
Hill v. Ross, Inc., 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928).
82. As in Female Orphan Society v. Young Men's Christian Association,
119 La. 278, 44 So. 15 (1907).
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estate." Such restrictions on the use of real property are to be
"likened to servitudes" under the provisions of Articles 709 and
728 of the Louisiana Civil Code and are properly enforceable by
injunction.8
Article 2652 of the Civil Code permits a person against whom
a litigious right has been transferred to obtain a release from the
litigation "by paying to the transferee the real price of the transfer together with interest from its date." According to Article 2653
"a right is said to be litigious, whenever there exists a suit and
contestation on the same." In Smith v. Cook,8 4 while their action
to establish title to real estate was pending in the Supreme Court,
all the plaintiffs transferred certain mineral rights and one of the
plaintiffs sold all his title and interest to the land in controversy.
In an excellent opinion on rehearing, the court granted the defendant's motion to remand the case so as to permit him to avail
himself of the provisions of Article 2652. The case establishes the
rule that a defendant against whom only a portion of the thing in
litigation has been transferred may invoke the codal provision
and that the proper procedure when the transfer is effected pending appeal is by motion to remand."5
Article 2557 of the Civil Code gives to the buyer, when he is
disquieted in his possession or when he has just reason to apprehend that he will be disturbed, a right to suspend payment of the
price. By exception, he is denied this protection when he was informed of the danger of eviction before the sale. In Culver v.
Culver,6 pursuant to a judgment ordering a partition by licitation, property was adjudicated to a purchaser at a partition sale.
During the pendency of the partition suit, the parties thereto had
executed mineral leases and had conveyed the mineral rights to
various transferees. These facts, through constructive knowledge
of his agent, were known to the purchaser prior to adjudication.
In this suit brought by the adjudicatee to recover the purchase
money and to enjoin its distribution on the ground that the title
83. La. Act 326 of 1938 establishes a prescriptive period of two years from
the commission of a violation of restrictions in title to real estate. For a
discussion of this statute see Hebert and Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation
of 1938 (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 80, 112-114.

84. 189 La. 632, 180 So. 469 (1938).
85. Langston v. Shaw, 147 La. 644, 85 So. 624 (1920). It would seem that
the motion to remand is imperative in this situation because after judgment
the party cast could not invoke Article 2652. See Cucullu v. Hernandez, 103
U.S. 105, 26 L.Ed. 322 (1880) and authorities therein cited. But for an analogous case in which the motion to remand was improperly refused, see Gulf
Refining Co. v. Glassell, 185 La. 143, 168 So. 755 (1936).
86. 188 La. 716, 178 So. 252 (1938).
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was defective by virtue of the mineral leases, it was held that the
purchaser was not entitled to a return of the purchase price paid
since he was apprised of the adverse claims at the time of the
purchase. The claimants to the mineral rights were not before
the court and since it did not appear that the adjudicatee had yet
been dispossessed by litigation, the instant case very properly
applied Article 2557. The decision is in accord with earlier au8 7
thorities.
Lease
(a) Immovable Property. In Williams v. James,8 the lessor
of a filling station claimed an error in the description of a piece
of property that had been leased and refused to deliver it. On the
facts, this refusal was held not justified since there was no mistake in the thing intended and the property was easily identified.
In rendering judgment for specific performance in favor of the
plaintiff the court held that the term of the lease would be extended so as to begin with the date on which the lessee was permitted to take possession of the premises. This latter decision
was based upon analogy to extensions granted under oil and gas
leases.8 9 Another filling station lease, involved in Noel Estate,Inc. v.
Louisiana Oil Refining Corporation,° stipulated for a term of five
years "or as long thereafter as may be required to sell such quantities of gasoline and oils, which at the rate of one cent (lc) per
gallon for gasoline and fifteen cents (15c) per gallon for oils
would pay to the lessee the sum of Five Thousand ($5,000) Dollars." 1 Almost nine years after the lease was executed the plaintiff (lessor) sued to cancel the contract alleging abandonment of
the leased premises. Defendant's exception of no cause of action,
based on plaintiff's failure to put defendant in default, was overruled in the Supreme Court. It was held that the quoted clause
in the lease impliedly imposed a duty on the part of the lessee to
use and occupy the property until $5,000.00 should be realized
from the sale of gasoline and oils. The abandonment of the prem87. Bemiss v. Dwight, 3 La. Ann. 337 (1848); Bonnecaze v. Grannery, 5
La. Ann. 166 (1850); Municipality No. One v. Cordevoille & Lacroix, 19 La. 235
(1841); Bayley v. Denny, 26 La. Ann. 255 (1874). But cf. Jennings-Heywood
Oil Syndicate v. Home Oil & Development Co., 113 La. 383, 37 So. 1 (1904).
88. 188 La. 884, 178 So. 384 (1938).
89. Cf. Gulf Refining Co. v. Hayne, 148 La. 340, 86 So. 891 (1921); Standard
Oil Co. of La. v. Webb, 149 La. 245, 88 So. 808 (1921); Fomby v. Columbia
County Development Co., 155 La. 705, 99 So. 537 (1924).
90. 188 La. 45, 175 So. 744 (1937).
91. 188 La. at 46-47, 175 So. at 745.
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ises under these conditions constituted an active breach of92 the
contract and therefore a putting in default was unnecessary.
(b) Charter party. In Poydras Fruit Co., Inc. v. Weinberger
Banana Company, Inc.,9" the owner of a ship sued to recover its
value from a charterer who had been in possession of the vessel
when it was destroyed by fire. No allegations of negligence being
contained in plaintiff's petition, the case turned largely on questions of burden of proof under Article 2723 of the Civil Code and
presumptions of negligence applied in similar cases by the admiralty courts. With great clarity it was pointed out that under
Louisiana law, unlike the rule of the French Civil Code, a lessee
is liable for the destruction of leased property by fire only "when
it is proved that the same has happened either by his own fault
or neglect, or by that of his family."9 4 French law places the burden of proof on the lessee to show absence of negligence when
leased property is destroyed by fire, while Louisiana law places
the burden on the lessor to show that the fire was occasioned by
the lessee's negligence. On the particular facts involved, the court
held that the circumstances surrounding the origin of the fire
raised a strong presumption of fault or negligence on the part of
a fireman in the charterer's employ and the loss was placed on
the lessee because this presumption of negligence was not overcome by any other possible explanation of the fire's origin.
Partnership
In Champagne v. Keen95 the articles of agreement contained
a clause providing: "This partnership shall begin on June 1, 1928
and endure for ten years, as aforesaid, reserving to any partner
at the expiration of any twelve months period, but at least ninety
days previous to any such expiration [the right] of giving notice of
dissolution to the partner in writing for such time."9 6 After the
death of one of the partners on June 6, 1935, his widow and heirs
sold his share in the partnership to the surviving partner but
they reserved the right to sue for and claim a share of the profits
for a period of ninety (90) days after his death by virtue of the
quoted clause. It was held that the partnership terminated by the
92. Arts. 1931, 1932, La. Civil Code of 1870. Cf. Temple v. Lindsay, 182 La.
22, 161 So. 8 (1935), and Pipes v. Payne, 156 La. 791, 101 So. 144 (1924), both of
which were distinguished by the court from the instant case.
93. 189 La. 940, 181 So. 452 (1938).
94. Art. 2723, La. Civil Code of 1870; see also Art. 2721, La. Civil Code of
1870 and Arts. 1732, 1733, French Civil Code.
95. 189 La. 681, 180 So. 485 (1938).
96. 189 La. at 683, 180 So. at 486.
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death of one of the partners under the Code provisions.97 The
stipulation relied on by plaintiffs applied only to a dissolution of
the partnership during the lives of the partners and conferred no
rights after dissolution of the firm by death. It is difficult to see
how the argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiffs in this case
could have been seriously urged before the court as the clause is,
by its very terms, patently inapplicable.
Security Contracts
(a) Pledge. In the enforcement of the debt, Article 31658
requires a judicial sale of the property pledged unless a private
sale has been authorized by the pledgor. Rembert v. Fenner &
Beane99 construed this code provision strictly where the pledge
contract authorized the private sale of pledged securities whenever they afforded an insufficient margin to the broker who held
them. Since the brokers sold these securities only because they
did not care to continue the plaintiff's account any longer, and not
because of any insufficiency of margin, they were held responsible
for the damages suffered by the plaintiff in repurchasing like
securities.
(b) Continuing Guaranties. In the two cases involving continuing guaranty contracts, the court was able to clear up ambiguities by ascertaining the intent of the parties from other language
of the contract. In Interstate Trust & Banking Co. v. Sabatier10 the defense was interposed that the contract was only a
special guaranty personal to the plaintiff's transferor.10' The court
answered this argument by pointing out that the language whereby the defendants guaranteed payment of any indebtedness "owing to said bank, its successors and assigns" manifested the parties' intent that the contract was assignable. In Reconstruction
Finance Corporationv. Mickleberry10 2 the trial court had maintained an exception of no cause of action inter alia on the ground
that the guaranty contract sued on was unenforceable since it
was undated and several blanks therein had never been filled out.
In reversing the judgment appealed from, the Supreme Court
pointed out that a notation on the reverse of one of the two notes
sued on identified the guaranty contract with the note; hence the
97. Arts. 2876, 2880, 2882, La. Civil Code of 1870.
98. La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended by La. Act 9 of 1872.
99. 188 La. 385, 177 So. 247 (1937).
100. 189 La. 199, 179 So. 80 (1938).
101. Cf. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co. v. Barthet, 177 La. 652, 148 So. 906
(1933).
102. 189 La. 105, 179 So. 49 (1938).
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two should be read together and each construed with reference to
the other. The defense that indorsements on the reverse of one of
the notes showed its payment in full was rejected on the ground
that such indorsements were not sufficiently clear to show payment conclusively. This and other contentions'0 8 were held to
be matters of defense to be urged on the trial of the case on its
merits. The final defense that the defendants were discharged by
the release of one of the solidary guarantors was overruled, in
view of a full reservation of all rights against the other guarantors contained in such release.
(c) Suretyship. In Ocean Coffee Co. v. Employers Liability
Assur. Corp.104 the receiver of a corporation whose affairs were
being liquidated appropriated certain funds of the receivership,
illegally advancing a portion thereof to his son-in-law and retaining the balance. Such sums were set up on the receivership
books as accounts receivable due by the receiver and his son-inlaw. In due course of administration, all accounts receivable were
sold to plaintiff. The latter eventually brought this suit against
the surety on the receiver's bond to recover the sums wrongfully
appropriated. The court overruled the defense that the indebtedness could not be partially assigned without the surety's consent,
pointing out that the entire indebtedness had been assigned to
plaintiff. The further defense that the bond sued on was a special
guaranty enforceable only by persons acting for the corporation
was likewise overruled. The court held that the plaintiff stood in
the shoes of the corporation and the payment of the purchase
price of the accounts receivable had discharged neither the indebtedness nor the accessory suretyship.
Article 3061105 provides that the surety is discharged by any
act of the creditor which impairs the former's right of subrogation to the mortgages and privileges held by the latter. This doctrine was applied in Brewer v. Forshee'0 6 where the court held
that the act of the creditor in selling some of the movables af103. Additionally, the defendants contended that the second note sued on
was not mentioned in the guaranty contract and that this note was payable
to a bank other than the one in whose favor the guaranty contract was executed. The guaranty was for the prompt payment of all debts which the
maker of the note "may now or at any time, or times hereafter, owe, or be
liable to pay." Although the opinion does not show this clearly it seems that
the second note was held by the bank in whose favor the guaranty was executed at the time of its execution.
104. 189 La. 11, 179 So. 18 (1938).
105. La. Civil Code of 1870.
106. 189 La. 220, 179 So. 87 (1938).
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fected by a chattel mortgage discharged the guarantor of notes
secured thereby.
(d) Mortgages. In the parish of Orleans, the inscription of
recordation of a mortgage can be cancelled upon the mere presentation to the recorder of a notary public's certificate that the in10 7
debtedness has been paid and the mortgage note cancelled.
Despite recent conclusive proof of this system's potentialities for
fraud, the Legislature has failed to remedy the situation. Zimmer
0 8
v. Fryer'
was the fruit of this vicious system. Because it felt
that the purchaser could have avoided the loss by requiring the
production of the cancelled note to be paraphed for identification
with the notary's release of mortgage, 0 9 the court held that he
purchased the property subject to the illegally cancelled mortgage. A plea of discussion was properly overruled in view of its
inapplicability to property affected by a special mortgage. Similarly, the purchaser's plea of estoppel was overruled because of
his inability to prove knowledge by the mortgagee that he had
bought and was improving the property. Finally, the court held
that prescription of the mortgage note had been renounced by interest payments thereon by the maker.
(e) Chattel Mortgages. In the case of In re Ruston Creamery' 10 the lessor competed with a chattel mortgagee for the proceeds of the sale of property affected by the privileges of both.
The mortgage was recorded prior to the commencement of the
lease, but at the time of recordation the property was in the
leased premises under a previous lease. All rent due under the
latter had been paid. The court applied the doctrine that the lessor's privilege does not attach prior to the beginning of the term
of the lease, and held the lessor's privilege subordinate to that of
the chattel mortgage.
107. Art. 3374, La. Civil Code of 1870.
108. 190 La. 814, 183 So. 166 (1938).
109. Although the result of the case was undoubtedly correct, it would
appear that this argument imposes an intolerable burden upon purchasers of
property in Orleans parish. First, if the mortgage certificate shows no mortgages affecting the property, the purchaser would find it difficult to discover
the existence of any which may have been cancelled fraudulently. Second, in
some of the cases cleverly-forged facsimiles of the mortgage note have been
cancelled and paraphed for identification with the release. Without the services of an expert It may be difficult for the prospective purchaser to discover
the fraud. Apparently there are cases where even the maker of the note has
not been able to determine which note was genuine and which was spurious.
See Cassard v. Woolworth, 165 La. 571, 115 So. 755 (1928). The remedy lies,
not in the imposition of intolerable burdens upon third persons, but, in the
abolition of the vicious system which makes such fraud possible.
110. 190 La. 681, i82 So. 715 (1938).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I

(f) Antichresis. A pignorative contract seldom employed in
Louisiana today is the pledge of immovable property. Despite its
rarity, however, antichresisll played a leading role in one of the
most important cases (insofar as the value of property involved
is concerned) decided in recent years. As has been pointed out
hereinabove,112 Gautreaux v. Harang18 held that the contract in
controversy was one of antichresis rather than of sale. The defendants' demand for the reformation of the instrument, so as to
have it decreed a sale, was denied on dual grounds. The action
was held barred by the prescription of ten years; and the court
further found that clear and definite proof of mutual error was
lacking. All plaintiffs except an attorney had transferred to the
latter a half interest in the property as a contingent fee for professional services to be rendered and costs to be expended. The
nullity of this transfer, as the sale of a litigious right, was asserted by the defendants. Since, at the time of the transfer no
litigation was pending, this contention was properly overruled.
An instrument, executed by all plaintiffs except the attorney, purported to recognize the contract as a sale and further to quitclaim
to defendants any rights to the property which such plaintiffs
might have. This instrument was relied on confidently by defendants to defeat the claims of the plaintiffs executing it. The
court, however, found that it had been procured through false representations, and refused to give the instrument any effect. Defendants were unable to render any accounting of the revenues
of the property during the fourteen years in which they and their
father had possession thereof. Because of this, the court rejected
defendants' claim for judgment for the amount of principal and
interest .due on the debt, holding that the revenues of the property during this period would be presumed to have liquidated the
indebtedness in full.
Criticism of the action of the court in Gautreaux v. Harang
in excluding the testimony of the notary who drafted the instrument in controversy, offered for the alleged purpose of proving
the intention of the parties, would not appear to be justified. 1 '1
111. For a short but excellent discussion of this subject, see Comment
(1938) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 131.
112. Supra, p. 344.
113. 190 La. 1060, 183 So. 349 (1938). See Comment (1938) 13 Tulane L. Rev.
131.
114. Parol evidence is admissible to resolve the ambiguities of a written
instrument. But here, in effect, the court held that the recorded act of mortgage was made part of the instrument in controversy by reference, and that
when construed therewith the contract was not ambiguous. There is at least
one analogy which justifies this application of the doctrine of "incorporation
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Insofar as our jurisprudence is concerned, the most important
question presented was whether the debt must be set forth expressly in the instrument evidencing the antichresis. The trial
judge, looking only to the instrument itself and finding no definite indebtedness shown thereon, held that this essential of antichresis was lacking. He therefore held the contract to be a sale.
The appellate court disagreed with the court a qua, finding that
a definite indebtedness was shown by the instrument in controversy and the act of record to which it referred.115 Impliedly, the
per curiam opinion denying a rehearing recognized that the statement of a definite debt was an essential of antichresis. It found
this essential, however, in the instrument under controversy and
the recorded mortgage to which it referred.
(g) Miscellaneous. Interstate Trust & Banking Co. v. Breckenridge' 6 presented for adjudication the question of whether certain instruments were participating certificates issued in connection with the deposit of securities, or whether they were moneyed
obligations of a defunct securities company secured by a pledge
of these securities. Since the instruments evidenced no obligation
of the securities company to pay them, and as they were designated as such on their face, the court held them to be participating certificates.
D. SUCCESSIONS
Wills
(a) Form. A strict observance of the letter of the law on form
of wills is presented in the case of Soileau v. Ortego."1 Two of the
witnesses to a testament (alleged to be valid as a nuncupative will
under private act) were residents of another parish, leaving but
three witnesses and the notary as witnesses from the parish where
the testament was made. The court stated that the requirements
by reference." Art. 3306, La. Civil Code of 1870, requires a sufficient description of the property sought to be mortgaged to be stated in the act itself.
Our courts have held, however, that where an insufficient description in the

act of mortgage refers to a recorded act giving a full description of the
property, the mortgage is valid. Baker v. Bank of Louisiana, 2 La. Ann. 371
(1847); Thornhill v. Burthe, 29 La. Ann. 639 (1877).
115. This conclusion was based on the theory of incorporation by refer-

ence. It would seem that on this point, under a different approach, the French
courts would have gone much further than did the Supreme Court of Louisi-

ana. Parol evidence would have been received to show the indebtedness, if
there was present the commencement of proof in writing. 12 Planiol et Ripert,

Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1927) 282, no 285; Art. 1347, French
Civil Code. Certainly the instrument in controversy would have constituted
such commencement of proof in writing.
116. 189 La. 1057, 181 So. 535 (1938).

117. 189 La. 713, 180 So. 496 (1938).
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of Article 1581 of the Civil Code for a nuncupative testament under private signature were mandatory, and since the instrument
under examination failed to meet them, it was invalid. In the
1 8 the alleged testatrix died on November
Succession of Patterson"
26, 1936; on March 18, 1937 a purported will was found. The document is set forth for examination by the reader:
"To my three nieces-Nena H. Wadleigh
Pauline W. Markel
Maude W. Barton
I make a present of One Hundred shares of my First National Bank stock of Chicago, Illinois to be equally divided between them-which will not be included in my willGertrude P. Patterson
Alexandria, Louisiana
February first
Nineteen hundred twenty six."
The court found that the above was not testamentary in either
form or substance. Consequently, the succession was treated as
intestate and an administrator in the person of a great nephew of
the deceased was appointed.
(b) Interpretation. In the Succession of Ferrara" the original will in question was not set forth in toto and, consequently,
perhaps a fair estimate of the court's interpretation cannot be
reached. The court stated that "The only bequest made in the
will was the bequest to the husband, Salvatore Ferrara, of the
usufruct of whatever property the testatrix might own at the time
of her death. She declared in the will: 'At the death of my husband my property belongs to my heirs.' ",120 The testatrix left no
property except her share of the community, which the court held
was not covered by the words of her testament. Just what else
the testatrix could have meant seems hard to discover. Whatever
sound underlying reasons the court may have had for the decision, the plain intention of the testatrix, as disclosed by the cited
excerpt from the opinion, seems to have been entirely disregarded. In Succession of Provost121 the first question decided by
the court was one of interpretation of the will. A husband left
his disposable portion, one-third of his property, to his wife. He
118.
119.
120.
121.

188
189
189
190

La. 635, 177 So. 692 (1937).
Ia. 590, 180 So. 418 (1938).
La. at 594, 180 So. at 420.
La. 30, 181 So. 802 (1938).
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also left her a specific bequest of movables. Children of a previous marriage insisted that this bequest of movables was the
only gift, although the testament used the words "included in this
one-third." The bequest was very properly held to be one-third
of the estate of the deceased. The second contention concerned
an accounting between the community and the separate estate of
the testator. Plaintiff failed to show that certain separate funds
were actually used for the benefit of the community and furthermore, was unable to prove what part of certain funds belonged
to the community and what to the separate estate. Plaintiff's demands were therefore rejected.
(c) Marital Portion. In Succession of Tacon 122 the court laid
down the principles that a widow may claim either the marital
portion or the $1,000 homestead, and that a succession does not
have to be insolvent in order for her to elect the latter if she cares
to, and finds it to her advantage. In Succession of Tacon,12 pre-

senting another phase of the same claim, the sole question was
the correctness of an item charging the widow with the value of
the occupancy of property belonging to the succession. This
charge was not allowed as it was unsupported by the evidence. In
Taylor v. Taylor 124 the plantiff, husband, was awarded the marital
portion in imperfect usufruct. The deceased wife had died intestate leaving one adopted child. The contention was that since
the deceased wife did not obtain delivery of her share of her
mother's estate before her death, that the financial condition of
the husband had not been changed, so as to leave him "poor" in
the sense of having been suddenly bereaved of accustomed afflu-"
ence. The court, recognizing the doctrine of le mort saisit le vif,
declared that the inheritance of the wife's share of her mother's
estate had -actually been hers. There was additional proof that
she had been receiving and spending the revenues sent by the
administrator of her mother's estate. The marital fourth was
awarded in imperfect usufruct, since the estate was in negotiable
bonds. The court decided after careful deliberation and a full review of authorities, that the husband did not have to give security as his usufruct was a legal one and no issue of a previous
marriage was left, but only an adopted child of the husband and
wife. The cases of Conner v. Administrators and Heirs of Con122. 188 La. 510, 177 So. 590 (1937), noted in (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 639.
123. 190 La. 158, 182 So. 133 (1938).
124. 189 La. 1084, 181 So. 543 (1938), noted in (1938) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 154.
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net'25 and Waring v. Zunts 26 were overruled insofar as they conflicted with the decision on the security point.
Miscellaneous
In the case of Succession of Haydel,12 the testator left a will
giving a piece of community property to his natural child. His
interdicted wife's curatrix wished to set aside the will on the
ground that the natural child was adulterine. The will was good
under the plain terms of Article 1488. The only valid attack would
have been one to reduce the amount of the legacy. Since the donation was not excessive for support, it was not subject to reduction.
The judgment was, of course, excellent and followed the unmistakable language of the Civil Code.
The Succession of Vance 12 dealt simply with the matter of
homologating an inventory, appraisals of land, and so forth. The
lower court's judgment was wisely affirmed.
In Perryman v. Trimble.29 after the death of the lessor, the
plaintiff lessee availed himself of Act 123 of 1922130 and deposited
his rent in court, as the children and widow in community were
both claiming it. The children tried to prove that the mother had
renounced the usufruct on the community property, but they
failed in this proof, and the mother, of course, was awarded all
the rent as a civil fruit of her usufruct.
The case of Succession of Faust' was a simple matter of reducing a remunerative donation to the estimated value of nursing
services rendered. The gifts inter vivos in question were bonds
given to two daughters by the mother. After a proper value was
placed upon the services the rest of the gift had to be collated.
Tillery v. Fuller'32 was a petitory action. The case is largely
concerned with a matter of proof in an unsuccessful attempt to
rebut the presumption that property bought during coverture
falls into the community. Application of familiar rules of prescription appear. The rule of suspension during minority was applied to Article 1030 of the Civil Code, giving 30 years within
which an heir may elect to accept or reject a succession. If no
acceptance is made within the period "his failure to accept will
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

13 La. Ann. 157 (1858).
16 La. Ann. 49 (1861).
188 La. 646, 177 So. 695 (1937).
189 La. 176, 179 So. 72 (1938).
189 La. 398, 179 So. 577 (1938).
Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1556.
189 La. 417, 179 So. 583 (1938).
190 La. 586, 182 So. 683 (1938).
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inure to the benefit of any co-heir or co-heirs who may have accepted, or of any heir next in degree who may have accepted, by
going into possession of the estate."' 133
In Jung v. Stewart 3 4 the court held that a notary was confined
to the ministerial duty of carrying out the court's judgment order
for partition and should have limited himself to that alone. Plaintiffs were not precluded from demanding collation, as that matter
had not been the issue and was not referred to in the judgment
for partition. The notary's inclusion of the item of collation was
beyond his province and of no effect.
In Succession of Elmer' the testator left everything to his
second wife. His six children filed opposition to the account rendered by the widow, executrix. The case is a factual resum6 of
their claims and the calculation of the children's l6gitime. The plea
that the second wife lived in open concubinage with the deceased
prior to his first wife's death was unavailing under Article 1481 of
the Civil Code, as the bequest was made to her after she was the
wife of the testator.

E.

MINERAL RIGHTS

The case of Producers Oil & Gas Co., Inc. v. Continental Securities Corp. 136 is a case of strict interpretation of the terms of a
lease. Certain sand was penetrated which was productive of gas
in the locality of the well, but production was not such as was required to keep the lease in force. There was a cessation of operations for more than thirty consecutive days, which was contrary to
the operation clause of the lease. The case of Clingman v. Devonian Oil Co.5 7 presented a question said to be identical with
that of Le Rosen v. North Central Texas Oil Co., Inc. 38 The assignee of an oil and gas lease deposited the rental in a bank to the
credit of the lessor and the lessor's wife. The court decided that
this did not place the sum within the sole control of the lessor
who as husband was head and master of the community, because
the law allows a wife to draw against such an account without the
husband's authority or consent. The Chief Justice dissented as he
had in the Le Rosen case. The rule seems manifestly unfair to
honest lessees. The money was available to the husband within
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

190
190
189
188
188
169

La. at 664-665, 182 So. at 709.
La. 91, 181 So. 867 (1938).
La. 1016, 181 So. 477 (1938).
La. 564, 177 So. 668 (1937).
La. 310, 177 So. 59 (1937), noted in (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 465.
La. 973, 126 So. 442 (1930).
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the terms provided and the mere fact that the wife could have
withdrawn it, which she did not, is a small technicality upon
which to base the lapse of a valuable right. In United Gas Public
Service Co. v. Mitchell 19 an imperfect description in an assignment of lease was held not to bind a small tract included in the
blanket clause of the original lease purporting to cover all contiguous lands of the lessor.
In Andrus v. Tidewater Oil Co. 1 40 a minors' lease was at

issue. The defendant oil company contended that rentals were to
be paid prior to February 12, 1935 within 12 months from the date
the lease was executed. The plaintiffs contended that rentals
were to be paid in advance of October 29, 1935 under the provisions of the lease. The order of the court granting the right to
lease the minors' property showed that the lease was to be for a
primary term of five years, beginning October 29, 1934. The court
held, in protecting the minor from the least injury, that the dates
set out in the order of court from which the lease got its binding
force should rule.
The case of Logan v. Tholl Oil Co.14 ' raised the question as to

when a lease terminates because of cessation of production in paying quantities. The question, of course, is factual. After finding
that four wells had been abandoned and that the remaining four
were small pumpers, producing only about one-third of a barrel
each and giving plaintiff slightly over $5.00 per month, it was
held that the lease had ceased to produce in paying quantities
within the meaning and terms of the contract. Damages were allowed only for attorney's fees in the amount of $500.00 with legal
interest from judicial demand. The case of Louisiana Canal Co.
v. Heyd 42 again raised the question of division of royalty. The
court made it plain that from the mere fact of the parties joining
in the same lease contract there does not arise a presumption that
they intended to pool. The rule laid down is one of intention of
the parties for which no hard and fast principle of interpretation
can be given. The court was not guided by any knowledge of acts
of the parties before the discovery of oil which would indicate the
construction which they, themselves, had put upon the contract;
but it decided, as a reasonable conclusion of intention, that the
contract showed agreement to share ratably-in proportion to
acreage-in royalties from oil produced from any part of the tract.
139.
140.
141.
142.

188
189
189
189

La.
La.
La.
La.

651,
142,
645,
903,

177
179
180
181

So.
So.
So.
So.

697 (1937).
61 (1938).
473 (1938).
439 (1938).
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The settled question was again referred to that, where two adjacent tracts of land owned by different parties are covered by the
same lease, development of any part keeps the lease alive as to
the whole. The case of Tomlinson v. Thurmon'43 reiterated the
doctrine that a mineral lease is an incorporeal right, that the sale
of such a lease carries an implied warranty, and that the lessor is
answerable for damage and loss sustained by the lessee in case of
eviction, citing Gulf Refining Co. v. Glasse1l.14 The court also
restated the principle of Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co.141 that
where a lessee transferred the lease without retaining an overriding royalty, an assignment and not a sublease resulted.
The case of Kennedy v. Pelican Well Tool Supply Co.1 6 is a
very important one in the annals. The issue was whether the
signing of a lease by certain land owners and the defendant company, mineral right owner, was a joint lease which had the effect
of interrupting the running of prescription against the mineral
rights, under the authority of Mulhern v. Hayne.4 7 Conceding the
doctrine of the Mulhern case that a joint lease would have the
effect of interrupting prescription, the court found that the lease
in the instant case was not a joint lease. The lease was signed
by the land owners without knowledge that the holder of the mineral rights would later be asked or permitted to sign the same
lease. The court found that not a joint lease but separate leases
had been confected which did not have the effect of acknowledgment and, hence, did not interrupt prescription.
The case of Goldsmith v. McCoy'4 8 presented a plea of acknowledgment to interrupt prescription of a mineral right by
statements made in an unrecorded lease. The court found that the
statements relied upon were mere acknowledgments of ownership and were unaccompanied by any statements of purpose or
intention to interrupt the prescription then accruing. The case is
very important for the fact that it may be said to settle the question of recordation of acknowledgment. The court clearly stated
that any contract, whether intended to create or acknowledge an
existing servitude, must be recorded in order to effect third parties in good faith.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

189
186
173
188
171
190

La. 959, 181 So. 458 (1938).
La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936).
La. 313, 137 So. 46 (1931).
La. 811, 178 So. 359 (1938).
La. 1003, 132 So. 659 (1931).
La. 320, 182 So. 519 (1938).
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In Superior Oil Producing Co. v. Leckelt 149 co-owners were
held to have consented to a mineral lease by acquiescing in the
payment of certain royalties. They consented to the receipt of
benefits of the servitude and thereby consented to its use, which
interrupted the running of prescription. The case of English v.
50
Blackman'
set forth with great clarity and full documentation
the two rules involved, namely: that an acknowledgment alone
of any variety will not interrupt prescription, but when coupled
with a clear intent and purpose to have that effect the court will
recognize the party's privilege to so deal with his right. The law
being very "clear," all that the court had to do was to find out
from the evidence the intent of the party against whom prescription was pleaded. Though the evidence was conflicting and the
court recognized that"... financial interest does sometimes 'warp
men from the living truth,' ,,151 the landowner's corroborative
testimony was believed that he did not have any "agreement"
with regard to the lease, that he had never had any "consultation" with the adverse parties, that he did not know they intended
to sign the lease later, and "emphatically" that no other names appeared as lessors in the document when he signed it. One "certain" fact appeared, that the parties did not sign the lease in the
presence of one another. While obviously that fact can scarcely
be said to be necessary or sacramental to the proof of a lease
"joint" and with "intent" to interrupt, certainly it is a most persuasive one in the absence of other evidence of "clear intent."
Estoppel was also pleaded in this case by virtue of accepted benefits but was unsuccessful.
The case of Ford v. Williams152 reaffirmed the rule of Sample
v. Whitaker,5 3 holding that the minority of an heir to a mineral
servitude suspends the prescription of ten years non-user of that
right. The facts vary slightly. One Mading held a 1/64 interest
in the mineral servitude as community property; his wife died
leaving a five months' old child; the mineral interests which this
child inherited from her mother, 1/128, was adjudicated later to
the father by the district court. Thereafter, but still within the
ten-year prescriptive period, the father died, leaving the minor
as his sole heir. The petition for cancellation itself showed "that
149. 189
189 La. 990,
150. 189
151. 189
152. 189
153. 172

La. 972, 181 So. 462 (1938); See also Superior Oil Co. v. Leckelt,
181 So. 468 (1938).
La. 255, 179 So. 306 (1938).
La. at 264, 179 So. at 309 (1938).
La. 229, 179 So. 298 (1938).
La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931).
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there was never a continuous period of as much as ten years during which the minor . . . did not own an interest in the servitude.'' 11 4 The court held that prescription against the servitude as
a whole and as to all parties holding an interest, was suspended
during the period of five months and one day that the minor held
an interest, from the date of her mother's death until the adjudication of her interest to her father; and that the prescription ran
again during the term of her father's possession and was suspended again at his death, when his 1/64 interest vested in the
minor. The mineral servitude was expressly declared to be a
"heritable" servitude, which had been tacitly held in Sample v.
Whitaker'5 and indicated in other decisions, notably, in the
foundation servitude case of Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sal56
ling's Heirs.1
A new and interesting theory was introduced in
the instant case as counsel's second contention, to the effect that
suspension for minority should not have resulted during the interim between the mother's death and adjudication of the minor's
interest to the father, because during that term, the father held a
usufruct of the minor's interest and the burden was upon him as
usufructuary to exercise the servitude. This theory is well supported by the articles of the Civil Code. The court simply stated
that "Conceding without holding that the father as usufructuary
could have exercised the rights which counsel say he could, it
does not follow that his failure to do so' 57deprived his minor child
1
of the benefit which the law gives her.'
The case of Childs v. Porter-Wadley Lumber Co. 58 illustrates
the situation where prescription began to run against the minor.
The minor was a stockholder in a corporation and at the dissolution of the corporation, a fractional interest in the mineral servitude vested in her. Suit for slander of title was brought by a possessor of the land whose deed of exchange contained no mention
of an outstanding servitude. This possessor was in good faith
though he obtained the property from his brother whose deed recited the mineral reservation which had also been registered in
the parish conveyance records. Prescription began to run against
the minor and her co-owners when the land was conveyed to
plaintiff, but "could not accrue until she reached the age of twen154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

189
172
150
189
190

La.
La.
La.
La.
La.

229,
722,
756,
229,
308,

234, 179 So. 298, 299 (1938).
135 So. 38 (1931).
91 So. 207 (1922).
240, 179 So. 298, 301 (1938).
182 So. 516 (1938).
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ty-two years."'15 9 When the minor became 22, however, the owner
of the land had possessed it for only eight years, four months and
eleven days. Even giving the defendant the benefit of the possibility that prescription did not begin to run against the minor
until "the effective date of Act 64 of 1924, '' 160 the suit was filed
more than ten years from that time.
The case of Roy 0. Martin Lumber Co. v. Hodge-Hunt Lumber Co. 16 1 presents a case of donation to two minors of a 1/64 interest, each, in mineral rights. No use of the right was made during the ten year period and when cancellation was sued for, the
plea of suspension because of the minors' interests was entered.
The donor practically admitted that the gifts were made for the
purpose of suspending prescription but the contention was made
"that the motive of the donors is immaterial if they complied with
the law and that one taking advantage of any provisions of the
law which are favorable to him is entirely within his legal rights
and is not guilty of any fraudulent or immoral conduct, citing,
'One cannot be guilty of fraud by doing what he has a legal right
to do. A Court does not inquire into one's motives for doing a
lawful act.' ,,12 The Court considered the donation under all the
circumstances to be a simulation and refused to grant a suspension. It said: "We are not confronted with a case where we are
called on to protect a minor's interest but are confronted with a
case wherein minors are interposed for the sole purpose of defeating the landowner of his rights and one where a corporation
is seeking by manipulation and subterfuge to continue a servitude
without developing or producing oil or making any effort to that
end as was contemplated by the parties when the servitude was
granted.' 1 8- There seems to be no good reason why a bona fide
donation inter vivos or mortis causa to a minor should not have
the same effect as the legally inherited interest in the Sample
case had, if it occurred at a time and under circumstances which
were "not suspicious." The person of his donor, the amount of the
donation and the purpose of the gift would obviously have to be
considered.
159. 190 La. 308, 317, 182 So. 516, 518 (1938).
160. 190 La. at 317, 182 So. at 518. (La. Act 64 of 1924 amended Art. 3478,
La. Civil Code of 1870.)
161. 190 La. 84, 181 So. 865 (1938).
162. 190 La. at 88, 181 So. at 866.
163. 190 La. at 90, 181 So. at 867.
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F. PRESCRIPTION
Liberandi causa. All actions to annul public sales affected on0 4
ly with relative nullities are prescribed in two years.1
In Phoe1 5
nix Building & Homestead Ass'n v. Meraux
plaintiff's action
for specific performance of a contract to sell was resisted on the
ground that plaintiff's title was defective. It was contended that
a judicial sale constituting a link thereof was null because it was
held on the Saturday following the date of sale scheduled by the
advertisement. This defect was held to be a relative nullity,
cured by the lapse of two years. In Ernest Realty Co. v. Hunter
Co. 16 plaintiff's jactitory action was resisted by the plea of a superior title in defendant. The latter deraigned title through a judicial sale which plaintiff contended was null since the advertisement thereof was not published in a newspaper, but in a legal
trade paper. Again the court applied the prescription, holding
that this relative nullity'6 7 had been cured by the lapse of the
prescriptive period. To plaintiff's argument that, under the doctrine quae temporalia, prescription could not be invoked against
him, the court properly answered that since the action sought to
improve rather than to preserve plaintiff's position, the maxim
was not applicable.
Of the other two cases involving prescription liberandi causa,
one applied the trite principle that prescription would not run
against a creditor holding a pledge to secure the debt. 1 8 In the
other, McGuire v. Monroe Scrap MaterialCo., 6 9 the doctrine contra non valentem was extended. 70 It was held that prescription
barring an action to recover the value of property wrongfully appropriated did not commence to run until the owner discovered
the identity of the person wrongfully appropriating the property.
Acquirendi Causa. Of the seven cases involving this type of
164. Art. 3543, La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended by La. Act 231 of 1932.
The prescription is five years when minors or interdicts are affected.
165. 189 La. 819, 180 So. 648 (1938).
166. 189 La. 379, 179 So. 460 (1938).
167. Advertisement of the judicial sale in a legal trade paper instead of a
newspaper was likewise held to be a relative nullity in Williams v. Burnham,
189 La. 376, 179 So. 459 (1938). There the judicial sale was held to have been
ratified by the mortgagor's acceptance of a lease of the property from the
adjudicatee.
168. Liberty Homestead v. Pasqua, 190 La. 25, 181 So. 801 (1938).
169. 189 La. 573, 180 So. 413 (1938).
170.' The holding supra goes somewhat beyond the previous limits of the
doctrine. Cf. Reynolds v. Batson, 11 La. Ann. 729, 730 (1856). See also, Comment (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 244. But see, Jones v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 125
La. 542, 547, 51 So. 582, 584, 136 Am. St. Rep. 339 (1910).
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2
prescription, one"' involved only factual issues. In Hill v. Dees"
the court applied the general rule that one co-owner cannot prescribe against the title of another.1 73 In Crawford,Jenkins & Booth
v. Wills 174 it was held that where the owners of property did not
go into possession until more than three years after a valid tax
sale to another, their possession subsequently would not affect the
title to the property unless it continued for 30 years.

A lesser corporeal possession is required of one asserting title
to timber lands through the prescription of 10 years than would
be necessary to acquire title to cultivated lands under an adverse
possession of 30 years.17 In Zylks v. Kaempfer 6 the prescription
of 10 years was pleaded to an action to recover an undivided interest in a tract of land, the greater portion of which was wooded,
and only a very small part of which was under cultivation. The
court held the following sufficient to constitute the necessary corporeal possession: granting of rights of way for a railroad and
public highways; sale of merchantable timber; and execution of a
mineral lease thereon. The possession of defendant and her ancestors was held sufficient to acquire title by the prescription of
10 years where they possessed as owners and had no contractual
relationships with the plaintiffs.
Article 3498177 announces the general rule that possession of
a portion of land by a person holding title thereto is presumed to
be possession of the whole. Feazel v. Peek"8 applied the doctrine
to the case where the defendant, under an ostensible title translative of ownership, in good faith took possession of a portion of
the land involved with the intention of possessing the entire tract
as owner, and the court held that he acquired a valid title to the
entire tract under the prescription of 10 years. One difficulty with
this doctrine of constructive possession is presented when two adverse claimants take corporeal possession of different portions of
the property, each intending to possess the whole as owner. Ob171. Gibson v. Fitts, 189 La. 753, 180 So. 509 (1938).
172. 188 La. 708, 178 So. 250 (1938).
173. It is possible for one co-owner to prescribe against the title of another, but "his possession [must be] so clearly hostile and adverse to the
rights of the other that notice will be given to the latter of the intent ,to
henceforth hold animo domini all of the common property." Comment (1938)
12 Tulane L. Rev. 608, 620. See also, Liles v. Pitts, 145 La. 650, 82 So. 735
(1919).
174. 189 La. 366, 179 So. 455 (1938).
175. Comment (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 608.
176. 189 La. 609, 180 So. 425 (1938).
177. La. Civil Code of 1870.
178. 189 La. 61, 179 So. 35 (1938).
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viously, the presumption voiced by the code provision cannot result in both having possession of the whole simultaneously. Ernest
Realty Co. v. Hunter Co. 179 applied one of the well settled exceptions to the rule. There, the defendant had a prior corporeal possession of the property, and it was held that plaintiff acquired
possession only of such property as he had actually possessed and
occupied, by enclosures and other vestiges of possession; and the
burden of proving the extent of such actual possession was held
to be on plaintiff.
Tyson v. Spearman, s0 presenting principally factual issues,
involved the title to valuable oil lands in the Rodessa field. Plaintiffs sought to recover a half interest therein on the ground that
they or their ancestors were five of the ten natural children of
Louisa Tyson, a former owner of the property. Defendants had
acquired the property from the other five irregular heirs. Finding
that all of the defendants were chargeable with notice of sufficient
facts to preclude them from relying upon the "estoppel" sanctioned by Article 1839,181 and that there was no sufficient possession to prove the prescription of 10 years pleaded, the court overruled both defenses. The principle that the prescription of 10
years cannot be bottomed on an act of sale which effected a conventional partition was affirmed, the court pointing out that a
partition was not translative of title but merely declaratory
thereof.
IV.

TORTS AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

Torts
Negligence, and libel and slander make up the cases disposed
of by the Supreme Court in the field of torts during the past term.
Negligence. The negligence cases involve automobile or railroad collisions. Nothing new is brought to light in them. Aaron
v. Martin' tends to restrict the doctrine that negligence of a driver
may not be imputed to the guest. Here the guest in the automobile was held contributorily negligent for failure to warn the
driver of an impending collision with a train. The court disavowed adherence to the doctrine that a guest in an automobile
may have the negligence of the driver imputed to him. But if
179. 189 La. 379, 179 So. 460 (1938).
180. 190 La. 871, 183 So. 201 (1938).
181. La. Civil Code of 1870.
1. 188 La. 371, 177 So. 242 (1937).
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failure to warn is held to be independent contributory negligence,
the doctrine of imputability is hardly needed in many cases.
The doctrine of "last clear chance" came before the court in
two cases. In Jackson v. Cook 2 it was held that a motorist, who
failed to keep a proper lookout, was liable for striking a drunken
pedestrian who was negligently on the highway. In Russo v.
Texas & Pacific Railway Company3 failure of a locomotive engineer to keep a sharp lookout, thus not noticing a pedestrian walking down the track, was held to subject the railroad to liability on
the doctrine of last clear chance. These two cases clearly indicate
that the Louisiana court does not look with favor upon the limitation of liability to "discovered peril" but extends it to perils
which should be discovered.
LouisianaPower and Light Co. v. Saia4 held that the defendants have the right to raise the issue of contributory negligence
by exceptions of no right or cause of action where plaintiffs' only
reason for failing to see a parked unlighted truck and trailer was
that "it was quite dark." The doctrine that a motorist is held to
have seen an object which, by the exercise of ordinary care he
would have seen in time to avoid running into, served to bring
the plaintiff to grief here. To drive at a greater speed than that
which will permit one to stop within the range of vision is negligence.
A non-resident defendant claimed that substituted service
was inefficacious where the injury occurred on a side road, since
the statute refers to public highways. Strangely enough, this contention was successful in the trial court. Upon appeal, the ruling
was reversed by the Supreme Court. Galloway v. Wyatt Sheet
Metal & Boiler Works.5
Libel and Slander and Malicious Prosecution." A minister of
the gospel, while riding on a bus, was seized with an apoplectic
fit. Though conscious, he was unable to make any sign. When
the bus reached the terminal and the plaintiff failed to leave, the
employees of the defendant assumed he was drunk and deposited
him on a bench in the waiting room. Shortly thereafter the plaintiff was discovered prone on the floor. The ticket seller of the de2. 189 La. 860, 181 So. 195 (1938).
3. 189 La. 1042, 181 So. 485 (1938).
4. 188 La. 358, 177 So. 238 (1938).
5. 189 La. 837, 181 So. 187 (1938).
6. In Calavartenos v. Southeastern Raw Fur Merchants of La., 189 La.
94, 179 So. 46 (1938), it was held that the evidence was insufficient to show
that the plaintiff acted maliciously and in bad faith in bringing the suit.
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fendant, likewise assuming that the plaintiff was drunk, telephoned the police that a drunken man was lying on the waiting
room floor. The police took him to headquarters, booked him on
a charge of drunkenness, threw him on a cot in a cell, from which
he slipped to the floor, and left him there for 24 hours. The plaintiff asked damages from the defendant for suffering due to neglect
and to his treatment at the hands of the police, and for slander
to his name and reputation.
It was held that the defendant's servants were responsible for
the inhuman treatment which the plaintiff received in the bus
station and in the jail. For injury to his reputation, although it
was shown that none of the plaintiff's parishioners believed the
defamatory statements, the court awarded him what it called
nominal damages, in the amount of $1000.00. Searcy v. Interurban
Transportation Co.'
The opinion does not discuss the problem of proximate or concurrent causation. If it had, this phase of the case would have
been a distinct contribution to the tort jurisprudence of the state.
It is apparent that the court was revolted by the inhuman treatment accorded one who, while in a helpless condition, was allowed to remain 24 hours without medical attention. The bus
company's defense that its servants thought in good faith that the
man was drunk, was unavailing. The moral to be drawn from the
decision is obvious: since dead drunkenness and apoplexy are
conditions hard to differentiate, it is the part of wisdom, if not of
humanity, for common carriers to accord everyone so disabled the
benefit of prompt medical attention.
In Lewis v. LouisianaWeekly Pub. Co." a newspaper was held
liable for defamatory statements concerning an employment
agency. In Wisemore v. First National Life Insurance Co.9 an insurance company was held liable on the doctrine of respondeat
superior for slanderous statements of its agent concerning an
agent of a rival company. There was evidence that the defamatory remarks were made in the presence of third parties whom
the plaintiff was soliciting for business and whom the defendant's
agent had called upon for the purpose of "getting them to keep in
force their insurance contracts which they already had with the
defendant company."
7. 189 La. 183, 179 So. 75 (1938).
8. 189 La. 281, 179 So. 315 (1938).
9. 190 La. 1011, 183 So. 247 (1938), noted infra p. 449.
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The majority of the court felt that these remarks were made
not only in the course of the employment but also within its
scope. Mr. Justice Odom in dissenting, took a narrower view of
the case. To his mind, the defamation was not within the scope
of the employment.
Workmen's Compensation
Easily the most important decision on Workmen's Compensation during the last term was the case of Harris v. Southern Carbon Co. 10 Here the court held, in interpreting section 20 of Act
20 of 1914 as amended,1 that after final judgment awarding a specific sum for partial disability, the injured workman may sue
anew for increased disability resulting from spread of infection.
Three judges dissented, Mr. Justice Land remarking that the
courts had no mandate to rewrite the compensation statute.
It was agreed by all that had this been an ordinary law suit,
the doctrine of res judicata would have barred the plaintiff. The
majority of the court, doubtless realizing that the plea of res judicata is an anomaly in the administration of continuing remedial
statutes such as Workmen's Compensation Acts, felt impelled to
deny the defense. The case is a good illustration of one of the
chief difficulties with judicial administration of Workmen's Compensation. Constant supervision and flexible control are requisite
to adequate administration of such matters. Courts are tempted
to depart from their proper functions and to torture their procedure unduly when faced with problems of this sort.
In Rogers v. Mengel Co. 12 it was held that a logger injured
while warming himself at a fire prior to returning home after
learning that there would be no work that day because of inclement weather was held to have been injured in the course of employment. In Stieffel v. Valentine Sugars, Inc.11 the court ruled
that seasonal employment of short duration, prompted by employers' sympathy, does not prevent an injured employee from recovering for total and permanent disability.
Jones v. Husicker4 held that under the head of medical expenses an injured workman may not recover for fees charged by
physicians for testifying as expert witnesses; Nevils v. Valentine
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

189
By
189
188
188

La. 992, 181 So. 469 (1938).
La. Act 85 of 1926, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 4410].
La. 723, 180 So. 499 (1938).
La. 1091, 179 So. 6 (1938).
La. 468, 177 So. 576 (1938).
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Sugar Co. 15 was a ruling that the evidence sustained the lower
court's finding that the workman was a malingerer; and Osborne
v. McWilliams Dredging Co. 6 decided that supplemental pleading showed that the injury occurred in the scope of employment.
Finally, in Rogers v. City of Hammond 7 it was held that a
workman who wishes to dismiss a suit may do so regardless of
the desire of his counsel to pursue an appeal. Apparently a
lawyer has no vested interest in a workmen's compensation case.
V.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

Fifty criminal cases were decided during the judicial year
1937-1938--almost one-fifth of all the cases considered by the
court. Of these, 33 were affirmed; in 17 the*Supreme Court reversed, remanded, or otherwise set aside the decision of the district court.' These figures indicate that there is one chance in
15. 188 La. 498, 177 So. 586 (1938).
16. 189 La. 670, 180 So. 481 (1938).
17. 190 La. 1005, 183 So. 245 (1938).
1. The lower court rulings were set aside for the following reasons: failure properly to give notice of meeting to two jury commissioners, State v.
Milton, 188 La. 423, 177 So. 260 (1937); a grand juror was disqualified because
a felony charge initiated in 1905 was still on file, State v. Gunter, 188 La. 314,
177 So. 60 (1937); failure of indictment to allege an essential element, State v.
Gendusa, 190 La. 422, 182 So. 559 (1938); finding that the accused, tried in a
district court, was under 17 when the "offense" was committed, State v. Connally, 190 La. 175, 182 So. 318 (1938); Invalidity of a liquor ordinance, State v.
Reed, 188 La. 402, 177 So. 252 (1937), State v. Leatherman, 188 La. 411, 177 So.
255 (1937), State v. Lawrence, 188 La. 410, 177 So. 255 (1937), State v. Well, 188
La. 430, 177 So. 369 (1937), State v. Wactor, 189 La. 535, 179 So. 865 (1938); unconstitutionality of a local statute prohibiting trapping, State v. Tabor, 189
La. 253, 179 So. 306 (1938); State v. Clement, 188 La. 923, 178 So. 493 (1938);
jury's viewing scene of crime in absence of accused, State v. Pepper, 189 La.
795, 180 So. 640 (1938); transcript incomplete, State v. Pepper, 189 La. 802,
180 So. 642 (1938); for prescription, accused must be fugitive from Louisiana
justice, not from that of another state, State v. Berryhill, 188 La. 550, 177 So.
663 (1937); habeas corpus dismissed because accused had waived defects in
indictment, State v. Chicola, 188 La. 694, 177 So. 804 (1937); father's letter concerning custody of his child was not libelous, State v. Lambert, 188 La. 968,
178 So. 508 (1938); a juror, charged with perjury on his voir dire, should have
been permitted to show that he voted for conviction, State v. Serpas, 188 La.
1074, 179 So. 1 (1938).
The above recital is hardly an adequate index of the variety of issues presented by the criminal jurisprudence of the past year. The most important
problems will be discussed in the text in some detail. As a very general characterization, it may be stated that the decisions deal with questions of procedure, evidence, pleading, administration, interpretation of statutes, substantive law, and constitutionality. Most important in this last field is State v.
Pierre, 189 La. 764, 180 So. 630 (1938), involving the question whether negroes
were improperly excluded from the juries. The United States Supreme Court
has granted certiorari in this case, 59 S.Ct. 100 (1938). The same issue was
Ineffectively raised in State v. Walker, 189 La. 241, 179 So. 302 (1938), and in
State v. Dierlamm, 189 La. 544, 180 So. 135 (1938) where the accused was a
white man.
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three of having a district court judgment in a criminal case reversed on appeal. This seems high.2 But it cannot be inferred
that the trial courts are correspondingly incompetent. A reading
of the cases suggests rather that the criminal law of Louisiana,
especially that part of it dealing with pleading, procedure and evidence, is in an uncertain and at times a very confusing condition.
In some instances it is also apparent that, although the problem
arises as a procedural one, the root of the difficulty is in the substantive law.
One of the most important problems dealt with in the year's
jurisprudence has to do with aggravated assaults and batteries.
The issues are revealed in three cases.
In State v. Antoine 8 the charge was "cutting with a dangerous
weapon with intent to murder," and the defendant was convicted
of "cutting with a dangerous weapon with intent to kill." Counsel for defendant had moved that the jury be instructed to return
one of the following verdicts: "(1) Guilty as charged, or (2) guilty of cutting with a dangerous weapon with intent to kill, or (3)
guilty of cutting with a dangerous weapon with intent to kill and
wounding less than mayhem, or (4) guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon, or (5) guilty of assault and battery, or (6) not
guilty."' The court charged only (1), (2) and (6), and rejected
the others on the ground that they were not responsive. This
judgment was affirmed.
As to instruction (3) (less than mayhem), the court's opinion
seeks support by reference to assertions in prior jurisprudence to
the effect that a charge under section 794 of the Revised Statutes5
is not included in section 791.6 The most recent case thus referred
to, State v. Mitchell, is a similar decision which in turn refers to
State v. Murdoch8 and State v. Jacques." The Murdoch case would
have been eminently worth studying for it reveals a sharp cleavage in decision, a remarkably well reasoned opinion by Mr. Jus2. However four of the reversals dealt with a Rapides ordinance which
was declared invalid. State v. Reed, 188 La. 402, 177 So. 252 (1937), State v.
Lawrence, 188 La. 410, 177 So. 255 (1937), State v. Leatherman, 188 La. 411, 177
So. 255 (1937), State v. Weil, 188 La. 430, 177 So. 369 (1937).
3. 189 La. 619, 180 So. 465 (1938).
4. 189 La. at 623, 180 So. at 466.
5. La. Rev. Stat. of 1870, § 794, as amended by La. Act 17 of 1888 (Dart's
Crim. Stats. (1932) Art. 768].
6. La. Rev. Stat. of 1870, § 791, as amended by La. Act 43 of 1890 [Dart's
Crim. Stats. (1932) Art. 764).
7. 153 La. 585, 96 So. 130 (1923).
8. 85 La. Ann. 729 (1883).
9. 45 La. Ann. 1451, 14 So. 213 (1893).

1939]

WORK OF LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

373

tice Manning, and the fact that State v. Delaney ° is a case presenting precisely the same facts as in the instant one (stabbing,
etc.). There is an assertion in the majority opinion in the Murdoch case that "the nature of the wound, which is of the essence
of the latter offense [mayhem], is not directly or indirectly put
at issue"'1 (in the major charge). It may be possible to support this
view by drawing a particularly fine distinction (between mayhem
and other batteries) which would seem to have hardly any application in the trial of actual cases. Indeed it is a moot question
whether such a distinction is theoretically maintainable since the
location and nature of the wound would be relevant to proof of
the criminal intent. The facts regarding the wound having been
presented to the jury, only the court's instruction on the definition
of mayhem would be required to support a verdict as to the latter.
Wihout pressing this view unduly, it may be suggested that reexamination of the jurisprudence was possible.
As to instruction (4) (assault with a dangerous weapon), the
court asserted that an indictment which denounces "cutting" does
not include a charge of "assault." This assertion would find readier
acceptance if the reverse of the instant case were involved (that
is, if the charge had been for "assault," and the verdict for "cutting") for the aggravated cutting offenses are uniformly more
serious than the aggravated assault offenses. By like token, it is
difficult to follow the court's holding in this regard. The question
at bottom is, broadly, the relationship of criminal battery to criminal assault; and the various statutes, confusing as they are in the
aggregate, do apparently reveal this one principle of differentiation. Tort law rather clearly supports the view upheld in the instant case; but in the criminal law, there is abundant doctrine to
require at least examination into the question whether battery
does not necessarily include assault. As to instruction (5) (assault and battery), this is ignored in the opinion because counsel
did not press it. Yet clearly it is involved in the principles discussed above.
Related problems are raised in State v. Dent 12 where the indictment charged that the defendant "did .. assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to murder." Defendant's motion to
quash, on the ground that no crime was charged, was granted;
whereupon the State was permitted to substitute "strike," for "as10. 28 La. Ann. 434 (1876).
11. State v. Murdoch, 35 La. Ann. 729, 731 (1883).
12. 189 La. 159, 179 So. 67 (1938).
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sault." On trial before another judge, the amended indictment
was quashed, and the State appealed. This ruling was affirmed,
the Supreme Court pointing out that sections 791 and 792 of the
Revised Statutes 1" not only charged distinct and separate crimes,
but also that a verdict responsive to one of them could not be responsive to the other.1
It is clear from the above cases that there is considerable confusion in the substantive law of aggravated assaults. "Intent to
kill" is differentiated from "intent to murder"; "striking" is differentiated from "assault" (which, of course, is necessary for certain purposes); and partially repealing legislation 15 has increased
the existing difficulties. Confusion in the substantive law leads to
unfortunate consequences in procedural law; we have noted the
courts' difficulties in determining the responsiveness of various
verdicts. Yet in the problem here involved, the solution is relatively simple; or perhaps, one had better say the solution ought
to be simple, for, under existing Louisiana law, a number of unusual difficulties need to be overcome.
As regards the various assaults, and the responsiveness of verdicts, two simple propositions apply: in the substantive law,
"striking with intent to murder" is at one extreme, while simple
"assault" is at the other. The substantive law should make clear
the series of gradations between these two. As for responsiveness, the major includes the minor cognate offense. Such a term
as "mayhem" can be interpreted to accord with these principles;
better yet, it might be omitted from the substantive law and replaced by language that does not conjure up ancient connotations.
The burden of the writer's comments on State v. Antoine"
was not that the court's decision cannot be supported, but that
there was sufficient vagueness and uncertainty in the jurisprudence to have permitted re-examination of the problem on its
merits; and that the objectives which ought to be attained and
the principles underlying the problem might well have suggested
another conclusion. The courts, whether they will or not, do perform a legislative function as they extend the jurisprudence step
by step.
13. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 791, as amended by La. Act 43 of 1890, § 1
(Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) Art. 764]; La. Rev. Stats. of 1670, § 792, as amended by La. Act 59 of 1896 and La. Act 9 of 1912 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) Art.
766].
14. State v. Broxton, 188 La. 456, 177 So. 572 (1937), involved La. Rev.
Stats. of 1870, § 793 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) Art. 767].
15. See Annotations in Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) Art. 767.
16. 189 La. 619, 180 So. 465 (1938), cited supra note 3.
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There are other, perhaps more serious consequences that flow
from the Antoine case because the rule now definitely established
imposes rigid limitations on the responsiveness of verdicts for
these lesser cognate offenses. In the Antoine case, a conviction
was upheld, but does that mean that the State will be the future
beneficiary of the ruling? By no means. For let us now consider,
in the light of the Louisiana jurisprudence of criminal procedure,
in just what position the district attorneys are placed.
We may assume that a desirable system of prosecution would
permit one trial of a defendant or group of defendants for a single
act or transaction. It would therefore permit the allegation of
various charges in one indictment, each of which fitted all or part
of the alleged criminal act or transaction. Finally, it would permit flexibility as to responsiveness; and in this, as in all particulars in the attainment of the above objectives, there is no need to
sacrifice any of an accused person's rights. Criminal law should
continue to guard these rights as zealously as ever, but this paramount issue should not be used to becloud the problem or to hamper the accomplishment of common efficiency through the elimination of unnecessary technicality that prevents attainment of
proper goals.
These objectives were clearly in the minds of those who
drafted the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is apparent from
Article 218, interpreted in relation to prior jurisprudence, especially State v. Hataway" which held that "the rule that two or
more crimes, if committed in one transaction, may be charged
in one indictment, is subject to the qualification that the two or
more crimes so charged 'are subject to the same mode of trial and
nature of punishment.'

"i

, Clearly Article 218 extended beyond that rule, for the mode
of trial was not retained as a limitation on the joinder of offenses.
The steps by which this article was declared to be unconstitutional, 9 then partially reinstated 0 to re-introduce the rule of the
Hataway case, were completely determined by Act 153 of 1932
which repealed Article 218. Interestingly enough, in two cases following this repeal21 the rule in the Hataway decision has apparently been revived. Because this latter course brings the juris17. 153 La. 751, 96 So. 556 (1923).
18. 153 La. at 755, 96 So. at 557.
19. State v. Jacques, 171 La. 994, 132 So. 657 (1931).
20. State v. White, 172 La. 1045, 136 So. 47 (1931).
21. State v. Mansfield, 178 La. 393, 151 So. 631 (1933); State v. Turner, 178
La. 927, 152 So. 567 (1934).
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prudence squarely in conflict with Article 217, it is clear that the
repeal of Article 218 was an incomplete job. The Code of Criminal
Procedure needs clear amendment on the very important question of joinder of offenses. While this broader question cannot be
discussed here, it is necessary to perceive the cumulative effect
of the limitations on joinder of offenses brought about by the repeal of Article 218 and on responsiveness of verdict produced by
the Antoine and similar cases.
What is the resulting position of the district attorney? The
dependence of the mode of trial upon the gravity of the penalty,
and the wide range of such sanctions, places serious limitations on
the joinder of various assaults and batteries. If he charges either
an aggravated battery or an aggravated assault, then he faces
rigorous restrictions as to possible verdicts. He is placed in a position where his procedure is inefficient from its very inception,
and where the best he can expect-saving luck-is a battle in the
uncertain arena of double jeopardy. Yet the objectives that ought
to be realized are everywhere recognized as proper and laudable.
They have been pointed out above; and while the problem in its
totality is one of considerable complexity, there is every reason to
believe that most of the difficulties can be removed.
Among other cases decided during the past judicial year involving, incidentally, questions of substantive law, the most important is State v. Gendusa.21 Defendant was charged with burglary under section 850 of the Revised Statutes, a capital offense.28
The indictment omitted the allegation of a "breaking." The defendant's motion to quash was overruled, as were his motions in
arrest and for new trial. He was convicted and sentenced to death.
On appeal, this conviction was reversed and the case remanded,
with Mr. Justice Higgins strongly dissenting. His opinion discloses a degree of ambiguity in the substantive law, and it must
be conceded that the criminal statute involved (§ 850) is poorly
drawn. The legislature might profitably re-examine the various
types of burglary not only with a view to improved expression
but also as regards the policy concerning "breaking." If that element is retained for the maximum offense, it may still be questioned whether there should be such disparity in penalties as now
exists between section 850 and the next most serious type of burglary.
22. 190 La. 422, 182 So. 559 (1938).
23. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 850, as amended by La. Act 21 of 1926, § 1
[Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) Art. 818].
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For the purpose immediately in hand, the position of the
court as regards verdicts on substantially defective indictments is
of major interest. In effect the court holds that Article 557
(which provides broadly that no conviction shall be set aside for
error unless there is a miscarriage of justice) must be read in
connection with, and is, indeed, superseded in part by Article 418
(which provides that the omission of any essential averment from
an indictment "constitutes an incurable defect"). In a lengthy review of the jurisprudence, upon rehearing, the court maintained
its original view that the allegation of a "breaking" was essential,
and that its omission was not cured by the verdict.
In its opinion2 4 the court did not consider Article 253,25 with
the result that the application of that very important provision
remains obscure and in part nullified. In its survey of cases, the
court does not distinguish those in which objection to the indictment was timely from those where the defense omitted to demur
or move to quash. Yet it is clear from Articles 284 and 253 that
this is a matter of first importance. On that basis, it is possible to
classify the Gendusa case with State v. Pinsonat," State v. Mor24. In the Gendusa case, a motion to quash was made; hence Art. 253 was
not applicable. But the opinion goes far beyond the facts, and may well be
the most important decision on the general problem of incurability of an essentially defective indictment. See Art. 253, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928,
in note 25, infra.
25. Art. 253, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928: "No indictment shall be
quashed, set aside or dismissed or motion to quash be sustained or any motion
for delay of sentence for the purpose of review be granted, nor shall any
conviction be set aside or reversed on account of any defect in form or substance of the indictment, unless the objection to such indictment, specifically
stating the defect claimed, be made prior to the commencement of the trial
or at such time thereafter as the court in its discretion permit. The court may
at any time before, during or after the trial amend the indictment in respect
to any defect, imperfection or omission in form or substance or of any variance with the evidence. If any amendment be made to the substance of the
indictment or to cure a variance between the indictmnt and the proof, the
accused shall on his motion be entitled to a discharge of the jury, if a jury
has been empanelled and to a reasonable continuance of the cause unless it
shall clearly appear from the whole proceedings that he has not been misled
or prejudiced by the defect or variance in respect to which the amendment
is made or that his rights will be fully protected by the proceedings with the
trial or by a postponement thereof to a later day with tfie same or another
jury. In case a jury shall be discharged from further consideration of a case
under this section, the accused shall not be deemed to have been in jeopardy.
No action of the court in refusing a continuance or postponement under this
article shall be reviewable except after motion to and refusal by the trial
court to grant a new trial therefor and no appeal based upon such action of
the court shall be sustained, nor reversal had, unless from consideration of
the whole proceedings, the reviewing court shall find that the accused was
prejudiced in his defense or that a failure of justice resulted."
26. 188 La. 334, 177 So. 67 (1937).
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ris, 7 and State v. Gunter2 as properly decided because in each of
these cases Articles 284 and 253 were observed.2 9
This leaves for special consideration State v. Williams0 and
State v. McDonald.31 In the former case, the defendant was
charged with operating a "gambling" game. At the conclusion of
the evidence, the State was permitted to amend the information
by substituting "banking" for "gambling," thus bringing the
charge within a penal statute. The trial court submitted that the
defendant had not been injured because evidence of "banking"
had been introduced, that defendant did not move for a continuance, and that Article 253 required the amendment as made. The
Supreme Court reversed the decision. Article 253 was not analyzed, and because the trial was upon an information which did
not allege an offense, it was held that "therefore it was prejudicial error to convict him of the offense charged in the amended
information, without a hearing thereon. ' 2 Presumably, in this
case, the only manner of prejudice could be by way of surprise.
Yet evidence of "banking" was introduced, and was contested by
the defendant, who did not request any continuance. It does not
seem unwarranted to conclude that the decision assumed what
was to be proved (that there was prejudicial error) and that it
did not carefully consider Article 253 in the light of its clear objectives.
The Williams conviction was for a misdemeanor. Of major
importance is the McDonald case where the charge was burglary,
and the sentence was to hard labor. The indictment charged
that defendant broke and entered "The American Hat Company."
Defendant's motion to arrest judgment on the ground that no
shop, store, other building, and so on, had been alleged, was overruled. The conviction was set aside on the ground that the information was fatally defective, that is, it could not be cured by the
verdict. The court relied on the Williams case, discussed above,
27. 185 La. 1037, 171 So. 437 (1936).
28. 188 La. 314, 177 So. 60 (1937).
29. These cases suggest that district attorneys might lean more definitely
in the direction of acceding to the motion to quash where at least a clear
doubt has been raised (as in the Gendusa case), for by such an attitude held
by them and the trial judges who must take such a view, costly errors as
have occurred might be avoided.
30. 173 La. 1, 136 So. 68 (1931).
31. 178 La. 612, 152 So. 308 (1934). The third case relied upon was State
v. Jackson, 43 La. Ann. 183, 8 So. 440 (1891); it will be argued in the text that
the Code of Criminal Procedure sought to prevent the very situation here
presented.
32. State v. Williams, 173 La. 1, 8, 136 So. 68, 70 (1931).
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3 case decided in 1891,
and on the Jackson"
where no motion to
quash had been made. Obviously, if the Code changed the prior
jurisprudence, the Jackson case cannot be invoked; the Williams
case, as pointed out, did not analyze the points at issue. Hence
the McDonald case is the only one of weight on the position taken,
and this has unfortunately been re-enforced by dicta in the Gendusa case.
Article 284 was stressed in the McDonald case. The language
of that article seems plainly to have enlarged the prior statute, for

it provides that "every objection. . ." whereas section 1064 of the
Revised Statutes provided that "every objection . . . for any
formal defect ... shall be taken by demurrer.. ." In spite of this

clear language, the court in the McDonald case restricted Article
284 to formal defects. In the first place, the court supports its
view to some extent by a rather strained interpretation of the
wording of this article (whereas an eye to the purpose of Article
284 might well have led to the opposite view). Secondly, the
court restricted Article 284 to formal defects because
"... if it had been intended by the adoption of the Code to

deprive an accused person of the right to quash the proceedings by motion in arrest of judgment, because of his failure to
demur or to file a motion to quash in limine, there would not
have been put into the Code those articles under title 26, which
relate to 'The motion in arrest of judgment.'"
"If it had been intended to cut an accused party off from
availing himself of the benefits of the motion in arrest merely
because he failed to demur or object to the indictment in limine where the indictment is substantially defective, the inclusion in the Code of those provisions relating to motions in
arrest was a vain and useless formality, tending only to confuse."3 '
Is that conclusion sound? One can determine the purpose of
Article 284 only in the light of the prior jurisprudence and of the
differences in the statutes prevailing at the respective times. The
evil of the prior jurisprudence was the product of a long development in the common law. It permitted a defendant to stand by,
observe a substantially defective declaration or indictment, and
then by motion after verdict, upset the entire proceedings. In recent years, most states have sought to avoid that evil by insisting
33. State v. Jackson, 43 La. Ann. 183, 8 So. 440 (1891).
34. State v. McDonald, 178 La. 612, 622-623, 623-624, 152 So. 308, 311 (1934).
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that objecion to pleadings be made at the outset. The evil sought
to be avoided is clear; the purpose of such provisions as Article
284 is correspondingly clear.
The surprising fact about the McDonald case is that Article
253 was not even mentioned. It is difficult to understand such
omission because Article 284 simply states the rule categorically;
Article 253 elaborates the consequences in detail. Article 253 confers the broadest powers of amendment; it provides for continuance where the defendant has been surprised; for a new jury, if
necessary; and it states specifically: "...

nor shall any conviction

be set aside or reversed on account of any defect in form or substance of the indictment, unless the objection ...

be made prior

to the commencement of the trial. .. "
Returning to the court's assertion in the McDonald case that
Article 284 must be confined to formal defects, or be a "useless formality," we see the alternative hypothesis, namely, that
Articles 284 and 253 require all objections to indictments to be
urged prior to trial; that if the objection is taken in such timely
fashion, then the defendant may again raise objections to substantial defects by motion in arrest. There is nothing whatever in
Articles 517 and 518 which makes it impossible to apply the above
limitation upon their operation, that is, that a demurrer or motion
to quash must have preceded. It is true that the Code does not
expressly assert that, but it is equally true that it does not expressly assert the opposite. The advantages of pursuing the first
interpretation are numerous and apparent. How else give effect
to the specific language in Articles 284 and 253 which so clearly
extend beyond the older statute and jurisprudence? The interpretation here recommended does give them effect. It also gives effect
to Articles 517 and 518.35
The obvious conclusion is that it was sought on the one hand
to avoid the evil of sharp procedure because of defects in pleading,
and on the other hand, to give the trial judge ample opportunity
to correct mistakes of pleading. This latter is done by the Code,
by provision for arresting judgment. Assuredly it is preferable
to give limited application-but important application nonetheless-to Articles 517 and 518 than it is to ignore the plain language of Articles 284 and 253.
35. Art. 418, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928 complicates the problem
somewhat; and it would be helpful if the Code had related this article to the
others discussed. As it stands, it can be interpreted to mean simply that a
(proper) motion is required as regards substantial defects whereas formal
ones that go unnoticed are cured by the verdict.
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On the other hand, there is no doubt that serious questions
remain to be settled. Just how far can the above principles be allowed to operate without unfairness? How defective can pleadings be permitted to be? Some limitations on Article 253 seem to
be needed, and it is not possible to do more here than suggest the
broad lines of issue. The problem is dismissed in the Gendusa
case with a sweeping assertion that "to convict a person of a
capital crime under an indictment from which an essential averment is omitted constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional right."36 In one possible and extreme interpretation, that
proposition may be valid. But is it valid under the limitations
prescribed by Article 253 where provision is made for continuance
and discharge of the jury? And the rules as to admissibility of
evidence provide an additional check. Consequently, it is difficult
to see why the canons as to notice, time for preparation, and fair
trial may not be preserved within the framework of a procedure
which is designed to prevent taking undue advantage of technical
defects. In the McDonald case, Justices Rogers and Brunot (who
wrote the opinion in the Williams case) dissented. And in his
concurring opinion in State v. Wall, Chief Justice O'Niell wrote:
"In such a case it would be a failure in the administering
of justice to set free a defendant whose guilt has been proved
in every essential element of the crime charged, after he has
silently taken his chance of being forever acquitted of the
crime charged. It was to prevent such a failure in the administering of justice that the provisions of article 253 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure were adopted."3'7
Accordingly, since all the discussion in the Gendusa opinion,
insofar as it bears upon failure to demur or move to quash, is
dicta, it is possible to re-examine the question with hope of revision.
Many questions of evidence arose in the cases, and among
these, admissibility is perhaps the most commonly involved. And
most important here was the question of admission of evidence of
ill-repute of, or prior threats made by, the deceased in cases of
self defense.
Article 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
"In the absence of proof of hostile demonstration or of
overt act on the part of the person slain or injured, evidence
86. State v. Gendusa, 190 La. 422, 446, 182 So. 559, 567 (1938).
37. State v. Wall, 189 La. 653, 669, 180 So. 476, 481 (1938).
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of his dangerous character or of his threats against accused is
not admissible."
Two cases discuss the issues in detail. In State v. Thornhill 8 the
defendant, a police officer, testified that the deceased advanced
upon him despite his order to stop, that he "threw his hands in his
pockets," at which time the defendant shot him once, that he
then "came out with his gun," and so forth. All of this was denied
by bystanders. The court found that the defendant was thoroughly impeached as to his testimony that the deceased drew a pistol.
Hence, evidence of an altercation thirty minutes before the shooting and of ill-repute was not admitted. This decision was upheld
by the Supreme Court with Chief Justice O'Niell writing a distinguished dissenting opinion.
The position of the Chief Justice is that
"...a
person on trial for murder or manslaughter, who pleads
that he did the killing in self-defense, should be allowed to introduce evidence of previous threats on the part of the deceased, or of the dangerous character of the deceased, whenever there has been introduced any evidence at all from which
the jury might decide that the deceased made a hostile demonstration against the defendant at the moment of the killing."39
His reason is that once some evidence is introduced, a question of
fact arises which goes to the issue (was the accused the aggresor?) and that it should accordingly go to the jury along with evidence of prior threats or ill-repute of the deceased, since the latter
bear upon the question at issue. The learned Justice argues that
the majority ruling requires the defendant to prove that the deceased was the aggressor without giving him the benefit of the
total relevant situation. But Article 482 requires proof of an
overt act before evidence of prior threats is admissible. Chief
Justice O'Niell accordingly argues that "proof" and "evidence"
in that context are synonymous, but reliance upon Webster, the
sole authority adduced, lends little weight to this argument. If
Article 482 were so construed, it could be entirely nullified in its
purpose to place some fair limitation upon the admissibility of
evidence of prior threats, since the defendant could always testify. Hence, "proof" as used in Article 482 probably means evidence that carries some persuasion. But how much evidence, or
what degree of persuasion required, is not stated. The opinion
88. 188 La. 762, 178 So. 343 (1938).
39. 188 La. at 794, 178 So. at 354.

1939]

WORK OF LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

383

stresses "reasonable ground," and the indications are that some
doubt must be raised. In any event, the criticism of the Chief
Justice would still be relevant, though not necessarily acceptable.
The same issues were raised in State v. Stracner ° but under
facts much more favorable to the accused, and hence to Chief
Justice O'Niell's position. Here the defendant testified to various
aggressive acts on the part of the deceased including actual battery, and a 13-year old boy testified that the deceased had a knife
in his hand. All of this evidence was contradicted, and the court
did not credit it. A further point of importance results from the
court's holding that "an overt act is a hostile demonstration of
such character as to create in the mind of a reasonable person
the belief that he is in immediate danger of losing his life or of
suffering great bodily harm."41 The additional difficulty which
this raises results from use of the term "reasonable person." For
it is left in doubt as to whether the facts that previous threats
were made and that the deceased was a person of vicious character, will be considered by the judge in determining whether the
defendant acted reasonably. If such threats are not to be considered for the purpose of determining reasonableness of the defendant's belief that the act was overt, a real hardship is imposed.
Yet the usual qualifying words "in the situation of the defendant"
are not employed. Certainly it would seem that so far as the
trial judge is concerned, for the purpose of deciding whether the
defendant reasonably believed an overt act was being made, prior
threats should be heard. There is some indication to suggest that
they were heard. If the trial judge does go into the entire factsituation, including prior threats, and if on that basis he uses
the standard of a reasonable person in the position of the defendant to determine whether an overt act was made, then some
benefit is derived by the defendant as regards proof of dangerous
aggression at the time of the homicide.
As for the major issue, it is apparent that it concerns a question of policy rather than one of law. Simply because the trial
judge passes upon the question to determine admissibility, does
not mean that he is not deciding a question of fact, even though
those facts and his ruling are reviewable. But it is not uncommon
for judges to exercise such a fact-finding function in jury cases.
If one adheres to the prevailing view that juries should be protected from certain types of misleading or inflammatory evidence,
40. 190 La. 457, 182 So. 571 (1938).
41. 190 La. at 470, 182 So. at 575.
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then the limitation suggested seems reasonable. But the opposite
view is quite defensible, and it has been urged to the extent of
arguing that no relevant evidence whatever should be kept from
the jury. No more is here suggested than that (1) the underlying
problem is one of policy and (2) that the existing law (both code
and jurisprudence) might well be clarified as to (a) the definition of overt act and (b) the nature of evidence or degree of persuasion required on the part of the trial judge.
An important problem in the administration of any code of
procedure concerns the determination of which provisions must
be strictly followed, which may be departed from-and to what
extent. Three cases in last year's decisions reveal the nature of
the difficulties encountered. In State v. Milton42 the defendant
was convicted of murder and sentenced to be hanged. He had
moved unsuccessfully to quash the entire jury array on the
ground that only three members of the jury commission (together with the clerk) had officiated. Notice had been sent the
other two commissioners on the day of the meeting, and there
was doubt whether it had been received. Article 176 of the Code
states that three members and the clerk constitute a quorum
provided all the members shall have been notified. The verdict
was set aside with no consideration given to Article 557. 43
In State v. Thornhill," after the entire jury had been selected
and sworn, the prosecution was permitted to challenge a juror
peremptorily-despite Article 358. The court quoted Article 557
and found that no injury had been done to the defendant.
In State v. Butler4 the defendant was charged with assault
by wilful shooting, tried by a jury of five, and convicted as
charged. After four jurors had been accepted and sworn, defendant's counsel noticed that the sheriff was calling the jurors from
the list instead of drawing their names by lot from the box. The
Supreme Court held that the names should have been drawn by
lot and that "there is merit in the argument, that serious injustice
42. 188 La. 423, 177 So. 260 (1937).
43. Art. 557, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928: "No judgment shall be set
aside, or a new trial granted by any appellate court of this State, in any
criminal case, on the grounds of misdirection of the jury or the improper
admission or rejection of evidence, or as to error of any matter of pleading or
procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to which application is made,
after an examination of the entire record, it appears that the error complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, is prejudicial to
the substantial rights of the accused, or constitutes a substantial violation of
a constitutional or statutory right."
44. 188 La. 762, 178 So. 343 (1938), cited supra note 38.
45. 190 La. 383, 182 So. 546 (1938).
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may result, either to the State or to a defendant, from the pracice of permitting the sheriff to call the names of the jurors from
the list
"46 Yet it found that defendant had suffered no in7

jury.'

In State v. Gunter48 the defendant was convicted of manslaughter. He had moved to quash the indictment on the ground
that one of the grand jurors had a felony charge pending against
him-disqualifying him under Article 172. This grand juror had
been convicted of a felony in 1905. The conviction had been set
aside and the case remanded. It had rested on the dead docket
for thirty-three years until it was nolle prossed when defendant
moved to quash the indictment. The grand juror had lived in
Rapides parish all those years and had exercised all rights of citizenship. Article 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directs the
district attorney to nolle prosse a felony charge when six years
have elapsed from the finding of the indictment. The Supreme
Court held that the grand juror was disqualified, reversed the conviction and declared the indictment void.
It will be noted in the above cases that where the penalty is
severe, there seems to be a tendency to apply Article 557 more
readily than otherwise. Yet such commendable motivation does
not result in a clearer understanding of this article. What is
needed is an analysis of the different types of mandate in order to
determine from the nature of the various situations, purposes and
policies, which provisions must be strictly applied regardless of
lack of proof of injury, and which ones may be departed from unless there is injury.
Finally, perhaps a few remarks may be permitted regarding
the form of the opinions. Some of them would be a credit to the
jurisprudence of any state. But many of the opinions suffer from
lack of analysis of the various principles involved. There is a
tendency to settle issues by reference to authority, when that authority itself was not the outcome of a reasoned discourse or
where it rests upon quite different facts. And it seems to be the
custom to discuss each and every point raised in the Bill of Exceptions regardless of its merit, with the result that the opinions
are disjointed and, so far as future adjudication is concerned,
much less helpful than they might be. Lawyers, of course, like to
46.
47.
cepted
48.

190 La. at 389, 182 So. at 548.
Another reason for affirming the judgment was that defendant acthe first four jurors, though his challenges were not exhausted.
188 La. 314, 177 So. 60 (1937).
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have each point passed upon; but the court owes a duty not only
in the case before it, but also as regards the construction of a
sound jurisprudence. A very brief disposition of points of little
or no merit would permit more detailed and carefully written
analysis of the fundamental issues. Certainly it would seem that
this would greatly improve the jurisprudence-which, so far as
criminal law and procedure are concerned, is much to be desired.
VI.

PUBLIC LAW

A. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Of the many statutes whose constitutionality was challenged
in the Supreme Court during the last term, only one was invalidated. This was a relatively minor act that imposed certain restrictions upon trapping.' And the legislation here was set aside
not because of any lack of power in the legislature but because
the act, being a "local or special law," had not been preceded by
proper publication.
Most of the major constitutional guaranties were under review; due process, equal protection of the laws, obligation of contracts, right to pursue a lawful calling, and many of the various
safeguards available to the accused in a criminal prosecution. In
addition, many specific provisions of the Louisiana Constitution
were invoked. It is indeed noteworthy that in all these instances,
save one, the large number of statutes under attack survived.
Price Fixing. Without doubt, the most important constitutional issue considered by the Supreme Court during the past
term was raised in the case of Board of Barber Examiners of
Louisiana v. Parker.2 This decision established the right of the
State to fix minimum prices for barbering services. Act 48 of
1936,1 after a long declaration of policy affirming the close connection between barbershop prices and the public health, proceeded in section 12 to charge the Board of Barber Examiners
with the duty of approving and establishing minimum price
agreements submitted by any organized groups of at least 75 per
cent of the barbers of each Judicial District.
Before promulgating such agreements, the Board was di1. La. Act 130 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1937)

§§ 2974.1-2974.3),

held

unconstitutional in State v. Clement, 188 La. 923, 178 So. 493 (1938) and in
State v. Tabor, 189 La. 253, 179 So. 306 (1938).
2. 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485 (1938), noted in (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIsw
218, and in (1938) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 144.
3. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) §§ 9389.1-9389.15.
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rected to satisfy itself that the prices agreed upon were such as
would best "enable the barbers to furnish modern and healthful
services and appliances so as to minimize the danger to the public health incident to such work." The assumption upon which
the statute is based, therefore, is that under-paid barbers menace
public health and safety because they are not "well-nourished,
strong and healthy persons" and because they cannot purchase
the "sanitary products so necessary in the operation of their business." Presumably, the moral is that an under-nourished barber
wields a shaky razor; and that cleanliness, while next to godliness, is not without its relation to finances.
On original hearing, the court decided that the statute was
an unconstitutional invasion of liberty of contract and a denial
of due process of law. On rehearing, the statute was declared constitutional. In its declaration of policy the act purports to regulate
prices, not in the interests of economic well-being, but solely for
the protection of public health. This lengthy legislative declaration of policy, or "wailing preamble" as it is often called, moved
the Chief Justice to make the following remarks:
"The profuse protestations . . .in the preamble or first

section of this statute,-which is quoted at length in the prevailing opinion in this case,-demonstrate to my mind that the
author of the statute realized how hard it would be to convince the courts that the real purpose of the statute was to
protect the public health or promote the general welfare. And
so I say, with great respect, that the preamble, or first section,
of this statute, 'doth protest too much, methinks.'"'
It is difficult to understand why legislatures should be compelled to insert extended declarations of policy in statutes whose
constitutionality is in doubt. Such preambles, in theory at least,
are totally unnecessary since the legislation must stand or fall on
the constitutional power of the legislature quite apart from the
avowed motive which induced enactment. The canon of constitutional construction which enjoins the court to sustain a statute,
if any provision of the fundamental document is strong enough to
support it, should be sufficient. It is the business of counsel to
bring to the attention of the court, in the course of actual litigation and in a proper case, such evidences of constitutionality as
suggest themselves. It is not desirable that the legislature make
a bogus "legislative" finding of facts as a preliminary to law4. 190 La. at 304, 182 So. at 514.
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making. Such legislative fact-finding is neither necessary nor
proper. In point of fact, it is highly doubtful whether "wailing
preambles" do any good. Both the NIRA 5 and the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act" contained these superfluous obeisances to supposed judicial truculence-in vain.
The preamble thus necessitated a narrow consideration of the
case. It was felt that the only inquiry properly before the court
was the relation of barbering prices to public health. The more
important question as to whether the legislature could have set
minimum prices in the interests of economic advantage, as a
means of restricting unfair or ruinous competition, was therefore
not in issue. It is unfortunate that this was so, because the outcome of the decision, while significant in itself as countenancing
price-fixing, does not encompass the general right of the legislature to fix prices in an endeavor to ameliorate economic conditions which have only a problematical and not a direct bearing
upon public health or safety.
Those justices who voted to uphold the barber statute relied
heavily on the celebrated case of Nebbia v. New York7 which sustained a statute regulating prices of milk. It will be recalled that
in the Nebbia case, the Supreme Court of the United States departed from the old limitation which restricted price-fixing to
"businesses affected with a public interest." Price-fixing was
there regarded as a legitimate means of effecting general legislative purposes regardless of the nature of the business regulated.
The barber case, therefore, takes its place among a whole host
of decisions upholding price-fixing statutes as health measures 8most of them obvious camouflages for out-and-out price regulation of private business. It would have been well if this issue
could have been fought out in the open, so to speak. The health
fiction resorted to in the barber legislation is certainly disingenuous in the last degree. If the legislature had seen fit to risk a trial
of strength on the point of regulating barber prices as a means
of assuring a decent livelihood to barbers, the decision would have
5. Act of June 16, 1933, c. 90, 48 Stat. 196 (1933),

15 U.S.C.A. § 701 (Supp.

1938), Title I of which was invalidated, by Schechter Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570, 97 A.L.R. 947 (1935).
6. Act of Aug. 30, 1935, c. 824, 49 Stat. 991 (1935), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-827
(Supp. 1935), invalidated by Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct.
855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1935). This act was repealed by Act of April 26, 1937, c. 127,
§ 20 (a), 50 Stat. 90 (1937).
7. 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1469 (1934).
8. See collection of cases in Note, (1938) 1 LoUISIANA LAW RVIEw 218;
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1469 (1934).
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been momentous as a prototype of one of the main constitutional
issues involved in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.9
The dissent of the Chief Justice, eminently readable as always, centers about a general distrust of price-fixing. The sentiment which constrained him to write his dissent is perhaps best
expressed in the words of Justice Roberts in the majority opinion
in the Nebbia case: "The thought seems nevertheless to have persisted that there is something peculiarly sacrosanct about the
price one may charge for what he makes or sells, and that, however able to regulate other elements of manufacture or trade,
with incidental effect upon price, the state is incapable of directly
controlling the price itself."10
Slum Clearance. In State ex. rel. Porteriev. Housing Authority of New Orleans1 the constitutionality of Act 275 of 193612 was
upheld. This statute provided for the creation of slum clearance
authorities in cities whose population exceeds 20,000. All powers
normally incident to such bodies politic were granted to the Authorities.
The present suit was a test case brought by the Attorney
General to determine the constitutionality of the act. This device,
precluding the possibility of a constitutional set-back for the enterprises perhaps in a late stage of their development, has all the
advantage of declaratory judgment proceedings. Its defect is that
the occasions upon which it can be utilized are of course severely
limited."3
It would be risking little to say that all the constitutional
issues likely to arise from the Slum Clearance Act were set at
rest by this decision. 14 The relator was astute to bring to the
attention of the court every conceivable objection to the statute,
and all of them were resolved against him. It was held, in the
main, that slum clearance was such a public purpose or public
use as would justify the expenditure of public funds and the expropriation of public property; that the bonds, notes and other
9. Act of June 25, 1938, c. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219
(Supp. 1938).
10. 291 U.S. at 532, 54 S.Ct. at 514, 78 L.Ed. at 954, 89 A.L.R. at 1480.
11. 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725 (1938), noted in (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw
221.
12. The Housing Authorities Law [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) H 6280.16280.28).
13. Flory and McMahon, The New Federal Rules and Louisiana Practice (1938) 1 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 45, 74.
14. In this connection, however, it might be asked why the case was not
carried to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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obligations of the Authorities might be exempted from taxation;
that no unconstitutional delegation of legislative or judicial powers had been attempted by the act; that the act was properly
passed, approved, and promulgated; that the act was not invalid
as local or special legislation, and did not include more than the
one object which is embraced in its title.
In holding that private property may be expropriated for
slum clearance, the court rejected the limitation that such property must be taken for actual use of the general public. The public advantage flowing from slum eradication, and from adequate
and sanitary dwellings for actual or potential slum residents was
deemed sufficient to constitute a public use. It may be argued
that the existence of urban slums in Louisiana is not widespread;
but it is undeniable that where they do exist, they constitute a
grave social menace.
Freedomof Contract. An ordinance of the City of Shreveport
declared uninvited visits to private residences by peddlers, solicitors or itinerant merchants a nuisance and punishable as a misdemeanor. Certain vendors of products in daily use were exempt.
The court found that the ordinance was within the legislative
power of the city and was free from formal invalidity. City of
Shreveport v. Cunningham.'5 On the constitutional issues of the
case, it was held that discriminating against hawkers and peddlers was not arbitrary class legislation and that declaring their
activities a nuisance did not deny them liberty of contract.
There is no doubt that itinerant hawkers and peddlers may be
treated as a "class" for regulatory purposes without a denial of
equal protection of the laws. The authorities cited by the court
amply sustain this proposition. On the principal constitutional
point of the case, liberty of contract, or perhaps more specifically,
the right to pursue a lawful calling, the opinion is less satisfactory. No authorities, save a former decision of the court on a
collateral matter, 16 are referred to. The business of door-to-door
peddling, while doubtless annoying at times, is generally regarded
as a legitimate occupation. In some instances, the ramifications
of the industry are nationwide, and while its proper regulation
is imperative, its total suppression is a serious matter. One should
not overlook the fact that itinerant solicitors are often subjected
15. 190 La. 481, 182 So. 649 (1938), noted infra p. 455.
16. City of New Orleans v. Schick, 167 La. 674, 120 So. 47 (1929) (ordinance requiring report to chief of police when moving household and personal
effects upheld).
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to local harassment not so much because they are "solicitors" as
because they are "itinerant." Local businessmen view them with
a hostile eye, but it is precisely to prevent unjust discrimination
that the right to pursue a lawful calling is protected by the constitutions of the state and the nation. Nonetheless, the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 1 7 had before
it an ordinance whose main provision is identical with that of the
Shreveport ordinance. The court held that the prohibition was
a police measure directed in the interests of public safety. The
ordinance was upheld on all counts.
Obligation of Contracts. One of the many shifts in governmental reorganization gave rise to the case of Higginbotham v.
City of Baton Rouge.'8 Here the appellant, on Jan. 10, 1935, was
elected Commissioner of Public Parks and Streets for the city of
Baton Rouge, for a term ending November, 1936, at a salary of
$5,000.00 per annum. The legislature abolished the office and provided that the incumbent should be employed by the city until
the next general election.' A city ordinance gave the appellant
employment under these terms. Later the legislature repealed
the provision relative to the employment of the appellant,20 and
the city terminated his employment. The appellant contended,
inter alia, that this was repugnant to the Constitutions of the
United States and of the State of Louisiana as an impairment of
the obligation of a contract. The decision was for the City, the
court holding that the office was governmental and that the employment under it by the appellant was the tenure of a public
office, not a private contract of employment.
On December 5, 1938 the Supreme Court of the United States
in preliminary consideration of an appeal in this case noted probable jurisdiction. 21 At the present writing, the case is on the
docket of that court for hearing.22
Civil Service. Interested citizens and taxpayers attacked the
constitutionality of Act 22 of the Second Extra Session of 1934,23
which purported to create a State Civil Service. The gist of the
complaint was that the statute did not in fact establish a civil
service system in the usual intendment of that term because,
17.
1933).
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. (2d) 112 (C.C.A. 10th,
190 La. 821, 183 So. 168 (1938).
La. Act 13 of 1934 (3 E.S.) § 4 (1) [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) § 5451.4].
La. Act 1 of 1935 (1 E.S.) § 1 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) § 5451.4].
Dec. 5, 1938, Docket No. 462 (1938), C.C.H. 1750.
59 S. Ct. 245 (1938).
Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) §§ 9443.1-9443.17.
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among other things, it creates no merit system, provides for no
competitive examinations, and erects no safeguard against arbitrary action by the appointing officers. The title of the Act, it was
claimed, is therefore not indicative of its object, contrary to Article III, section 16 of the Constitution of 1921. The court upheld
the statute on the ground that it related to civil service in its "enlarged sense." Mr. Justice Odom, in dissenting, seemed to feel
that the sense of the term civil service had been "enlarged" for
24
the occasion. Ward v. Leche.
State Debt. In two cases of importance to the state's financial
arrangements, it was held that proposed bond issues were without
taint of illegality. In the first case, 25 the court held that certain
bonds offered for sale by the Board of Liquidation of State Debt
did not constitute an increase of the public debt inasmuch as the
26
obligations in question were refunding bonds. In the second case,
the court sustained the validity of bonds issued to finance the
building program of the Louisiana State Board of Education.
Dedication.In Arkansas-LouisianaGas Co. v. Parker Oil Co.2 71
the Supreme Court held that a dedication of public ways under
a statute vests title in the public in full ownership and does not
merely create a servitude. Hence an act 28 which provided that
unused ways be deemed abandoned and that title to the land pass
to contiguous owners, did not deprive the dedicator of property
without due process of law.
Formal Validity of Statutes. The usual quota of cases challenging the formal validity of statutes came before the court at the
last term.25 As a rule, such objections are parasitic. They seldom
form the sole basis of a constitutional attack, but are generally
urged in connection with other more weighty matters. Correspondingly, it does not often happen that mere informality suffices
to strike down a statute. If informality is found, it is generally discovered in company with other constitutional infirmities. The
24. 189 La. 113, 179 So. 52 (1938).
25. State ex rel. Porterie, Atty. Gen. v. Board of Liquidation of State
Debt, 190 La. 520, 182 So. 661 (1938).
26. State ex rel. Porterle, Atty. Gen. v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 190 La. 565, 182 So. 676 (1938).
27. 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938).
28. La. Act 151 of 1910 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 5856].
29. State v. Hill, 188 La. 444, 177 So. 421 (1937); State v. McBrayer, 188
La. 567, 177 So. 669 (1937); State v. O'Brien, 188 La. 584, 177 So. 674 (1937);
Ward v. Leche, 189 La. 113, 179 So. 52 (1938); City of Shreveport v. Cunningham, 190 La. 481, 182 So. 649 (1938); State ex rel. Porterie v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725 (1938); Arkansas-Louisiana Gas
Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938).
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defense of statutory informality was sustained in two cases"
which invalidated Act 130 of 1936 prohibiting certain types of
trapping on lands situated less than 150 miles from the Gulf of
Mexico. The act here was held to be a "local or special law"
which had not been preceded by proper publication.
Criminal Cases. In a number of criminal cases,3 1 unconstitutional action, whether under a statute or not, was charged. It was
uniformly held that the conduct attacked was not unconstitutional.
B. TAXATION
People continue to pay taxes reluctantly. Tax litigation,
therefore, occupies much of the attention of the Supreme Court.
A simplified and understandable system of taxation, whether
state or national, is perhaps a pipe dream. Yet it does seem that
some order could be introduced into the confusion of tax statutes,
tax regulations, methods of assessment, collection, suits, and finally, that bte-noir of the conveyancer-the tax sale. Tax litigation is generally a matter of statutory construction and when
statutes accumulate, the occasions for ambiguity multiply. The
tax cases before the court during the last term amply illustrate
this truism.
A tax case which attracted much attention by reason of the
assiduity with which it was fought out was State v. Standard Oil
Co. of La.8 2 Its manifold issues arose out of the practice whereby
the oil companies subject to the severance tax deducted from the
amount of oil taxable, a 2 per cent allowance for loss in transporting the oil from the well to the refinery. The state contended that
the tax covered 100 per cent of the oil severed from the well. The
oil company countered with the defense that executive and administrative construction of the statute, long prior to and during
the alleged taxable period, settled the meaning of the statute
otherwise.
In preliminary proceedings the Oil Company unsuccessfully
entered the following defenses: the summary tax statute is unconstitutional in that it deprives the taxpayer of opportunity to
30. State v. Clement, 188 La. 923, 178 So. 493 (1938); State v. Tabor, 189 La.
253, 179 So. 306 (1938).
31. State v. Cass, 188 La. 606, 177 So. 682 (1937); State v. Berry, 188 La. 612,
177 So. 684 (1937); State v. Pierre, 189 La. 764, 180 So. 630 (1938), Cert. granted,
59 S. Ct. 100 (1938); State v. Connally, 190 La. 175, 182 So. 318 (1938); State v.
Gendusa, 190 La. 422, 182 So. 559 (1938).

32. 188 La. 978, 178 So. 601 (1938).
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make an adequate defense, in that it unfairly casts the burden of
proof upon the taxpayer, and in that it takes from him the right
of devolutive appeal; the state invoked the wrong remedial statute; and the three year period of limitation applied to the claim.
The defendant did not neglect the time-tried defenses that the
statute was an unlawful delegation of legislative and judicial
power; that a severance tax on a purchaser of oil was a taking of
property without due process in violation of the Constitution of
the State and of the United States; and that the equal protection
clauses of both Constitutions had been flouted.
It was apparent, however, that contemporaneous administrative construction was the principal defense relied on in this complicated law suit. It is not difficult to agree with the Chief Justice
(whose dissent was directed solely to this point) that the practice
of deducting two per cent was known to and acquiesced in by the
legislative and executive branches of the government, and that
the doctrine of contemporaneous construction in the interpretation of an ambiguous statute should govern the case. To be sure,
to the majority of the court the language of the act was not susceptible of double meaning, and indeed a reading of the terms of
the statute supports that stand. There is undoubtedly need for
legal procedure by which the hardship resulting from an erroneous construction of a statute by administrative ruling or practice
should be eliminated. An administrative ruling which resolves a
statutory doubt in favor of a private party puts him in an equivocal position. It would be inhuman to expect him to spurn the
advantage; on the other hand, if he accepts it he may be faced
with a law-suit in the inconvenient future. The alternative, a suit
to test the construction of a statute every time ambiguity seems
possible, would stop the wheels of government. This difficulty has
been partially met by a constitutional amendment, 3 adopted in
1938, establishing a prescriptive period of three years for such
4
taxes and licenses.
In a later case against the same defendant, the doctrine of
contemporaneous administrative construction was used by the
court in favor of the taxpayer. State v. Standard Oil Co. of La.3 5
The statute permitted a three per cent deduction, for lossage, on
the total taxable gallonage received by the dealer. An adminis33. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 59.1, as amended in accordance with
proposal in La. Act 200 of 1938.
34. Hebert and Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1938 (1938) 1 Lou[SIANA LAW REVIEW 80, 118.
35. 190 La. 338, 182 So. 531 (1938).
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trative ruling decided that this meant a flat deduction of three
per cent of total sales, regardless of actual losses. The majority of
the court felt that the doctrine of contemporaneous construction
should govern the matter in any event. But they went further,
and held that the administrative construction was correct. Mr.
Justice Higgins, while agreeing that contemporaneous construction in effect estopped the collection of the tax, could not refrain
from pointing out that the legislature or the Supervisor of Public
Accounts hardly contemplated the situation in which gasoline and
oil dealers of the state retain $300,000.00 annually which they collect as taxes from consumers without any showing of the amount
of actual loss suffered.
Tax Titles. A number of cases attacking the validity of tax
titles or procedure for redemption of property occupied the attention of the court. One sometimes wonders whether such property is not in effect inalienable within the relevant periods of
prescription, because of the excessively complicated nature of tax
sales. Simplification of tax sales appears to be an imperative demand.
In Gayle v. Slicer 6 the court held that erroneous description
in the assessment of property, the subject of a tax sale, does not
invalidate the sale where the land can be identified by evidence
within the assessment.
In Crawford, Jenkins & Booth v. Wills3 7 the defendants, long

in actual possession of the land, were surprised to learn of a prior
valid tax sale to another. Laughlin v. Hayes8 represents an unsuccessful effort to set aside a tax sale by an offer of redemption
to the purchaser which would have been effective had not prescription intervened. Tillery v. Fuller3 and Johnson v. Chapman"
were complicated proceedings involving tax titles.
Of some interest is the holding in State v. City of New Orleans41 which ruled that redemption of property adjudicated to
the city must proceed according to Act 170 of 1898, section 62, as
amended by Act 175 of 1934. 4 2 The city cannot be compelled to
accept tender of back taxes.
Assessments. A disgruntled land owner attacked the consti36. 188 La. 940, 178 So. 498 (1938).
37. 188 La. 366, 179 So. 455 (1938).
38. 189 La. 707, 180 So. 494 (1938).
39. 190 La. 586, 182 So. 683 (1938). See also at p. 358, supra.
40. 190 La. 1034, 183 So. 285 (1938).
41. 190 La. 208, 182 So. 329 (1938).
42. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) § 8466.
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tutionality of both front foot rule and square foot rule for fixing
paving assessments. Needless to say, the attack was unsuccessful.
It does seem, however, that legislative ingenuity could devise
some more equitable method of levying assessments than those
rough and ready mechanical rules. Hagmann v. City of New Orleans.48 Hinkle v. McGuire4 4 represents an unsuccessful suit to
subject certain property to a lien for street paving.
Licenses. Echoes of the current agitation for abolition of intergovernmental immunity from taxation" were heard in two
cases. In State v. Whitney National Bank 4 the defendant national
bank operated buildings having fourteen, seven, four and two
stories respectively. It used for banking purposes four stories of
the 14-story building and one story of each of the others. The
court dismissed without scruple the fantastic claim that all four
buildings should be entirely exempt from license tax even on the
portion not used for banking purposes since the bank was authorized by federal law to provide for future expansion. In State v.
Oberle4 7 a customhouse broker, licensed by the Federal Treasury
Department, was held not to be an agent or instrumentality of
the federal government so as to be exempt from a state occupa48
tional tax.
The perennial Chain Store License Tax fight entered what
appears to be its last round in State v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. 8 Here the taxpayer assailed as unconstitutional the attempt of the state to collect interest and attorneys' fees under the
Chain Store License Tax, particularly because prior to the due
date of the tax the taxpayer had challenged its constitutionality
in the federal courts. It was held that the tax was constitutionally
levied, and that it was collectible for the period of the pendency
of the suit in the federal courts. The abundant reference in the
opinion to federal jurisprudence fully sustains these rulings. On
October 24, 1938, the Supreme Court of the United States denied
certiorari5 0
A series of miscellaneous tax cases are the following: State v.
DeSoto Securities Co., Inc.51 held that a corporation liquidating
43. 190 La. 796, 182 So. 753 (1938).
44. 190 La. 397, 182 So. 551 (1938).
45. See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 58 S.Ct. 969, 82 L.Ed. 1427
(1938), noted in (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 224.
46. 189 La. 221, 179 So. 84 (1938).
47. 190 La. 1053, 183 So. 347 (1938).
48. La. Act 15 of 1934 (3 E.S.) § 17 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) § 8604).
49. 190 La. 925, 183 So. 219 (1938).
50. 305 U.S. (Preliminary Print) xxii, 59 S.Ct. 108 (1938).
51. 189 La. 285, 179 So. 316 (1938).
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its business is not subject to a license tax levied on those "engaged in business"-a conclusion which should startle no one;
State v. Burton Swartz Cypress Co.6 2 ruled that a domestic corporation, almost all of whose funds are invested in a foreign corporation, must pay a license tax 55 based on its entire capital stock,
surplus and undivided profits since the statutory exemptions apply only to corporations which (1) do business, in whole or in part,
outside of the state, or (2) are parent corporations whose subsidiaries have paid the tax; State v. Levy, 54 held that the proprietor
of the shoe repair department in a department store was not to
be exempt from the same occupational license tax as a person
engaged in mechanical pursuit, despite the fact that at times he
repairs shoes; and State v. Succession of Brewer," held that the
proceeds of a life insurance policy payable to the estate are not
exempt from inheritance tax.
C. PUBLIC UTILTIES
An important and novel point in public utilities law was
raised by four cases, later consolidated under the title of Bradford v. Louisiana Public Service Commission. The Commission
had granted to the Herrin Motor Lines, Inc. a certificate to operate
as a motor carrier between Baton Rouge and New Orleans. Plaintiff, representing competitive interests, claimed that the certificate
of convenience and necessity should not have been granted to the
Herrin Lines until the existing franchise holders were given an
opportunity to provide the additional service which the granting
of the new certificate presumed to exist. The court refused to
read section 4 of Act 292 of 192611 as requiring that this be done.
Without reliance on other authority, the court held that the construction of the statute advanced by the plaintiff was self-contradictory. In addition, it might be said that the statutory inference
claimed by the plaintiff would lead to a virtual monopoly in existing franchise holders when the market for transport service is
growing, as is evidently the case at present between Baton Rouge
and New Orleans. Competitors would thus be admitted only at
52. 190 La. 947, 183 So. 226 (1938).
53. Under La. Act 8 of 1932, § 1 (4) [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 8722].
54. 190 La. 511, 182 So. 659 (1938).
55. 190 La. 810, 182 So. 820 (1938).
56. 189 La. 327, 179 So. 442 (1938). The other three cases are Bradford v.
Louisiana Public Service Commission, 189 La. 339, 179 So. 446 (1938); Yazoo
& Mississippi Valley R. R. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 189 La.

340, 179 So. 447 (1938); Id., 189 La. 341, 179 So. 447 (1938).
57. Dart's Stats. (1932) § 5813.
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the will of the existing franchise holders who would have the
right to forestall competition by agreeing to furnish additional
service at the Commission's instance.
VII.

A.

COMMERCIAL LAW

BANKING AND NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

In the case of In re Interstate Trust & Banking Co.,' with
more than seventy lawyers entering appearances, the Supreme
Court had before it for consideration some 69 claims for preferences in the distribution of funds of a defunct New Orleans bank.
The appealed claims represented the sizeable remnant of an original total of 98 oppositions to the distribution proposed by the
State Bank Commissioner. The court, in one sweep, disposed of
64 of the oppositions by construing the statute regulating the filing of claims by persons other than depositors to mean that any
such claim not filed within the time fixed by the State Bank Commissioner should be barred by limitation. 2 This statute merely
provided for publication of notice to creditors to file claims within
a time to be fixed by the Bank Commissioner and contained no
express provision as to barring the claim.3 It was held to be "the
intention of the Legislature ... that all claimants other than depositors should be required to file and prove their claims within
a fixed period of time"' and consequently the failure to comply
with the requirement barred such claimants from asserting their
claims although the statute lacked a positive provision to this
effect. From this ruling the Chief Justice dissented, concurring
with the trial judge that the court should not pronounce a forfeiture which the Legislature has not expressly created.
With the bulk of the claims for preferences thus disposed of,
the remaining five oppositions were denied for assigned reasons.
A New Orleans coffee importer caused the Interstate Trust &
Banking Company to issue an irrevocable letter of credit in favor
of a Brazilian coffee exporter who was authorized to draw drafts
covering the purchase price of coffee. It was agreed that the New
Orleans importer was to provide the Bank with funds to meet any
draft drawn against the letter of credit at least one day prior to
1. 188 La. 211, 176 So. 1 (1937).
2. Of the 64 claims disposed of in this manner only 6 had been allowed as
preferred claims by the trial court after exhaustive consideration of each
separate opposition.
3. La. Act 300 of 1910, § 4 [Dart's Stats. (1932)

4. 188 La. 211, 227, 176 So. 1, 6 (1937).

§ 700].
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the maturity of the draft. After sale of the coffee, by check drawn
on the Interstate Bank, the importer prepaid by more than two
months the amount of the outstanding draft issued against the
letter of credit. It was held that neither the importer nor the ex5
porter was entitled to a preference in the distribution. The court
refused to grant an equitable lien on the basis of trust relationship and further held that Act 63 of 19266 does not accord a lien
or privilege in this situation.' Similarly, the holder of a draft
drawn against a letter of credit under the circumstances outlined
above was denied a preference and was classed only as an ordinary creditor of the Bank.8
In the Opposition of Hattiesburg Grocery Company,9 the court
10
again repudiated the Jones County case and, affirming the Pan
American Life Insurance Co. case," held that the opponent Grocery Company, which had issued bonds payable at the Interstate
Bank, was not entitled to a preference under Act 63 of 1926 for
sinking funds on deposit with the Bank as "paying agent." The
vigor with which the Chief Justice expressed his dissent from the
overruling of the Jones County case suggests that this problem
will probably receive further attention from the court.
A depositor had received credit in its account on March 1,
1933 for two checks drawn on other New Orleans banks. A privilege was asserted on the ground that the checks were not collected
until March 3, 1933 on which date the bank had resumed the 100
per cent status as to'deposits made on that date and, in the alternative, opponent asserted a privilege under Act 63 of 1926.12 Although the checks passed through the New Orleans Clearing
House under rules and deposit slip stipulations which would have
5. In re Interstate Trust & Banking Co. (Opposition of Hickerson and
Ornstein) 188 La. 211, 234, 176 So. 1, 8 (1937).
6. Dart's Stats. (1932) §§ 648-651.
7. Equitable liens are held not to exist in Louisiana because liens and
privileges are stricti juris and are provided by statute only. See Daugherty v.
Canal Bank & Trust Co., 180 La. 1003, 158 So. 366 (1935); Young v. Teutonia
Bank & Trust Co., 134 La. 879, 64 So. 806 (1914).

8. In re Interstate Trust & Banking Co. (Opposition of N. V. Nederlandshe Koloniale Handelvereening) 188 La. 211, 239, 176 So. 1, 10 (1937).
9. 188 La. at 243, 176 So. at 11.

10. In re Liquidation of Hibernia Bank & Trust Company (Jones County,
Intervener) 181 La. 335, 159 So. 576 (1935). For an exhaustive discussion of the
soundness of this case see O'Niell, C.J., dissenting in In re Interstate Trust &
Banking Co., 188 La. 211, 255, 176 So. 1, 16 (1937).
11. In re Hibernia Bank & Trust Company (Pan American Life Insurance
Company, Intervener) 185 La. 448, 169 So. 464 (1936) (overruled the Jones

County case).
12. In re Interstate Trust & Banking Co. (Opposition of State Agricultural Credit Corporation, Inc.) 188 La. 211, 245, 176 So. 1, 12 (1937).
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permitted appropriate adjustments on March 2, 1933 if the item
had not been finally paid, the court held: "The deposit was absolute and not conditional and the deposit became effective as of
March 1, 1933." 13 Opponent, therefore, assumed the status of a
general creditor by virtue of a deposit completed on March 1,
1933 and there was no agency for collection within the provisions
of Act 63 of 1926.14
Another case arising out of the liquidation of the Interstate
Trust & Banking Company was that of Compania ExportadoraDe
Cafe, S. A. v. Banco Nacional De Mexico. 5 Two drafts drawn by
the plaintiff payable to its own order were discounted on February 1, 1933 with the Interstate Bank prior to the banking holiday.
The Interstate Bank was directed by the plaintiff to remit the proceeds of the drafts to the defendant bank with which plaintiff
maintained an account as depositor. Unknown to the plaintiff,
there existed an agreement between the defendant depositary
bank and the Interstate Bank whereby the latter was authorized
to credit defendant's account in such transactions instead of making a direct remittance. Pursuant to this agreement, as had been
done in other instances, the Interstate Bank notified the plaintiff
that remittance had been made to defendant bank although in effect it had merely credited the account of the defendant depositary bank without actually making remittance. After the banking
holiday the Interstate Bank operated on a restricted basis and
was later placed in liquidation and the defendant therefore refused to honor the credit asserted by the plaintiff on the ground
that the proceeds had not been received by the defendant and
that immediate notice of credit had not been sent. In the plaintiff's action, as depositor, to recover the amount of these two
items, it was held that the transaction between the plaintiff and
defendant was such as to create the relationship of creditor and
debtor respectively, and that the action of the intermediary Interstate Bank, in crediting defendant's account pursuant to the agreement with the defendant consummated the deposit.
13. 188 La. at 251, 176 So. at 14.
14. See In re Liquidation of Canal Bank & Trust Company (Intervention
of Clark & Company) 181 La. 856, 160 So. 609 (1935) and In re Liquidation of
Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. (Intervention of Progressive Investment Company, Inc.) 182 La. 856, 162 So. 644 (1935), also holding that where a chdck is
indorsed without restriction and deposited with a stipulation in the deposit
slip that the bank is acting as agent and reserves the right to charge the
check back if unpaid, the giving of an immediate though conditional credit,
creates the relation of debtor and creditor and the depositor is not a privileged creditor of the bank for the amount of the check so deposited.
15. 188 La. 875, 178 So. 381 (1938).
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Although, as a general proposition, it is clear that a bank is
not liable for the amount of a credit given for a deposit when in
fact no deposit is actually made with the depositary bank, 16 yet
the decision reached in the Compania case seems entirely sound
in the light of the facts found by the court. Under the circumstances of this case, the entries that were made appeared sufficient to create simultaneously the relation of depositor and bank
between plaintiff and defendant and a similar relationship between the defendant and the Interstate Bank so that the loss occasioned by the latter's closing should be borne by the defendant
bank and not by the plaintiff.
In Williams v. DeSoto Bank & Trust Co.'7 it was decided that
the liquidation and dissolution of a bank under the applicable
banking regulatory statute, 8 terminated its legal existence and
released such bank by operation of law from further liability as
guarantor to the plaintiffs. Under these circumstances plaintiff
need not make any express reservation of his rights as against
such bank in order to hold other co-debtors in solido liable.
The intervention of D. H. Holmes Co., Ltd., In re Liquidation
of the HiberniaBank & Trust Co.,19 raises for consideration the
extent of the application of the issues of the Wainer case 20 and
poses the problem of the status of facultative compensation in the
civil law of Louisiana. 21 The D. H. Holmes Company contended
that its note for $100,000.00 dated March 13, 1933 payable on June
12, 1933, should be declared extinguished by compensation by vir22
tue of a deposit to its credit on the books of the Hibernia Bank.
Since the note in question matured after May 20, 1933 (the date
on which the State Bank Commissioner took over the assets of the
Hibernia Bank for liquidation) the doctrine of facultative compensation, approved in the Wainer case, was invoked by reason
of a letter written by the Holmes Company on April 3, 1933, requesting that the note be offset against its frozen account. It was
contended that the letter of April 3rd operated as a waiver of a
term in favor of the debtor under Article 2053 of the Civil Code;
that by bringing about the maturity of the obligation the obsta16. See American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Marine Bank & Trust Co., 167 La. 153,
118 So. 871 (1928).
17. 189 La. 245, 179 So. 303 (1938).
18. La. Act 300 of 1910 [Dart's Stats. (1932) §§ 697-706].
19. In re Liquidation of Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. (In re Intervention
of D. H. Holmes Co., Ltd.) 189 La. 813, 180 So. 646 (1938).
20. In re Canal Bank & Trust Co. (Intervention of Wainer) 178 La. 961,
152 So. 578 (1934).
21. See Comment (1934) 8 Tulane L. Rev. 423.
22. Arts. 2207, 2208, 2209, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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cle to compensation was removed and the obligations were "equally liquidated and demandable" within the meaning of Article 2208
of the Civil Code. The court rejected these contentions, taking
the view that intervenor's rights became fixed from the time that
the bank went into liquidation. Facultative compensation was not
allowed, because it was held that the term stipulated in negotiable
instruments is in favor of both debtor and creditor.
It is interesting to note that this decision made no attempt to
distinguish the Wainer case and did not refer to the absence of a
finding of "insolvency" which was stressed in the Wainer case and
was equally absent in the Holmes Intervention. The case is illustrative of the tendency of the court to eliminate preferential
treatment in the settlement of the affairs of banks in liquidation.
This obvious trend suggests that the doctrine of the Wainer case
may possibly receive still further limitations in its application
and a bold prophet might even predict the ultimate triumph of
the full implications of People's2Bank in Liquidationv. Mississippi
& Lafourche Drainage District.
In Brock v. Citizens State Bank & Trust Co.24 the Supreme
Court reversed two decisions of the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, 25 and refused to grant a privilege on the assets of a defunct

bank to secure the payment of moneys deposited by the bank as
the financial tutor of two minors. Act 63 of 1926 was construed
as not applying to any situation other than an agency for collection. 28 The additional factors present in this case, showing that
the bank had failed to invest the minor's funds properly, and that
the bank as financial tutor had originally received the money in
the form of checks, did not bring the case within the application
of the statute. The claims of the minors were consequently listed
as ordinary claims. The court considered that the instant case
was covered by the earlier re-examinations of the statute in the
Pan American Life Insurance Co. case 27 and in In re Liquidation
23. 141 La. 1009, 76 So. 179 (1917). The court has consistently refused to
overrule the People's Bank case. In the Wainer case O'Niell, C. J., concurred
in the result but stated that the People/s Bank case should be overruled. See
also Brock v. Pan American Petroleum Corporation, 186 La. 607, 173 So. 121
(1937).
24. 190 La. 572, 182 So. 679 (1938).
25. 172 So. 546 (La. App. 1937); 180 So. 650 (La. App. 1938).
26. For a criticism of the policy involved in La. Act 63 of 1926, see Townsend, The Bank Collection Code of the American Bankers' Association (1934)
8 Tulane L. Rev. 376, 378.
27. In re Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. (Pan American Life Insurance Co.,
Intervener), 185 La. 448, 169 So. 464 (1936), overruling In re Liquidation of
Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. (Jones County, Intervener), 181 La. 335, 159 So.
576 (1935).
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of the Interstate Trust & Savings Bank.2 8 The case further illustrates the general policy of protecting the general depositors
through eliminating claims of "equitable liens" on the assets of
insolvent banks.
Only one case of importance involving interpretation of the
Negotiable Instruments Law was considered by the court. In
Bank of St. John v. HiberniaBank & Trust Co. 29 the plaintiff executed two demand notes for $10,000 each dated August 31, 1932
and September 29, 1932 respectively. Both notes were pledged to
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation as collateral security for
loans made to the Hibernia Bank. The first note was pledged 93
days after its execution and the second 25 days after its execution.
It was held that this constituted negotiation of demand paper
within a "reasonable time" under the "facts and circumstances
of the case," so that the transferee was to be considered as a holder
in due course of the notes at the time the Hibernia Bank went
into liquidation. The instant decision is an unquestionably sound
interpretation of the applicable statutory provisions. 0°

B.

BANKRUPTCY

Only two controversies arising out of bankruptcy proceedings
came before the court during the last term. In Plauchev. Streater
31
a trustee in bankruptcy brought a pleInvestment Corporation
nary suit, based on provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, 8 2 against a
"family corporation" owned by the bankrupt. The trustee was
seeking to obtain possession of realty transferred to the corporation by the bankrupt in return for stock. To this suit a plea of res
judicata was sustained because of a prior Supreme Court decision
in the action of a judgment creditor against the bankrupt debtor
and the same corporate defendant." In the earlier case, mortgages executed by the bankrupt before the sale to the corporation
and mortgages executed by the corporation after the sale, all in
favor of innocent parties, were recognized as valid incumbrances
against the property. Accordingly, the court had declined to place
28. 188 La. 211, 176 So. 1 (1937).
29. 189 La. 2, 179 So. 15 (1938).
S0. La. Act 64 of 1904 (Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law) §§ 53, 193,
59 [Dart's Stats. (1932) §§ 842, 983, 848].
31. 189 La. 785, 180 So. 637 (1938).
32. The Bankruptcy Act, § 70(a5), 30 Stat. 565 (1898) as amended by 44
Stat. 667 (1926), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a5) (Supp. 1937). [The entire Bankruptcy
Act was amended by the Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 11103 (Supp. 1938).]

33. Alliance Trust Company, Ltd. v. Streater and Streater Investment Corporation, 182 La. 102, 161 So. 168 (1935).
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the property in the bankrupt's name, but did authorize its seizure
and sale for satisfaction of rights of judgment creditors, subject
however, to the innocent mortgage creditors' rights. The instant
case, interpreting the earlier decision, held that the prior rejection of the revocatory action was res judicata to the trustee's suit.
Bass v. Bishop 4 was a suit brought by a trustee in bankruptcy to
set aside a mortgage executed by the bankrupt. It was alleged
that a mortgage executed by the bankrupt while insolvent, a few
days prior to the bankruptcy petition, was fraudulent and constituted an attempt to grant an unfair preference to one of his creditors over others, that the consideration was grossly inadequate,
and that the mortgagee knew that the bankrupt was insolvent.
The court held that the petition stated a cause of action. 5
C.

CORPORATIONS

With the present policy of encouraging various industries to
locate in Louisiana, and the increase in the number of corporate
charters, it has naturally followed that corporate transactions
involving potential litigation have increased in number and importance. The fact that only seven cases presenting questions of corporation law have been decided by the Supreme Court during the
1937-38 term, stands as a mute testimonial to the clarity and careful draftsmanship of the Louisiana Business Corporations Law of
1928 and other related statutes.
In the case of Allardyce v. Abrahams16 a corporation had executed a note secured by a mortgage note payable to the corporation. When the creditor demanded payment the president and
general manager paid the balance due out of his personal funds
and received the corporate note and collateral note. The trial
court's finding of fact, sustained by the evidence, was that the officer intended a purchase of the corporate obligation rather than a
gratuitous payment of the debt, and that he acted in entire good
faith and in the interest of the corporation. After suggesting that
"It was optional with the corporation if its officers felt that it was
injured or damaged, to request that the transaction be set aside
as being voidable,"37 the court very properly held that the corpora34. 190 La. 392, 182 So. 549 (1938).
35. Arts. 3359, 3360, La. Civil Code of 1870; Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 1808
[Dart's Stats. (1932) § 2118]; The Bankruptcy Act, HI 60(b) [30 Stat. 562
(1898), as amended by 44 Stat. 666 (1926)], 67(e) [30 Stat. 564 (1898), as amended by 48 Stat. 924 (1934)], 11 U.S.C.A. H§ 96(b), 107(e) (Supp. 1937).
36. 190 La. 686, 182 So. 717 (1938).
37. 190 La. at 693, 182 So. at 719.
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tion could not keep the benefit of the transaction and reject the
burdens. Thus it could not have the transaction set aside without
tendering or offering to reimburse the officer for the money paid
out of his personal funds to the corporate creditor.
The facts in the instant case show that the corporation was
protected rather than damaged by the purchase of its note. The
purchasing officer stood to gain nothing, except to protect his
subordinate interest as an officer, and probably a substantial
shareholder, by helping the corporation out of financial difficulty
with an insistent creditor. Thus there was certainly no breach of
the officer's fiduciary relation to the corloration and the transaction was entirely valid, 88 rather than voidable as suggested by
way of dictum by the court.8 9
°
Section 39 of the 1928 Business Corporations Law" imposes
the mandatory duty on certain officials to make an annual report
to the Secretary of State containing information therein required;
and also upon the request of any shareholder of record, to send
him a properly verified copy of such report. If such report is not
furnished within fifteen days after request, the shareholder may
recover $50.00 from the officers for every day of delay. In Tichenor
v. Tichenor 41 a shareholder sued the president of a corporation
to recover $4,500.00 in penalties under Section 39. The president
had sent a report containing all necessary information but through
oversight had failed to sign or verify the report as required by
the statute. The shareholder had obviously refrained from pointing out the defect in order to recover the penalties. In affirming
the lower court's judgment for the president, the court declared
that Section 39 was enacted "primarily to protect the investing
public" and not "to penalize an officer who, acting in good faith,
mailed an honest and accurate report, but through oversight failed
to sign or verify the same."4 2 The decision was a logical application of the doctrine that "statutes imposing penalties must be
strictly construed and every doubt must be resolved against the
imposition of the penalty." 48
In State ex rel Equitable Securities Corporationof Nashville
38. Stevens v. Laub, 38 Wyo. 182, 265 Pac. 453 (1928) (directors allowed
to sue on corporate note they had acquired by paying the creditor); Scott v.
Norton Hardware Co., 54 F. (2d) 1047 (C.C.A. 4th, 1932) (directors subrogated
to rights of creditors paid).
39. 190 La. 686, 693, 182 So. 717, 719 (1938).
40. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 39 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1119].
41. 190 La. 77, 181 So. 863 (1938).
42. 190 La. at 83, 181 So. at 865.
43. 190 La. at 83, 181 So. at 864-865.
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v. Conway, Secretary of State,44 a mandamus was issued to compel the Secretary of State to issue a certificate to do business in
Louisiana to a Tennessee corporation, the "Equitable Securities
Corporation." It was held that by adding the term "of Nashville"
to its name, the petitioning corporation had met the requirements
of the Louisiana statute4 5 and had sufficiently distinguished itself
from the "Equitable Securities Company, Inc.," a domestic corporation already doing business in the state. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that the duty of issuing the certificate is discretionary rather than ministerial, and that where the designated
officer has concluded that the name in question is not sufficiently
distinguished the court should not interfere except on a showing
of arbitrary abuse of discretion.46 In the instant case the court
may have felt that the withholding of the certificate was arbitrary in view of the fact, stressed in the decision, that the two corporations were not competitors and that no injury to the domestic
corporation could be presumed.4 7 Again, it appears from the language of the court that the Louisiana statute is being interpreted
as imposing a purely ministerial duty, with the result that the
court may substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary of
State on the question of whether the names are sufficiently distinguished.
Suit was brought in R. J. Brown Company v. Grosjean6 by
a foreign corporation which maintained no local office but had,
over the period of a year, purchased 442,501 gallons of petroleum
products in the state and sold the same to 48 different Louisiana
purchasers. The plaintiff corporation was held to have transacted "a substantial part of its ordinary business" within the
state, 49 and was therefore precluded from bringing suit by Act 8
44. 189 La. 272, 179 So. 312 (1938).
45. La. Act 120 of 1920, § 1 (amending and re-enacting La. Act 267 of 1914,
§ 23) [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1246]. The statute expressly forbids the Issuance
of a certificate to do business to a foreign corporation with a name deceptively similar to that of a corporation already authorized, unless such foreign
corporation shall add some term to properly distinguish its name.
46. Horowitz v. Beamish, 323 Pa. 273, 185 Atl. 760 (1936) (mandamus refused where the Secretary of State had refused to issue a certificate to the
"Keystone State Moving Picture Operators' Ass'n" on the ground that the
name was deceptively similar to "Keystone Theatrical Stage Employees and
Motion Picture Machine Operators Union, Inc."); Brooks Clothing of California, Ltd. v. Flynn, 232 App. Div. 346, 250 N. Y. Supp. 69 (1931).
47. The necessity of probable Injury was stressed in Central Mutual Auto
Ins. Co. v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., 275 Mich. 554, 267 N.W. 733 (1936).
48. 189 La. 778, 180 So. 634 (1938).
49. Cf. Norm Advertising, Inc. v. Parker, 172 So. 586 (La. App. 1937)
where a foreign corporation merely had traveling agents who solicited orders
which were forwarded to the New York office for acceptance and the neces-
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of the Third Extra Session of 1935.50 This statute denies a foreign
corporation "doing business in this state" the right to sue in any
Louisiana court unless it has duly qualified to do business in the
state, and has paid all taxes, excises and licenses due the state.
In Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Jones51 it was held
that a domestic corporation could bring suit on a note without
alleging payment of its franchise tax. The court declared that the
act levying an annual franchise tax on all corporations did not
state or intimate "that the payment of the tax is a condition preengage in
cedent to the corporation's engaging or continuing '5to
2
simple.
and
pure
act
revenue
"a
was
but
business,"
General Motors Truck Co. v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse
Co., Inc.5 8 deals with the compensation of a corporate receiver.
Where $1,000.00 had already been allowed, the claim for an additional fee of $1,500.00, out of a fund of $14,523.65 which he proposed to distribute, was rejected because of his mismanagement
and neglect of the receivership affairs.
Act 159 of 1898, Section 1051 provides that when, "on the application of any party at interest," it is made to appear that the
property cannot be so administered as to pay the debts and
restore possession to the corporation, the receivership may be
ordered dissolved, the corporate property sold and the assets distributed. The court held in In re Geo. D. Geddes Undertaking &
Embalming Co., Ltd." that a stockholder-creditor had a sufficient
"interest" to appeal from a judgment dismissing a rule to sell and
distribute the corporate assets, even though the funds realized
would probably be completely absorbed by claims prior in rank
and no pecuniary gain would accrue to him.
An interesting question, relating to the administration of a
corporation's affairs by trustees for the benefit of creditors, was
56
presented in Vincent v. FarmersBank & Trust Co. The Iota Rice
Milling Company was heavily indebted. When its mill was destroyed by fire, it entered into an agreement with its creditors,
whereby trustees were appointed to administer the affairs of the
company and pay its debts. The agreement expressly provided
sary materials were mailed to the Louisiana contracting party, was held not
to be "doing business" in the state.
50. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1937) § 1247.1.
51. 188 La. 519, 177 So. 593 (1937).
52. 188 La. at 526, 177 So. at 595.
53. 189 La. 529, 17 So. 843 (1938).
54. Dart's Stats. (1932) § 1218.
55. 188 La. 366, 177 So. 240 (1937).
56. 189 La. 1073, 181 So. 540 (1938).
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that the trustees, in paying out moneys collected, should only pay
secured creditors in proportion to the part of their debts which
was unsecured; and that no distribution should be made until
such unsecured amounts were definitely ascertained. The trustees
collected $100,000 insurance money for loss of the building and
machinery. Banking conditions were uncertain, so rather than
run the risk that the money would be frozen in the bank, they
immediately distributed dividends of 50 per cent and 15 per cent
to all creditors, including a payment to the defendant of $6,500.00.
The defendant, whose claim of $10,000.00 was secured by a pledge
of warehouse receipts on certain rice in the mill, subsequently received a payment of over $4,000.00 in an interpleader proceeding
instituted by the companies which had insured the rice. The
trustees then brought this action to recover their overpayment to
defendant. (His dividend had been based upon the entire $10,000.00 debt, rather than upon the unsecured portion thereof.)
Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed on the theory that the
dividends were declared by the trustees as "mere tentative payments," and that such procedure was justified by the unsettled
banking conditions. The court emphasized the fact that the defendant was a party to the agreement, and also relied on the general provisions of the Civil Code which obligate a party to return
money received through mistake.17
D.

FIRE

INSURANCE.

INSURANCE

The Anti-Technicality Statute58 provides

that no policy of fire insurance shall be avoided for breach of any
representation, warranty or condition unless such breach increase either the moral or physical hazard. In Brough v. Presidential Fire & Marine Ins. Co.59 the insurance in controversy covered a building which the insured had built on ground being
purchased under a bond for deed. The insurer contended that the
policy had been avoided by breach of the condition requiring the
building to be on land owned by the insured in fee simple. The
court held that the insurer had failed to prove any increased hazard by the breach of the condition, and properly rendered judgment for the insured.
LIFE INSURANCE. Two cases involved the proceeds of life insurance policies payable to the estate of the insured. In State v.
57. Arts. 2301, 2302, La. Civil Code of 1870.
58. La. Act 222 of 1928, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 4191].
59. 189 La. 880, 181 So. 432 (1938), noted in (1938) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 148.
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Succession of Brewer ° the court again held that such proceeds
were subject to the inheritance tax. Michiels v. Succession of
Gladdensl was a case involving the statute 2 which exempted life
insurance proceeds from the payment of debts. The court here
recognized that an insured's right to dispose by will of the proceeds of life insurance payable to his estate carried with it the
right to direct his executors to apply such proceeds to the payment of his debts.
In Giuffria v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.63 the insured sought
to change the beneficiary of a policy while on his death bed. The
proper form was executed, delivered to the insurer and actually
received at its home office one day prior to the insured's death.
The policy provision relating to change of beneficiary required
the surrender of the original policy. This was not complied with
until a day before the insured's death purely because of the original beneficiary's failure to deliver it timely to the insured. 4 In
a suit by the substituted beneficiary against the insurer, the latter
deposited the proceeds of the policy in court and impleaded both
beneficiaries. The court held the attempted change of beneficiary
ineffective and decreed the proceeds to belong to the original beneficiary. Every other American jurisdiction which has had occasion to consider these questions has always held contrary to this
case.65
A statute6 provides that the policy and documents attached
thereto constitute the entire contract of insurance; and that no
statement shall be used by the insurer as a defense unless it be
in writing and indorsed upon or attached to the policy when is60. 190 La. 810, 182 So. 820 (1938).
61. 190 La. 917, 183 So. 217 (1938), noted in (1938) 1
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239.
62. La. Act 189 of 1914, § 1, as amended by La. Acts 95 of 1934, § 1, and
155 of 1934, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) § 4105).
63. 188 La. 837, 178 So. 368 (1937).
64. The policy was held by the local office of the insurer as security for
a policy loan. Realizing that the insured might desire to change beneficiaries,
the original beneficiary paid this loan to secure possession of the policy.
When the insured requested the policy, she unduly delayed compliance, so
that the policy was delivered to the insured only two days before his death.
The day before his death it was surrendered to the local agent of the company, but because of his death was never forwarded to the home office.
65. See the host of cases cited in Vance on Insurance (2 ed. 1930) 573-574;
2 Couch on Insurance (1929) 912-915, § 324; 7 Cooley's Briefs on Insurance (2
ed. 1928) 6448 et seq. In a few of the states where the distinction between
law and equity still exists, the attempted change of beneficiary might be
deemed ineffective in an action at law . But in all jurisdictions except Louisiana, where the question was presented in an equity interpleader proceeding,
the substituted beneficiary would be allowed to recover.
66. La. Act 52 of 1906 as amended by La. Act 227 of 1916, § 2 [Dart's Stats.
(1932) § 4113].
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sued. In Laurent v. Unity Industrial Life Ins. Co.6 7 the insured

was an agent who had become indebted to the defendant insurer
for premiums collected and not remitted. In part payment of this
debt, it was alleged that the insured orally agreed to cancel the
policy and apply the accumulated reserve to this indebtedness.
It was admitted that this accumulated reserve (but for its application by the insured to his indebtedness) would have been sufficient to carry the policy until the insured's death. Evidence in
support of this defense of cancellation was excluded by the court
under authority of the act referred to above. The dissenting
opinion of Mr. Chief Justice O'Niell pointed out the inapplicability of the statute to the facts of the case. 8 The effects of this
unfortunate decision will be far-reaching.6 9
Brunson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York ° presented the
question of the right of a beneficiary to recover double indemnity
under a policy affording such coverage for death resulting from
bodily injury effected solely through external, violent and accidental means. The trial court had held that an allegation that the
insured came to his death "through unexpected and accidental
complications from the extractions" of several teeth did not state
a cause of action for double indemnity benefits. The Supreme
Court, finding this allegation sufficient, reversed the judgment appealed from and remanded the case for trial. In Madison v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America7 ' the insurer appealed from a judgment condemning it to pay an attorney permanent and total disability benefits, and further imposing penalties upon it for its refusal to comply amicably with its policy obligations. Two contentions were advanced by the defendant to defeat recovery: (1)
the disability was not permanent since it appeared that the in67. 189 La. 426, 179 So. 586 (1938), noted in (1938) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 150.
68. The object of this statute was to suppress the practice of making
documents not annexed to the policy, and of which the insured usually knew
absolutely nothing, a part of the contract by reference. It was never intended
to prevent subsequ6nt modification of the contract by mutual agreement of
insured and insurer.
69. For instance, it is certain to question the efficacy of one of the devices
which insurance companies have employed in good faith to aid their distressed policyholders. When an insured is financially unable to meet the
premium payments on a policy, the insurer commonly permits him to reduce
the coverage and use the reserve thereby rendered available to carry the
reduced coverage for some little time. While the agreement to reduce the
coverage is always in writing, and usually annexed to the original policy, it
cannot be "attached to the policy when issued." It is always possible, of
course, for the courts to protect the insurer in such cases through the application of some doctrine of laches or equitable estoppel.
70. 189 La. 743, 180 So. 506 (1938).
71. 190 La. 103, 181 So. 871 (1937).
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sured might recover eventually; and (2) the disability was not
total since the attorney could perform some slight professional
duties. Under well settled principles of insurance law both contentions were rejected. The judgment appealed from was amended, however, by striking all penalties therefrom. The insurer was
held to have defended the action in good faith.
Prior to 1934, if an industrial insurer issued a policy without
requiring a medical examination of the insured, it was barred
from invoking a forfeiture on any ground which might have been
discovered by the due diligence of its agents. 72 A statute of 1934 78

qualified this rule by permitting an industrial insurer to assert a
forfeiture for fradulent answers to questions propounded by a
written application. In Geddes & Moss U. & E. Co. v. First National Life Ins. Co.74 the policy in controversy had been issued

prior to 1934, but the insured died in 1936. The question presented
was whether the 1934 statute applied retrospectively so as to permit the insurer to avoid the policy for the insured's fraud in
falsely stating in the written application that she was in sound
health at the time. On dual grounds, the court found it unnecessary to determine whether the statute was remedial legislation.
It was held that, conceding arguendo the statute to be a remedial
one, it disclosed a legislative intent to be applied only prospectively. Further, the court found that a retrospective application
of the 1934 act would impair the obligation of the insured's contract.
75
presented for interpretation
MISCELLANEOUS. Parks v. Hall
the "omnibus clause" of a casualty insurance policy which covered the operation of an automobile by any person with the "permission of assured." The insured had directed his chauffeur to
take the car to be washed and greased, to thereafter inquire about
some packages at the express office and then return the car to the
insured's residence. The wash rack at the garage being in use,
the chauffeur picked up a friend of his and two women and drove
72. La. Act 97 of 1908, § 1, as amended by La. Act 195 of 1932, § 1 [Dart's
Stats. (1932) § 4118].
73. La. Act 160 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) §§ 4134.1-4134.3]. The
question presented would be foreclosed, in any case involving a policy issued

subsequent to the effective date of the 1938 statutes, by La. Act 144 of 1936, §
1, as amended by La. Act 140 of 1938, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) § 4134.4).
This act, as amended, provides that industrial life insurance policies are in-

contestable after one year, except for nonpayment of premiums.
74. 189 La. 891, 181 So. 436 (1938), affirming Geddes & Moss U. & E. Co. v.

First National Life Ins. Co., 177 So. 818 (La. App. 1938), noted in (1938) 12
Tulane L. Rev. 469.
75. Parks v. flall (two cases), Hall v. Hall, Carbons Consolidated v. Same,
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some distance out of town with them to collect some money due
the friend. On the return trip to the garage the accident in controversy occurred. The evidence showed that the insured, although knowing of the previous personal use of the auto by the
chauffeur, had never objected thereto. The court found that the
chauffeur was using the car with the "permission of assured"
within the intendment of the omnibus clause, and held the casualty insurer liable.
Turner v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.7 8 presented several fac-

tual issues as to whether an employee insured under a group life
policy was totally and permanently disabled. All such issues were
resolved by the court in favor of the insured. One question of
law was presented. The policy required the insured to furnish
"due proof" of his disability to the insurer, but failed to impose
any time limit therefor. In view of the late discovery by the insured of his true condition, the submission of proof thereof two
years after the accident was held sufficient.
189 La. 849, 181 So. 191 (1938). These decisions reversed Parks v. Hall, 179 So.
868 (La. App. 1937); Id., 179 So. 877 (La. App. 1937); Hall v. Hall, 179 So. 877
(La. App. 1937); Carbons Consolidated v. Hall, 179 So. 878 (La. App. 1937). See
Note (1938) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 146.
76. 189 La. 342, 179 So. 448 (1938).

